Abstract

This paper examines Eswatini’s economic and political status in relation to South Africa, arguing that bilateral relations are defined by profound structural asymmetries that simultaneously bind the two states together and generate persistent tensions. Drawing on recent economic data, diplomatic developments, and regional security analyses through February 2026, the analysis demonstrates how Eswatini’s dependence on South Africa—through the currency peg, SACU revenue transfers, energy imports, and trade flows—creates both opportunities and vulnerabilities that shape every dimension of bilateral engagement. The paper contends that Eswatini’s status in South Africa is best understood through three interconnected dimensions: as an economically dependent neighbor navigating fiscal vulnerability within regional institutions; as a politically divergent state whose absolutist governance model creates diplomatic friction with South Africa’s constitutional democracy; and as a sovereign actor employing diplomatic agency to manage asymmetric relations while seeking diversification. The convergence of fiscal pressures, energy transition, and democratic governance debates creates both challenges and opportunities for recalibrating this complex bilateral relationship.

Keywords: Eswatini-South Africa relations, asymmetric interdependence, SACU dependency, regional integration, monarchical sovereignty, energy security

Introduction

The relationship between Eswatini and South Africa represents one of the most structurally asymmetric bilateral dynamics in the Southern African region. Eswatini, Africa’s last absolute monarchy, is a small landlocked kingdom of approximately 1.2 million people completely surrounded by South Africa except for a brief border with Mozambique. South Africa, the continent’s most industrialized economy with a population of over 60 million and a constitutional democratic system, naturally dominates this relationship in demographic, economic, and geopolitical terms. Yet the relationship is far from one-sided domination; it is characterized by complex interdependence, persistent diplomatic tensions, and ongoing negotiations over sovereignty, regional norms, and economic integration.

This paper investigates a central research question: What is Eswatini’s current economic and political status in South Africa, and how does this relationship navigate the fundamental asymmetries between a small absolute monarchy and a regional democratic hegemon? The significance of this inquiry extends beyond bilateral diplomacy. Eswatini’s situation illuminates broader dynamics of small state survival in asymmetric regional relationships, the tensions between regional governance norms and domestic political sovereignty, and the complex interplay of economic dependence and political agency in Southern African international relations.

This paper proceeds in five sections. Following this introduction, Section Two examines Eswatini’s domestic political economy, establishing the foundational context for its external relations. Section Three analyzes bilateral economic relations, focusing on SACU dependency, the currency peg, trade patterns, and energy cooperation. Section Four investigates political and diplomatic alignment, including the profound tensions between Eswatini’s absolutist governance and South Africa’s democratic foreign policy. Section Five addresses emerging sectors and diversification strategies, including ICT development and external partnership diversification. The conclusion synthesizes these findings and offers prospective analysis.

1. Eswatini’s Domestic Political Economy: The Foundation of Regional Status

Eswatini’s external status in South Africa cannot be understood without first examining its domestic political and economic trajectory. The kingdom’s unique governance structure—Africa’s last absolute monarchy—and its profound economic vulnerabilities condition every aspect of its bilateral engagement with Pretoria.

1.1 Governance Structure and Political Dynamics

Eswatini is governed as an absolute monarchy, with King Mswati III wielding ultimate executive, legislative, and judicial authority. Political parties have been banned since 1973, and the country operates under a system of traditional governance where the King appoints the prime minister and cabinet, and parliament serves primarily a consultative function . This governance model makes Eswatini a political outlier in Southern Africa, where constitutional democracy and multiparty competition have become regional norms.

The political legitimacy of the monarchy rests on complex foundations. Traditional structures, including chiefs and local councils, maintain significant authority and enjoy popular support in rural areas. The annual Incwala ceremony and Umhlanga (Reed Dance) reinforce cultural cohesion and royal prestige . However, these traditional foundations coexist with growing urban-based opposition to absolutist rule and demands for democratic reform.

The protest wave of 2021 marked a significant escalation in domestic political tensions. Over 30 protesters were killed when the King deployed the army to suppress demonstrations, with videos posted on social media appearing to show soldiers firing at and assaulting demonstrators . Prime Minister Themba Masuku’s initial attempts to deny deaths were abandoned, and his government insisted protesters had descended into “criminality” . This episode fundamentally shaped regional perceptions and subsequent diplomatic engagement.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) responded by sending a team of 16 ministers to Eswatini in July 2021 . South Africa’s response was particularly pointed, with President Cyril Ramaphosa’s African National Congress issuing a strong rebuke. Lindiwe Zulu, head of international relations, stated that “the use of security forces to quell political dissent and the failure to address legitimate civilian concerns complicates the conflict and adds fuel to the fire” . This intervention signaled that Eswatini’s domestic governance had become a matter of regional concern.

1.2 Macroeconomic Structure and Fiscal Vulnerabilities

Eswatini’s economy is characterized by extreme concentration and external vulnerability. The country maintains a small, open economy heavily dependent on South Africa for trade, investment, and employment. The African Development Bank’s 2025 Country Focus Report highlights that SACU receipts account for approximately 45 per cent of government revenues, making Eswatini’s fiscal position extraordinarily vulnerable to external shocks .

This dependency creates structural vulnerabilities that constrain policy autonomy. Through SACU’s revenue-sharing formula, any slowdown in regional trade volumes can shrink the customs pool and reduce Eswatini’s allocation. The AfDB specifically warns that reduced Chinese exports to South Africa and neighboring states, together with wider US-China tariff disputes, pose risks to the stability of Eswatini’s fiscal accounts . Falling oil prices, while easing inflationary pressure, also suppress customs collections, further narrowing fiscal space .

The fiscal situation has required repeated external borrowing. In late 2025, the government secured two major loans to ease cash flow pressure: US$47.5 million from the African Development Bank and US$50 million from the OPEC Fund . These funds were urgently needed to address arrears to government suppliers, who staged a picket outside the Treasury Department in November 2025 demanding payment for work completed more than six months previously .

Minister for Finance Neal Rijkenberg acknowledged longstanding warnings about SACU overreliance, stating that “the country had been warned since time immemorial about the over reliance on SACU” . However, he noted a new dimension of risk: “new tariffs result in lower growth, but are not indicating recessions. So the risk is that SACU does not grow, not that it gets reduced” .

1.3 Social Indicators and Development Challenges

Eswatini faces severe social challenges that compound its economic vulnerabilities. The AfDB reports that unemployment is estimated at 37.6 per cent, with youth unemployment reaching an alarming 65 per cent . More than half of Eswatini’s population lives in poverty, while inequality remains entrenched with a Gini index of 54.6 .

The country’s HIV/AIDS burden remains among the world’s highest, with over 230,000 people dependent on treatment programs heavily supported by international donors . The AfDB warns that any reductions in US support would directly affect critical programs, including HIV treatment . This aid dependency—with 94 per cent of official development assistance coming from the United States—creates additional vulnerability to shifts in donor priorities and geopolitical alignments .

Governance indicators have declined in recent years, further complicating development prospects. Eswatini fell from 85th place in 2017 to 130th in 2023 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, while its performance on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance also slipped . The AfDB observes that “weak institutions, opaque procurement systems and delays in implementing the Fiscal Adjustment Plan have raised fears with policymaking perceived as benefitting a narrow group rather than the broader population” .

1.4 The Currency Peg: Monetary Integration Without Policy Autonomy

A fundamental feature of Eswatini’s economic relationship with South Africa is the currency peg between the Lilangeni and the South African Rand. The Lilangeni is pegged at par with the Rand, and the Rand is legal tender in Eswatini. This arrangement provides monetary stability and eliminates exchange rate risk in bilateral trade, but it comes at the cost of monetary policy autonomy.

Paul Vos, Regional Managing Director of the Chartered Institute for Procurement & Supply (CIPS) Southern Africa, explains the implications: “Even though Eswatini was spared the steepest reciprocal tariffs, it would be misleading to think the country is insulated. Because of the Rand–Lilangeni peg, any ripple effect in South Africa’s economy eventually flows into Eswatini” . This means that when South Africa faces tariff retaliation, electricity constraints, or logistical bottlenecks, “Eswatini feels those consequences immediately” .

The currency peg thus represents both integration benefit and sovereignty cost. It provides stability and facilitates trade but transmits South African economic shocks directly into Eswatini regardless of domestic conditions. This monetary asymmetry fundamentally conditions Eswatini’s policy space and economic management.

2. Bilateral Economic Relations: Asymmetric Integration and Fiscal Dependency

Economic relations between Eswatini and South Africa are characterized by deep integration across multiple dimensions, creating a structure of asymmetric interdependence that shapes every aspect of bilateral engagement.

2.1 SACU Framework: The Fiscal Lifeline

The Southern African Customs Union provides the foundational architecture for bilateral economic relations and represents Eswatini’s most significant economic link to South Africa. As one of the oldest customs unions in the world, SACU facilitates duty-free movement of goods among its members—Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa—while establishing common external tariffs.

The February 2026 receipt of E2.6 billion from SACU illustrates the magnitude of this dependency . This money, derived from duties on goods imported into the SACU area, is distributed based on a formula that favors smaller economies, making it a “major revenue stream” and “significant part of the national budget, funding government operations and development” . Minister Rijkenberg confirmed that priority would be settling arrears to suppliers, highlighting how SACU transfers directly fund basic government obligations .

The fiscal significance of SACU extends beyond routine operations. The AfDB warns that SACU receipts account for approximately 45 per cent of government revenues, creating extreme vulnerability to external shocks . When regional trade volumes slow or global tariff disputes reduce customs collections, Eswatini’s fiscal position immediately deteriorates. This dependency constrains policy autonomy and makes budget planning highly contingent on external factors beyond domestic control.

The India-SACU free trade agreement negotiations represent both opportunity and challenge for Eswatini. South Africa’s High Commissioner to India, Prof. Anil Sooklal, confirmed that both sides have agreed to expedite discussions on what would be the first free trade agreement between India and a regional bloc in Africa . While such an agreement could expand market access for Eswatini’s exports, it also illustrates how trade negotiations are conducted at the SACU level, with South Africa playing the dominant role in shaping regional positions.

2.2 Trade Dependency and Market Access

South Africa is overwhelmingly Eswatini’s largest trading partner, accounting for the bulk of imports and exports. Vos notes that “South Africa is not just a neighbour; it is the anchor of Eswatini’s trade” . This concentration creates both opportunities and risks. Access to the South African market is essential for Eswatini’s exporters, particularly in sectors like apparel and agricultural products. However, dependency means that economic shocks in South Africa transmit directly to Eswatini.

The structure of bilateral trade reflects broader patterns of regional economic geography. Eswatini exports primarily primary products and labor-intensive manufactures to South Africa, while importing higher-value manufactured goods, machinery, and services. This pattern generates persistent trade deficits that are offset by SACU transfers, worker remittances, and other financial flows.

External tariff pressures add complexity to Eswatini’s trade position. The 10 per cent tariff imposed on some Eswatini exports to the United States could squeeze certain sectors, particularly apparel and agricultural products that have long benefited from preferential access . Vos notes that exporters have taken steps to cushion themselves, but the tariff represents a erosion of preferential access that has historically supported Eswatini’s export competitiveness.

2.3 Energy Cooperation: The 10-Year Power Purchase Agreement

Energy cooperation represents a particularly significant dimension of bilateral economic relations, with recent developments pointing toward deepened integration and mutual dependency. In February 2026, South Africa’s Minister for Electricity and Energy, Dr. Kgosientsho David Ramokgopa, visited Eswatini to provide assurances about regional power supply and advance negotiations on a long-term power purchase agreement .

The timing of this engagement reflects significant changes in South Africa’s energy landscape. Ramokgopa announced that South Africa is now producing enough power to meet domestic needs while also supplying regional partners, declaring that “the era of load-shedding is now a thing of the past” . This turnaround follows Eskom’s return to profitability in 2025—its first profit in many years—after decisive restructuring and operational improvements .

The centerpiece of energy cooperation is a new 10-year Power Purchase Agreement between the Eswatini Electricity Company (EEC) and South Africa’s National Transmission Company of South Africa (NTCSA), currently being finalized . Eswatini’s Minister of Natural Resources and Energy, Prince Lonkhokhela, stated that the agreement will “anchor Eswatini’s supply security for the next decade” . Cabinet has tasked the EEC Board and Management with ensuring the agreement includes additional efficiencies to cushion consumers, emphasizing “affordability, affordability, affordability” .

This PPA represents both dependency and opportunity. Eswatini’s complete reliance on South African electricity imports makes supply security paramount. However, the agreement’s long-term nature provides predictability that enables economic planning. Prince Lonkhokhela emphasized that “electricity is like the air we breathe—without it, life, jobs, schools, industries and homes are rendered ineffective” .

2.4 Eswatini’s Generation Ambitions

Despite deep import dependency, Eswatini is pursuing ambitious plans to develop domestic generation capacity. Prince Lonkhokhela announced that the kingdom is preparing to roll out a 1,500 MW generation expansion plan over the next few years, inspired by the need to secure long-term energy independence, support industrialization, and ensure affordable electricity .

Significantly, 18 prospective independent power producers (IPPs) have already expressed interest in developing generation capacity within Eswatini . This private sector interest suggests that Eswatini’s energy market, while small, offers attractive opportunities for renewable energy development, particularly given regional electricity demand and the country’s solar resource potential.

The generation expansion plan includes a strong emphasis on skills development. Prince Lonkhokhela appealed for deeper cooperation with South Africa in engineering, project management, and operational excellence—skills demonstrated in large South African power projects such as Medupi and Kusile . He stated that “as we embark on the 1,500 MW expansion, capacity building will be crucial” .

This dual strategy—securing long-term import arrangements while developing domestic generation—reflects Eswatini’s effort to manage dependency while building greater energy autonomy. If successful, the generation expansion could gradually reduce import reliance while creating new economic opportunities.

2.5 The 2026 SACU Receipt and Fiscal Management

The February 2026 SACU receipt of E2.6 billion provides a concrete illustration of how fiscal dependency operates in practice. Minister Rijkenberg confirmed that priority would be settling arrears to suppliers, addressing a source of significant domestic tension following the November 2025 supplier protests .

The minister noted that the SACU funds would be supplemented by the OPEC Fund loan not exceeding E858 million (US$50 million) for a budget support lending programme . This combination of SACU transfers and external borrowing illustrates the fiscal management challenges facing Eswatini: recurrent expenditure depends heavily on volatile SACU receipts, while budget deficits require repeated external financing.

The supplier protests themselves illuminate the human dimension of fiscal stress. Nearly 50 government suppliers and service providers’ directors picketed outside the Treasury Department demanding payment for work completed more than six months previously, displaying placards with messages such as “ningasitjeli nge network” (do not blame the network) . These protests reflected accumulated frustration with payment delays that threatened business viability and demonstrated how fiscal constraints translate into tangible economic pressures.

3. Political and Diplomatic Relations: Tension, Engagement, and Sovereignty

The political dimension of Eswatini’s status in South Africa is characterized by profound tensions arising from divergent governance models, periodic diplomatic crises, and ongoing negotiations over sovereignty and regional norms.

3.1 Governance Divergence and Regional Pressure

Eswatini’s absolutist governance model places it at odds with the democratic norms that have become established throughout Southern Africa. While South Africa, Botswana, and other regional states have consolidated multiparty democratic systems, Eswatini maintains political party bans and monarchical absolutism . This governance divergence creates persistent diplomatic friction and makes Eswatini a target of regional pressure for political reform.

SADC engagement on Eswatini’s governance has intensified following the 2021 protests. The organization has sent multiple mediation missions, with various regional leaders assigned to engage King Mswati III on reform. President Cyril Ramaphosa has been involved in these efforts, alongside Namibian President Hage Geingob . However, progress has been limited, with King Mswati remaining “deaf to pleas for reform despite growing pressure” .

The governance divergence creates complex dynamics in bilateral relations. South Africa’s ruling ANC, with its historical commitment to liberation and democracy, faces domestic pressure to take stronger positions on Eswatini’s political situation. However, practical considerations—including economic interdependence, regional stability concerns, and diplomatic norms of non-interference—constrain more assertive intervention.

3.2 The 2026 Immigration Controversy: A Test of Sovereignty

A significant diplomatic test emerged in February 2026 when South Africa raised concerns about Eswatini’s decision to accept five criminal immigrants deported from the United States. The five individuals, convicted of crimes in the US, had been rejected by their countries of origin (Laos, Cuba, Jamaica, Vietnam, and Yemen) and were subsequently relocated to Eswatini .

South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation expressed concern through spokesperson Chrispin Phiri, stating that the government was “deeply concerned about the profile of these individuals and the potential adverse impact on SA’s national security and immigration policy, given the geographical proximity between the two sisterly countries” . This statement reflected South African anxiety that individuals deemed security risks by the US could affect regional stability given open borders and close ties.

Eswatini’s response was firm and sovereignty-affirming. Acting Government Spokesperson Thabile Mduli stated that “government will not relent on its position” and would “engage with RSA through diplomatic channels” . She emphasized that “these immigrants pose no threat to either emaSwati or neighbouring States” and that Eswatini was entitled to its sovereign decision .

The government clarified procedural aspects, noting that the five inmates were housed in correctional facilities in isolated units and that the exercise resulted from “months of high-level engagements between the United States Government and Eswatini” considering “every avenue, including risk assessments and careful consideration for the safety and security of citizens” . The involvement of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in facilitating transit was also noted .

This episode illustrates several dimensions of Eswatini-South Africa relations: South Africa’s security concerns about developments in its small neighbor; Eswatini’s assertion of sovereign decision-making despite asymmetric power; and the preference for diplomatic engagement rather than public confrontation in managing bilateral differences.

3.3 The Sovereignty Debate: Responding to Incorporation Proposals

Perhaps the most fundamental challenge to Eswatini’s status emerged in February 2026 when ActionSA leader Herman Mashaba suggested that Lesotho and Eswatini should be incorporated into South Africa, arguing that “it is practically and economically impossible for these countries to survive on their own” .

Eswatini’s response was swift and unequivocal. Government Spokesperson Alpheous Nxumalo stated that he was “not too sure if Mashaba knew what sustained the Sovereignty of a Nation,” emphasizing that sovereignty rests on “the will of the people to maintain their respective sovereignty” rather than “necessarily economic boom” . He affirmed that “Eswatini is a sovereign state and Emaswati are very proud for who they are irrespective of any challenges” .

The debate drew responses from other South African political figures. Former EFF MP Fana Mokoena rejected the incorporation idea, arguing that “the issue of Lesotho, eSwatini and Botswana is historical rather than economic” and noting that “Lesotho and Swaziland were not colonised, but became protectorates. Hence their trajectory was different from ours” . Mokoena proposed an alternative: “why don’t we rather propose greater economic participation and sharing of resources between us?” .

This exchange illuminates fundamental tensions in how Eswatini’s status is perceived. For some South Africans, economic logic suggests incorporation as a rational solution to small-state vulnerability. For Eswatini, sovereignty is non-negotiable, rooted in history, culture, and the collective will of the emaSwati people. Managing this perceptual gap requires continuous diplomatic attention.

3.4 South African Mediation in Regional Disputes

South Africa’s role as regional mediator occasionally involves Eswatini in broader diplomatic dynamics. In early 2024, President Ramaphosa mediated between Botswana and Eswatini following tensions over former Botswana President Ian Khama’s alleged presence in Eswatini . King Mswati was hosted in Pretoria following Ramaphosa’s visit to Eswatini, with diplomatic sources indicating Ramaphosa was “trying to resolve the tension between the two Heads of State” .

This mediation episode demonstrates South Africa’s continuing role as regional diplomatic broker while engaging Eswatini in trilateral diplomacy. For Eswatini, such engagement provides access to regional conflict resolution mechanisms while reinforcing its status as a sovereign actor within SADC frameworks.

4. Emerging Sectors and Diversification Strategies

Beyond traditional economic linkages, Eswatini is pursuing diversification strategies that could reshape aspects of its relationship with South Africa. These efforts reflect recognition that excessive dependency requires managed reduction through strategic economic transformation.

4.1 ICT Hub Ambitions: Leveraging Geographic Position

Eswatini’s Minister of Information, Communication and Technology, Savannah Maziya, has articulated an ambitious vision for positioning the kingdom as a regional ICT hub. Speaking at a Business Eswatini indaba, Maziya emphasized that Eswatini has the potential to leverage its strategic location between South Africa and Mozambique to serve a regional market of over 100 million people .

Maziya stressed the urgency of digital transformation, noting that the world’s top 10 companies by market capitalisation are technology-driven firms heavily invested in artificial intelligence . She framed Eswatini’s current position not as limitation but as “wake-up call because the future is not coming, it is already here” .

The minister highlighted a striking paradox: while neighboring Mozambique has approximately 35 million people and South Africa 65 million, Eswatini has yet to fully capitalize on its land-linked advantage. She stated, “We are right there in the nucleus of over 100 million people and we seem not to be able to figure out how to bring value and become the ICT hub in Southern Africa” .

Maziya called for urgent action to modernize digital infrastructure and services, urging stronger collaboration between government and private sector. She cautioned against “a culture of indecision,” warning that delays in decision-making could undermine competitiveness .

This ICT hub vision, if realized, could begin rebalancing Eswatini’s economic relationship with South Africa. Rather than merely serving the South African market as a peripheral supplier, Eswatini would position itself as a regional service center, attracting investment and generating higher-value exports.

4.2 Diversifying External Partnerships: The China Question

A significant dimension of Eswatini’s diversification strategy involves reconsidering its diplomatic isolation from major powers. Eswatini is the only country in Africa with no diplomatic relations with China, maintaining instead long-standing ties with Taiwan . This positioning has excluded the kingdom from various trade agreements between China and African countries, limiting access to investment and market opportunities.

Recent diplomatic engagement suggests potential evolution on this front. Chinese Ambassador to South Africa, Wu Peng, met with Swaziland News editor Zweli Martin Dlamini in February 2026 to discuss critical issues, including Eswatini’s exclusion from China-Africa cooperation frameworks . The editor thanked the Ambassador for being “open and transparent” and had opportunity to discuss “what needs to be done in ensuring that, emaSwati are not excluded in such opportunities” .

While this single meeting does not signal imminent diplomatic recognition, it reflects growing recognition within Eswatini that isolation from Africa’s largest trading partner carries economic costs. Any shift in Taiwan policy would have profound implications for Eswatini’s international positioning and could significantly expand economic partnership opportunities.

4.3 Regional Market Integration: Beyond South Africa

Eswatini’s diversification strategy also emphasizes deeper integration with other regional markets, particularly Mozambique. The country’s geographic position—bordering both South Africa and Mozambique—offers access to Maputo’s port and potentially to regional transport corridors that reduce exclusive dependence on South African infrastructure.

The ICT hub vision explicitly references this geographic advantage, positioning Eswatini to serve both South African and Mozambican markets . Energy sector planning also reflects regional thinking, with generation expansion potentially enabling electricity exports that diversify revenue sources beyond traditional sectors.

5. Comparative Positioning: Eswatini and South Africa in Regional Context

Understanding Eswatini’s status in South Africa requires comparative perspective on both countries’ positions within Southern African political economy and governance landscape.

5.1 Economic Asymmetries and Complementarities

The economic relationship exhibits extreme asymmetries. South Africa’s GDP is approximately 200 times larger than Eswatini’s, and its diversified industrial base completely dominates regional production structures. Eswatini’s economy, by contrast, is small, concentrated, and fundamentally dependent on South Africa for trade, investment, employment, and fiscal transfers through SACU.

These asymmetries create structural dependency that limits Eswatini’s policy autonomy. Vos observes that when South Africa “faces tariff retaliation, electricity constraints, or logistical bottlenecks, Eswatini feels those consequences immediately” . The currency peg transmits South African monetary conditions directly, while SACU dependency makes fiscal planning contingent on external trade volumes.

However, complementarities also exist. Eswatini’s geographic position provides transit advantages and potential service hub functions. Its cultural resources—including the Incwala and Umhlanga ceremonies—attract regional tourism. And its labor force participates in South African employment markets, generating remittance flows that support domestic consumption.

5.2 Governance Divergence and Normative Tensions

The governance divergence between democratic South Africa and absolutist Eswatini creates persistent normative tensions in bilateral relations. South Africa’s foreign policy emphasizes democratic governance, human rights, and constitutional rule—values directly challenged by Eswatini’s political system.

These tensions manifest in periodic diplomatic friction. South African criticism of the 2021 protest crackdown reflected genuine concern about human rights violations but also highlighted the difficulty of maintaining constructive bilateral relations with a state whose governance model contradicts fundamental regional norms .

Yet practical considerations moderate normative impulses. Regional stability concerns, economic interdependence, and diplomatic conventions of non-interference constrain more assertive South African action. SADC’s mediation approach—engaging rather than isolating Eswatini—reflects recognition that transformation, if it comes, must be internally driven.

5.3 Sovereignty Strategies in Asymmetric Relationships

Eswatini’s approach to managing asymmetric relations with South Africa offers insights into small state sovereignty strategies. Despite profound dependency, Eswatini consistently asserts sovereign equality and decision-making autonomy. The firm response to South African concerns about US deportees illustrates this stance: while engaging diplomatically, Eswatini maintains its position as a matter of sovereign right .

Cultural resources reinforce sovereignty claims. Invitations to South African officials to experience Incwala, Marula, and Umhlanga ceremonies  emphasize Eswatini’s distinct cultural identity and historical continuity. These cultural assertions provide non-economic foundations for sovereignty that complement political and legal claims.

External partnership diversification represents another sovereignty strategy. Engagement with China, while preliminary, suggests interest in expanding diplomatic options beyond exclusive reliance on South Africa and traditional Western partners . Any shift in Taiwan policy would significantly expand these options, potentially opening access to infrastructure investment and market opportunities currently unavailable.

Conclusion: Eswatini’s Evolving Status and Future Trajectories

This paper has examined Eswatini’s economic and political status in South Africa across multiple dimensions: domestic political economy foundations, bilateral economic relations, political and diplomatic alignment, and emerging diversification strategies. The analysis reveals a relationship characterized by profound asymmetries, deep integration, persistent tensions, and ongoing negotiation over sovereignty and regional norms.

Eswatini’s status in South Africa is best understood through three interconnected dimensions: as an economically dependent neighbor navigating fiscal vulnerability within regional institutions; as a politically divergent state whose absolutist governance model creates diplomatic friction with South Africa’s constitutional democracy; and as a sovereign actor employing diplomatic agency to manage asymmetric relations while seeking diversification opportunities.

Several factors will shape the future trajectory of this relationship. First, Eswatini’s fiscal sustainability—including management of SACU dependency, domestic revenue mobilization, and external borrowing—will determine its capacity to maintain policy autonomy while meeting basic governance obligations. The AfDB’s warning about governance weaknesses constraining capital mobilization highlights the urgency of institutional strengthening .

Second, political developments in both countries will influence bilateral engagement. South Africa’s evolving coalition politics may affect foreign policy priorities and the intensity of pressure for Eswatini democratic reform. Within Eswatini, succession questions and potential reform movements could transform governance dynamics in ways that reshape regional relationships.

Third, economic diversification outcomes—including ICT hub development, energy generation expansion, and potential China engagement—will affect Eswatini’s capacity to reduce exclusive dependence on South Africa. Success in these areas could gradually rebalance the relationship toward greater symmetry, while failure would reinforce existing dependency patterns.

The most significant finding of this analysis is the remarkable resilience of Eswatini’s sovereignty despite extreme asymmetric dependency. Through consistent assertion of sovereign rights, cultural diplomacy, and strategic engagement with multiple external partners, Eswatini maintains autonomous decision-making space even as economic integration with South Africa deepens. The Mashaba incorporation proposal and the decisive response it provoked illuminate both the perceived vulnerability of Eswatini’s position and the determination of emaSwati to maintain their independent statehood .

For South Africa, Eswatini’s status represents both responsibility and constraint: responsibility to support a smaller neighbor’s development within regional frameworks; constraint arising from respect for sovereignty and the limits of regional pressure for democratic reform. Managing this relationship requires balancing normative commitments with practical cooperation, economic integration with respect for autonomy.

For Eswatini, South Africa remains simultaneously an essential economic partner, a persistent source of democratic pressure, and a complex neighbor whose scale inevitably shapes regional structures. Navigating this multidimensional relationship requires sustained diplomatic attention, strategic diversification, and the cultural resources that underpin national identity and sovereignty claims.

The relationship between Eswatini and South Africa, in sum, illuminates fundamental dynamics of asymmetric interdependence in Southern African international relations. It demonstrates how small states can maintain sovereignty despite profound dependency, how governance divergence creates persistent diplomatic friction, and how cultural resources and strategic agency can partially offset structural power asymmetries. As both countries navigate the challenges of the coming decade—fiscal pressures, energy transition, democratic governance debates—this relationship will continue to evolve, shaped by the tension between integration imperative and sovereignty assertion that defines Eswatini’s unique position within Southern Africa.

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