Abstract

This paper examines the contemporary economic and political status of Tunisia within the North African regional context as of early 2026, drawing upon World Bank economic forecasts, Africa Confidential’s detailed political reporting, United Nations human rights documentation, and diplomatic analysis from regional policy institutes. The research confronts a profound transformation: the sole democracy to emerge from the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings has undergone a comprehensive authoritarian reversal, with President Kaïs Saïed consolidating power, dismantling institutional checks, and rejecting international partnerships even as the economy teeters on the edge of crisis. This paper argues that Tunisia’s trajectory represents the most dramatic political regression in contemporary North Africa—a country that has moved from democratic exemplar to autocratic isolate in less than five years, with its economic prospects dimmed by political choices that have severed it from international financial support and its regional influence diminished by self-imposed diplomatic isolation. The analysis proceeds in three main sections: economic stagnation characterized by moderate growth insufficient to address deep structural imbalances; political consolidation manifested in the entrenchment of presidential authoritarianism, judicial subordination, and civic space repression; and regional positioning defined by fraught relations with Europe, cautious engagement with the United States, and strategic ambiguity toward great power competition. The conclusion assesses Tunisia’s trajectory and the sustainability of its current path.

Keywords: Tunisia, North Africa, authoritarian consolidation, economic stagnation, migration diplomacy, democratic reversal

1. Introduction

Tunisia occupies a uniquely symbolic position in North African and broader Arab political consciousness. As the birthplace of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, Tunisia was long celebrated as the sole success story—the one country where mass mobilization had produced a genuine democratic transition rather than civil war, counter-revolution, or renewed authoritarianism. Its pluralist constitution, vibrant civil society, and competitive elections earned international acclaim and positioned Tunisia as a model for democratic change across the region.

That model has been systematically dismantled. Since July 25, 2021, when President Kaïs Saïed sacked the government and froze parliament, Tunisia has undergone a comprehensive authoritarian reversal that has concentrated power in the presidency, subordinated the judiciary, repressed civil society, and silenced independent media . The 2022 constitution established a highly centralized presidential system that consolidates authority within the executive branch, reducing citizens to marginal participants in a process of symbolic consultation . Civic space has deteriorated sharply, shifting from “obstructed” to “repressed” in international monitoring, with more than 80 individuals—including journalists, politicians, lawyers, and human rights defenders—detained for exercising fundamental freedoms .

This political regression has occurred alongside—and profoundly shaped—economic deterioration. Tunisia’s growth has stagnated, with the World Bank projecting 2.6 per cent for 2025 and 2.4 per cent on average over 2026-2027, driven primarily by agriculture and tourism rather than sustained structural transformation . Negotiations with the International Monetary Fund for a $1.9 billion bailout have been stalled since 2023, with Saïed dismissing reform conditions as “foreign diktats that will lead to more poverty” . In a dramatic escalation of its isolationist posture, the government returned €60 million in European Union funding in February 2026, describing the sum as “derisory” and “without respect,” throwing a broader €785 million migration control deal into doubt .

This paper provides a deeply researched analysis of Tunisia’s economic and political status as of early 2026, drawing upon World Bank economic data, Africa Confidential’s authoritative political reporting, UN human rights documentation, and diplomatic analysis. The timing is significant: February 2026 has witnessed the EU funding rejection, renewed US diplomatic engagement through Senior Advisor Massad Boulos’s second visit to Tunis, continued crackdowns on press freedom documented by journalists’ protests, and persistent migration-related controversies—developments that collectively illuminate the trajectory of contemporary Tunisia.

The analysis proceeds in three main sections. Section two examines Tunisia’s economic status, analyzing modest growth projections, fiscal consolidation efforts, public debt dynamics, and the IMF impasse. Section three analyses the domestic political landscape, including the consolidation of presidential authoritarianism, judicial subordination, repression of civil society and media, and the regime’s social base. Section four addresses Tunisia’s regional position, examining relations with Europe and the migration deal, US diplomatic engagement, the Chinese question, and positioning within Maghreb dynamics. The conclusion synthesizes these findings to assess Tunisia’s overall regional standing and the sustainability of its current trajectory.

2. Economic Status: Modest Growth, Structural Stagnation, and Financial Isolation

2.1 Growth Performance and Sectoral Dynamics

The Tunisian economy is experiencing modest growth, but at levels insufficient to address deep structural challenges or improve living standards for the population. According to the World Bank’s October 2025 MENA Economic Update, Tunisia’s GDP is projected to expand by 2.6 per cent in 2025, up from 1.4 per cent in 2024 . This acceleration follows zero growth in 2023, indicating a gradual recovery from the pandemic and post-revolutionary disruptions.

The primary driver of this growth is agriculture, with stronger production of olive oil and cereals supporting the rebound . Tunisia’s agricultural sector benefits from the country’s Mediterranean climate and established export networks, particularly for high-quality olive oil. However, the sector remains vulnerable to climatic variability and water scarcity—challenges likely to intensify with climate change.

The tourism sector has also contributed to growth, continuing its gradual recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and the security concerns that followed the 2015 terrorist attacks . Tourism’s revival provides employment and foreign currency, but it does not constitute the kind of structural transformation needed for sustained, inclusive growth.

The World Bank forecasts growth to moderate to 2.4 per cent on average over 2026-2027, with tighter financial conditions weighing on the economy . These projections assume continued constraints on external financing and persistent regulatory barriers to investment. The National Institute of Statistics (INS) has noted that the economy continues to operate in a “complex policy and financing environment,” with regulatory barriers holding back sustained growth .

Lodewijk Smets, World Bank Country Economist for Tunisia, emphasized during a November 2025 roundtable that growth will remain moderate in the short to medium term due to a constrained financing context and barriers to market entry . Trade uncertainty, limited external financing, and gradual reduction of energy dependence could weigh on macroeconomic stability .

2.2 Fiscal Consolidation and Budget Dynamics

Despite political turbulence, Tunisia has made progress in fiscal consolidation. The budget deficit has declined from 9 per cent of GDP in 2020 to an estimated 5.7 per cent in 2025, and is projected to fall further to 4.4 per cent in 2027 . This improvement reflects efforts to control the wage bill and subsidies, combined with moderate growth in tax revenues.

During the first eight months of 2025, tax revenues continued to increase year-on-year, while the growth of the public sector wage bill—though still high by international standards—was contained . These measures demonstrate that the government retains some capacity for economic management, even in the absence of an IMF programme.

However, the fiscal consolidation achieved to date has come through administrative measures rather than structural reform. The government has refused to implement the kind of comprehensive reforms demanded by the IMF, including cuts to energy and food subsidies, privatization of state enterprises, and measures to improve the business environment . President Saïed has explicitly rejected any cuts to subsidies, arguing that they would worsen conditions for ordinary Tunisians .

The World Bank notes that prospects could improve if Tunisia engaged in structural reforms aimed at strengthening fiscal discipline, modernizing public enterprises, and stimulating competition . To date, however, the government has shown no willingness to pursue such reforms, and its rejection of IMF terms suggests that comprehensive structural adjustment is politically untenable.

2.3 Public Debt Dynamics

Tunisia’s public debt has risen sharply over the past decade, reflecting successive economic shocks and the absence of sustained reform. According to World Bank data, public debt stood at 68 per cent of GDP in 2019, before the pandemic. By 2025, it had reached 84.5 per cent of GDP .

The debt trajectory is projected to stabilize, with the World Bank forecasting a slight decline to 83.6 per cent of GDP in 2027 . This stabilization reflects increased reliance on domestic financing and government efforts to maintain macroeconomic balances, rather than any fundamental improvement in debt sustainability.

The composition of debt has shifted toward domestic sources as external financing has become constrained. The IMF impasse has effectively closed off access to significant new external financing, forcing the government to rely on domestic banks and the central bank to fund its deficits. This dynamic crowds out private sector credit and increases the financial system’s exposure to sovereign risk.

The World Bank’s characterization of the debt trajectory as “stabilizing” rather than declining reflects the underlying fragility: without access to external financing and without structural reforms that would unlock growth, Tunisia’s debt dynamics remain precarious.

2.4 The IMF Impasse: Rejection of Conditionality

The most consequential economic policy decision of the Saïed presidency has been the rejection of IMF support. Negotiations with the International Monetary Fund for a $1.9 billion bailout, on which tentative agreement was reached with Tunisian officials in late 2022, have been stalled since 2023 .

President Saïed has dismissed the terms offered by the IMF as “foreign diktats that will lead to more poverty,” arguing that cuts to subsidies and privatization of state assets are unacceptable . He has contended that alternative measures—including new wealth taxes and more efficient management of existing resources—will be sufficient to address Tunisia’s financing needs, despite warnings from economic experts that the country could quickly face a balance of payments crisis without international support .

The IMF has maintained an open door. Jihad Azour, Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department at the IMF, stated in late 2023 that an IMF mission would visit Tunisia in the coming months to assess economic developments, though no date was specified . The Fund has urged the Tunisian government to reform its fuel subsidy, which Azour noted mainly benefits the wealthy in its current form .

Pressure has mounted from top officials in the United States and the European Union for Tunisia to conclude the IMF deal as soon as possible . Yet Saïed has remained immovable, calculating perhaps that the political costs of IMF-mandated austerity would outweigh the economic costs of continued isolation.

The World Bank suspended talks on future funding with Tunisia in early 2023 in the wake of Saïed’s racially charged claims about a plot to settle migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Tunisia . This suspension further narrowed the government’s financing options.

2.5 The EU Funding Rejection: February 2026

In a dramatic escalation of its isolationist posture, the Tunisian government returned €60 million to the European Union in February 2026, with President Saïed describing the sum as “derisory” and “without respect” . The money had been formally requested by Finance Minister Samir Saïed on 31 August 2025 and was intended to be part of the first disbursement of a €127 million tranche under the EU-Tunisia memorandum of understanding signed in July 2023 .

This rejection has thrown the broader €785 million “cash for migrant control” deal into doubt . The EU agreement, which had included budget support and investment in two infrastructure projects, had been viewed as an alternative—at least in part—to an IMF loan. With that alternative now spurned, it is increasingly difficult to see where Tunisia will source financial support in the coming months .

The rejection reflects Saïed’s consistent posture toward external engagement: a deep suspicion of conditionality, a preference for sovereignty-enhancing gestures over material benefit, and a calculation that popular sentiment supports standing up to European pressure. Whether this posture can be sustained as foreign reserves dwindle and financing needs mount remains an open question.

2.6 Socio-Economic Pressures

Behind the macroeconomic aggregates lie severe pressures on Tunisian households. Inflation remains elevated, eroding purchasing power. Unemployment, particularly among youth and university graduates, remains high. Public services, including health and education, have deteriorated as budgets have been squeezed.

The World Bank has emphasized the need to strengthen social safety nets to protect the most vulnerable . The government’s rejection of IMF conditionality is partly rooted in concern about the social impact of subsidy cuts, but the absence of reform also means that resources continue to flow to untargeted subsidies that disproportionately benefit better-off Tunisians rather than to programs that could more efficiently support the poor.

The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy’s 2026 outlook notes that Tunisia’s post-revolutionary aspirations for “freedom, peace, and justice” remain unfulfilled, with the “fundamental right to life” systematically threatened . This characterization applies as much to economic and social rights as to civil and political liberties.

3. Political Status: The Consolidation of Authoritarian Rule

3.1 The July 25, 2021, Power Grab and Its Aftermath

The foundational event of contemporary Tunisian politics is President Kaïs Saïed’s July 25, 2021, decision to sack the government and freeze parliament—a move his opponents and international observers characterized as a coup . Saïed justified the action as necessary to combat corruption and dysfunction, and initially, it enjoyed significant popular support among Tunisians frustrated with the political class’s perceived failures.

Subsequent months saw a systematic dismantling of the institutional architecture of Tunisia’s democratic transition. In September 2021, Saïed announced he would rule by decree, appointing a committee to draft amendments to the 2014 constitution and establishing “a true democracy in which the people are truly sovereign” . Parliament remained suspended, as did members’ immunity from prosecution.

The 2022 constitutional referendum formalized this new political order. The constitution that entered into force on August 16, 2022, established a highly centralized presidential system that consolidates authority within the executive branch . Although the constitution formally guarantees various rights and freedoms, these are not effectively upheld in practice .

Executive power has become heavily concentrated, marginalizing citizens from meaningful participation and reducing public consultation to a symbolic process . Political pluralism, which characterized the national landscape until 2021, has been severely undermined .

3.2 The February 2026 Judicial Dissolution

The most recent consolidation of presidential power came in February 2026, when Saïed dissolved the Supreme Judicial Council (CSM), the top independent judicial watchdog . The CSM, established in 2016 as an independent constitutional body to guarantee the proper functioning and independence of the judiciary, was declared “a thing of the past” by Saïed during a meeting with government ministers .

Saïed accused the council of serving political interests, alleging that “positions and appointments are sold and made according to affiliations” and that “you cannot imagine the money that certain judges have been able to receive, billions and billions” . He also accused the CSM of delaying politically sensitive investigations into the 2013 assassinations of left-wing opposition figures Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi.

The dissolution represents the culmination of a sustained campaign against judicial independence. The CSM had already been targeted in January 2026, when Saïed stripped its members of social and financial benefits, including fuel subsidies, transport, and living allowances . Raoudha Karafi, honorary president of the Tunisian association of judges, had criticized Saïed’s earlier moves, stating that “justice is a red line” .

Observers view the judicial dissolution as part of a broader effort to bring all state institutions under presidential control. The Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) has seen its credibility significantly eroded since its members became presidential appointees rather than being selected by Parliament, as was the case from 2011 to 2019 . The audiovisual regulatory authority (HAICA) has seen its activities frozen .

3.3 Repression of Civil Society and Civic Space

Civic space in Tunisia has undergone profound regression since the entrenchment of the current autocratic order. According to the CIVICUS Monitor, Tunisia’s civic space has shifted from “obstructed” to “repressed” . Government-aligned narratives increasingly dominate the public sphere, while the number of prisoners of conscience has risen substantially—particularly among journalists, politicians, lawyers, and human rights defenders.

Human Rights Watch documented that as of January 2025, more than 80 individuals remained detained for exercising fundamental freedoms, including participation in peaceful protests and political activism . Freedoms of expression, opinion, the media, association, and peaceful assembly—gains secured and exercised since the 2011 revolution—are no longer guaranteed .

The repression is systematic rather than incidental. Restrictions on civil society form “part of a deliberate strategy by the executive to silence dissenting voices and suppress calls for the restoration of Tunisia’s democratic transition” . Civil society organizations have been targeted with administrative suspensions, judicial harassment, and threats of custodial sentences . Independent media outlets Inkyfada and Nawaat were among about 20 NGOs handed administrative suspensions over accusations including receiving suspicious funds .

Despite these pressures, Tunisian civil society continues to demonstrate resilience. Throughout 2025, organizations remained active under difficult conditions, persistently exposing violations despite recurrent smear campaigns, administrative suspensions, and judicial harassment .

3.4 Media Freedom and Decree-Law 54

The media environment is now dominated by outlets aligned with the government, operating within a climate of surveillance and intimidation directed at journalists, activists, and commentators . The principal instrument of media control is Decree-Law 54/2022 on Cybercrime, which criminalizes so-called “false news,” imposes severe penalties, and enables extensive surveillance .

Journalists have described the current climate as the worst since the 2011 revolution. Mahdi Jlassi, a journalist and former head of the National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists, stated at a February 2026 protest that “today we’re seeing unprecedented repression of freedom of the press and expression. Innocent journalists are jailed in unjust trials, stripped of their rights and punished for doing their job” .

Decree 54 “hangs like a sword over the neck of journalists,” according to Jlassi . The law has been used to prosecute and detain numerous Saïed critics. Protesters in February 2026 also condemned the denial of press accreditation to some journalists, as well as authorities’ refusal to issue filming permits to foreign correspondents . Police have recently been preventing most journalists from entering courtrooms to cover trials involving political and media figures, a move Jlassi said was aimed at “imposing a media blackout that would allow the authorities to promote their false narratives and suppress all dissenting voices” .

Tunisia’s declining press freedom has been registered internationally. The country dropped 11 places in the 2025 Reporters Without Borders global press freedom index, from 118th to 129th of 180 surveyed countries .

3.5 Political Opposition and Ennahda

The formal political opposition has been systematically marginalized. Ennahda, the Islamist-inspired party that was the largest in parliament before the 2021 suspension, has been a particular target. Saïed’s moves have been widely interpreted as seeking to clamp down on Ennahda, which controlled parliament and various governments from 2011 to 2021 .

Ennahda has hired the US and UK public relations and political consultancy Burston Marsteller to help its fightback, retaining BCW, a subsidiary of the PR giant WPP Group . However, Africa Confidential notes that the current strategy “does not appear to extend much beyond waiting for President Saïed’s popularity to drop,” which “may be indicative of the malaise that has seen Ennahda lose support at successive elections and the public anger at all party politicians” .

Secular opposition parties—including Attayar, Al Jouhmouri, Akef, and Ettakatol—issued a joint statement in September 2021 asserting that “the president has lost his legitimacy by violating the constitution … and he will be responsible for all the possible repercussions of this dangerous step” . Such statements have had little practical effect in the face of Saïed’s consolidation of power.

Several potential presidential candidates have been excluded, prosecuted, or imprisoned, paving the way for elections shaped to favour a single political trajectory . The Tahrir Institute notes that this dynamic has “significantly eroded” the credibility of electoral processes .

3.6 The Regime’s Social Base

Despite the authoritarian consolidation, Saïed retains significant popular support among segments of the Tunisian population. Many Tunisians welcomed his initial moves against a political system widely perceived as corrupt and ineffective . The “July 25 movement”—composed of Saïed supporters—has mobilized in favor of his actions, including calling for the dissolution of the CSM to “purge” the judiciary of “corrupt magistrates” .

This support reflects deeper currents in Tunisian politics: frustration with the post-2011 political class’s failures to deliver economic improvements, suspicion of Islamist political movements, and a desire for strong leadership that can cut through institutional gridlock. Saïed has successfully positioned himself as an outsider standing against a corrupt elite, even as he has concentrated power more comprehensively than any Tunisian leader since independence.

However, this support is not unlimited. The powerful trade union federation, the UGTT, has launched public attacks on Saïed’s political and economic programme . Opposition supporters have gathered in Tunis demanding the release of political prisoners and calling for a “national dialogue” to return Tunisia to democratic governance . Deteriorating economic conditions could erode Saïed’s popular base, potentially creating space for renewed mobilization.

4. Regional Position: Strategic Isolation and Pragmatic Engagement

4.1 Relations with Europe: The Migration Deal and Its Discontents

Tunisia’s most consequential external relationship is with the European Union, centered on migration control. In July 2023, the EU and Tunisia signed a memorandum of understanding that included up to €1 billion in support—comprising €150 million in direct budget support, €105 million for migration control policies, and investments in two infrastructure projects . The deal was viewed as a lifeline for Saïed’s government and an alternative—at least in part—to an IMF loan.

That lifeline is now in jeopardy. The February 2026 rejection of €60 million in funding, with Saïed describing the sum as “derisory” and “without respect,” has thrown the broader agreement into doubt . The move reflects deep tensions in the relationship: Saïed bristles at conditionality and what he perceives as European disrespect, while European officials grow increasingly frustrated with Tunisian intransigence.

The migration dimension remains fraught. Tunisia has clamped down on irregular migration, negotiating repatriation agreements with African countries to increase voluntary returns of irregular migrants . Foreign Minister Mounir Ben Rjiba told parliament that “the number of requests for voluntary repatriation is steadily increasing” and that “expulsions are increasing as are operations to counter attempts at irregular migration” .

However, Tunisia’s treatment of sub-Saharan African migrants has drawn severe international criticism. The United Nations human rights chief has accused Tunisia of race-based “targeting” of African migrants, expressing concern about “the increased targeting in Tunisia of migrants, mostly from south of the Sahara, and individuals and organizations working to assist them” . There have been multiple reports of arbitrary arrests and detention of sub-Saharan Africans who have then been left at the borders with Libya and Algeria .

The African Union accused Tunisia of racial discrimination against sub-Saharan Africans in 2022, following President Saïed’s complaints about a plot to settle migrants from south of the Sahara in Tunisia—comments the AU characterized as “racialised hate speech” . The European Commission has insisted that its arrangements with Tunisia include commitments to protect human rights and that it had sought “clarification” about arrests from Tunisian authorities .

The combination of funding rejection, human rights concerns, and divergent interests on migration management has left the EU-Tunisia relationship in a state of deep uncertainty.

4.2 Relations with the United States: Strategic Attention Amid Tension

The United States has demonstrated growing interest in Tunisia, reflected in the two visits of Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos within six months . Boulos’s February 2026 visit, which included talks with Foreign Minister Mohamed Ali Al-Nafti, addressed common interests and reviewed U.S. tariffs on Tunisia .

Analysts suggest this American attention reflects a growing recognition of Tunisia’s strategic importance. Former Tunisian Ambassador Abdallah Al-Obaidi noted that “the repetition of visits in a short period carries meanings beyond diplomatic niceties,” and that Washington seeks to establish direct communication channels with capitals it views as capable of playing a role in the region . Tunisia’s geographical location, “connecting Europe and Africa, makes it a significant area in Washington’s estimation. Its position on the global trade route map is considered more important than the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, as it serves as the gateway to Africa, which everyone today is vying to control due to its vast resources” .

However, the relationship is marked by significant tensions. Boulos’s first visit in late 2025 was marked by visible awkwardness—the US official remained standing while Saïed spoke about the genocide in Gaza . The second visit did not include a presidential reception, which some analysts interpreted as “indicating greater tension” .

Fundamental divergences persist. “The United States realizes that Tunisian positions on the Palestinian issue are not aligned with its policies, as it seeks to involve as many Arab countries as possible, if not all, in the Abraham Accords, which were orchestrated by Donald Trump himself” . Washington acknowledges that the Tunisian politicians closest to it have been ousted one after another by Saïed, “amid undeniable popular support, which explains the degree of embarrassment it feels” .

University professor Farid Al-Alebi suggests that from the American viewpoint, Tunisia has “lost its way,” necessitating efforts to bring it back to the “right path” through gradual pressure—a “carrot” approach before showing the “stick” .

4.3 The Chinese Question and Great Power Competition

Tunisia’s relationship with China has emerged as a point of contention in its relations with the United States. Analysts suggest that the United States is “not pleased with the rapprochement between Tunisia and China, viewing it as a threat to its influence in the region” .

China’s engagement with Tunisia fits within its broader Belt and Road Initiative and its increasing diplomatic and economic presence across North Africa. For Tunisia, China offers an alternative source of investment and infrastructure financing without the democratic conditionality attached to Western support. However, the scale of Chinese engagement to date has been limited relative to Tunisia’s needs, and China has shown no willingness to provide the kind of budget support that the IMF and EU have offered.

Al-Alebi argues that Trump’s focus on great power competition extends to North Africa, with the United States seeking to counter the spread of the “Russian bear” and the “Chinese dragon” . In this context, Tunisia’s strategic ambiguity—its willingness to engage with multiple powers while avoiding alignment with any—generates both opportunities and risks.

4.4 Relations with Maghreb Neighbours

Tunisia’s relations with its immediate Maghreb neighbours—Algeria and Libya—are shaped by geography, security concerns, and economic interests, but have not been a primary focus of Saïed’s foreign policy.

With Algeria, Tunisia shares a long border and deep historical ties. Algeria has provided support to Tunisia during periods of economic stress, including energy supplies and financial assistance. The two countries coordinate on security issues, particularly concerning the Libyan border. However, Tunisia’s political trajectory has diverged from Algeria’s, and Saïed’s isolationist posture has limited deeper engagement.

With Libya, Tunisia’s relationship is dominated by the spillover effects of the Libyan conflict. The February 2026 RSF capture of the tri-border area with Libya and Egypt adds a new dimension to Tunisian security concerns . However, analysts caution against overinterpreting US diplomatic visits as focused on Libya. Abdallah Al-Obaidi stated that “contrary to what some might think, U.S. interest in Tunisia is unrelated to the crisis in Libya,” noting that the solution to Libya is “being prepared quietly behind closed doors, away from the interventions of neighboring countries” .

The broader Maghreb context shapes Tunisia’s regional positioning. Al-Alebi observes that Boulos’s recent visit was part of a tour that included several Maghreb countries, meaning it is “fundamentally linked to issues beyond Tunisia’s specific situation and encompasses the entire region” . “Geostrategic cards are being reshuffled both west and east” .

4.5 Regional Isolation and the Question of Gains

The central question facing Tunisian diplomacy is whether its current posture—rejection of Western funding, resistance to conditionality, strategic ambiguity toward great powers—can translate into tangible political and economic gains. As Annahar’s analysis asks, “Will Tunisia succeed in turning this apparent U.S. interest into tangible political and economic gains, or will the visit remain part of a broader diplomatic movement, governed by international considerations that transcend Tunisian political priorities?” .

To date, the returns have been limited. The EU funding rejection has foreclosed a significant source of budget support. The IMF impasse blocks access to $1.9 billion in financing and the catalytic effect an IMF programme would have on other donors and investors. US engagement has produced no concrete assistance. Chinese investment remains modest.

Meanwhile, the economic pressures mount. Foreign reserves decline. The currency depreciates. Inflation erodes living standards. The gap between Tunisia’s financing needs and available resources widens. Saïed’s calculation that sovereignty-enhancing gestures can substitute for material support faces its ultimate test as the balance of payments crisis deepens.

5. Conclusion: Tunisia’s Trajectory and the Sustainability of Isolation

Tunisia in early 2026 presents a portrait of a country that has turned inward at the very moment when external engagement is most needed. The economic picture is one of modest growth insufficient to address structural challenges, fiscal consolidation achieved through administrative measures rather than reform, and a debt trajectory that has stabilized only because new external financing has been foreclosed. The IMF impasse and the February 2026 rejection of EU funding have left Tunisia financially isolated, with few remaining sources of budget support.

The political picture is one of comprehensive authoritarian consolidation. The democratic institutions painstakingly built after 2011 have been systematically dismantled. The judiciary has been subordinated, civil society repressed, media silenced, and political opposition marginalized. Civic space has shifted from “obstructed” to “repressed.” More than 80 individuals remain detained for exercising fundamental freedoms. Decree-Law 54 hangs over every journalist’s work.

The regional picture is one of strategic ambiguity yielding limited returns. Relations with Europe are strained by the funding rejection and migration-related human rights concerns. Relations with the United States are marked by tension over Gaza, the Abraham Accords, and Tunisia’s domestic trajectory. Relations with China have not yet produced significant material benefits. Maghreb neighbours are preoccupied with their own challenges.

The sustainability of this trajectory is deeply questionable. The economic pressures facing ordinary Tunisians—inflation, unemployment, deteriorating public services—will not be alleviated by sovereignty-enhancing gestures. The political repression may contain dissent in the short term but does not address the underlying grievances that fueled the 2011 revolution. The diplomatic isolation forecloses the very partnerships that could provide the resources for recovery.

Yet Saïed retains significant popular support among Tunisians who shared his frustration with the post-2011 political class. The opposition remains fragmented and marginalized. Civil society, despite its resilience, operates under severe constraints. The security apparatus remains loyal. For now, the authoritarian consolidation holds.

The longer-term question is whether this model can deliver the economic improvements that sustain popular acquiescence. Tunisia’s post-revolutionary aspirations for freedom, peace, and justice remain unfulfilled. The tragedy is that the country that once offered hope to the Arab world has become a cautionary tale—a reminder that democratic transitions can be reversed, that authoritarian consolidation can be popular, and that the international community’s capacity to influence domestic trajectories is sharply limited.

Whether Tunisia can find a path back toward its democratic aspirations depends on factors beyond its borders—the evolution of regional dynamics, the engagement of external powers, the availability of financing—but ultimately on forces within: the resilience of its civil society, the calculations of its leadership, and the patience of its people. The birthplace of the Arab Spring waits to see whether its revolution’s promise can ever be reclaimed.

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