Abstract

This paper examines the contemporary economic and political status of Sudan within the North African regional context as of early 2026, drawing upon United Nations Security Council briefings, International Monetary Fund data, diplomatic reporting, and specialized policy analysis. The research confronts a nation in extremis: more than 1,000 days into a brutal war that has nearly destroyed Africa’s third-largest country, Sudan presents a profile of comprehensive state collapse, systematic atrocities, and humanitarian catastrophe. This paper argues that Sudan’s trajectory represents the most severe manifestation of state failure in contemporary North Africa, characterized by the complete breakdown of economic governance, the fragmentation of political authority between warring military factions, and the erosion of any meaningful distinction between state and armed group. The analysis proceeds in three main sections: economic collapse characterized by hyperinflation, production destruction, and the abandonment of reform; political fragmentation manifested in the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the emergence of parallel authorities, and the failure of international mediation; and regional implications including border destabilization, proxy dynamics, and external engagement. The conclusion assesses Sudan’s trajectory and the prospects for reconstruction.

Keywords: Sudan, North Africa, state collapse, civil war, humanitarian crisis, paramilitary conflict

1. Introduction

Sudan occupies a paradoxical position in the North African geopolitical imagination: a country of vast geographical expanse, historical depth, and resource wealth that has nonetheless become synonymous with conflict, displacement, and state failure. As the third-largest country on the African continent, straddling the divide between North and Sub-Saharan Africa, Sudan’s trajectory carries implications far beyond its borders. The Nile waters that sustain Egypt flow through its territory. The Sahel’s security dynamics intersect with its western Darfur region. The Red Sea, one of the world’s most strategic maritime chokepoints, borders its eastern coast.

Yet Sudan’s contemporary reality defies any conventional understanding of statehood. More than 1,000 days into a war that has “nearly destroyed the third largest country in Africa,” as UN Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo told the Security Council in February 2026, Sudan has experienced 1,000 days of “staggering violence and unimaginable suffering” and “total impunity for the perpetrators of a long list of atrocities and war crimes” . The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” has devolved into a comprehensive civil war with ethnic cleansing dimensions, foreign proxy involvement, and no end in sight.

This paper provides a deeply researched analysis of Sudan’s economic and political status as of early 2026, drawing upon UN Security Council briefings, IMF data and forecasts, US State Department sanctions announcements, diplomatic reporting, and policy institute analysis. The timing is significant: early 2026 has witnessed intensified fighting across multiple fronts, the establishment of RSF control over the strategic tri-border area with Libya and Egypt, new US sanctions targeting RSF commanders for atrocities, UN warnings of genocide indicators in Darfur and Kordofan, and the first humanitarian convoy reaching besieged cities after months of isolation—developments that collectively illuminate the trajectory of contemporary Sudan.

The analysis proceeds in three main sections. Section two examines Sudan’s economic status, analyzing the collapse of formal economic institutions, hyperinflation, the destruction of productive capacity, and the irrelevance of pre-war reform frameworks. Section three analyses the political and security landscape, including the fragmentation of state authority between SAF and RSF, the commission of atrocities documented by international bodies, the emergence of parallel governance structures, and the failure of mediation efforts. Section four addresses Sudan’s regional position, examining relations with North African neighbours, the destabilization of border regions, the role of external powers, and the implications for regional security. The conclusion synthesizes these findings to assess Sudan’s trajectory and the prospects—however remote—for reconstruction and recovery.

2. Economic Status: From Reform Promise to Comprehensive Collapse

2.1 The Pre-War Reform Moment: A Lost Opportunity

To understand the scale of Sudan’s economic catastrophe, it is necessary to recall the moment of possibility that preceded it. In early 2021, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s transitional government had secured critical international backing for an economic turnaround that offered a path out of decades of isolation and mismanagement . France had pledged a $1.5 billion bridging loan to settle Sudan’s arrears to the International Monetary Fund, with Britain, Ireland, and Sweden making similar loans to repay arrears to the African Development Bank, and the United States providing a bridging loan to pay off arrears to the World Bank .

These arrangements positioned Sudan to begin a debt-relief programme under the IMF and World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative, which would have unlocked approximately $2 billion in new World Bank lending for urgent development projects and brought in IMF financing for further economic restructuring . The reform programme included politically difficult measures—ending fuel subsidies, raising power tariffs, liberalising foreign exchange policy—that pushed up prices but were accompanied by a Family Support Programme designed to compensate most Sudanese .

The next stage of reforms, which would have involved restructuring and reviewing the accounts of some 600 state companies, was recognized as potentially riskier. Many of these enterprises, which had “corruptly benefited from public funds,” were in the hands of “Islamist acolytes of the former ruling party or the military and intelligence services” . Under Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim, these companies were meant to come under treasury surveillance, but anti-corruption activists warned that “political ideologues and security officials are pushing back hard” .

That reform moment has been utterly obliterated by the war that erupted in April 2023. None of the promised debt relief materialized. None of the structural reforms were implemented. The $60 billion foreign debt burden remains, now compounded by the destruction of the economy’s productive base.

2.2 Macroeconomic Indicators of Collapse

The International Monetary Fund’s October 2025 World Economic Outlook database provides the most authoritative—though necessarily estimated—picture of Sudan’s economic freefall . For 2026, the IMF projects:

• Real GDP growth: 9.5 per cent

• GDP, current prices: $49.91 billion

• GDP per capita: $763

• Inflation rate, average consumer prices: 54.6 per cent

• Unemployment rate: 58 per cent

• Population: 51.73 million

These figures, while devastating, require careful interpretation. The projected 9.5 per cent GDP growth for 2026 is not a sign of recovery but rather a statistical artefact of the extraordinary depth of prior contraction. The Sudan Times, reporting on the IMF’s October 2025 forecasts, noted that the Fund maintained its projection of a “severe 23.4 percent contraction for 2024” and assumed that the war “concludes by year-end, allowing reconstruction and economic recovery to begin promptly” . The 2026 growth projection is therefore contingent on peace—a condition that remains tragically unmet.

The inflation picture is equally dire. After reaching a staggering 87.2 per cent in 2024, inflation is projected to fall to 54.6 per cent in 2026 and further decline to 16.1 per cent by 2026 . But these improvements are from such extreme levels that they offer little comfort to households facing basic goods prices that have multiplied many times over since the war began. The IMF’s own data indicates that Sudan has not updated official economic statistics since 2019, with statistical systems “largely outdated, some remaining unchanged since the 1980s” .

Trading Economics, drawing on World Bank data, reports that Sudan’s GDP reached a historic high of $64.83 billion in 2008 and stood at $49.91 billion in 2024 . The projected 2026 GDP of approximately $91.4 billion in their modelling reflects different methodological assumptions but confirms the same basic picture: an economy operating at a fraction of its potential .

2.3 The Military-Economic Complex

A fundamental structural feature of Sudan’s economy—one that pre-dates the current war and helps explain its persistence—is the deep entrenchment of military and security institutions in productive sectors. As Africa Confidential’s detailed reporting documented, approximately 22 per cent of the national budget was allocated to the military in the pre-war period, with management that remained “opaque” .

Beyond direct budget allocations, individual officers gained access to funds through a complex network of “military-industrial” companies such as Giad, which falls under the Ministry of Defence and operates through a web of subsidiaries . A report by Sudanese researcher Suliman Baldo for the US-based Sentry Group highlighted the role of Al Sabika Al Zahabia, a gold mining company that remained controlled by the General Intelligence Service even after the 2019 revolution .

The Rapid Support Forces, originally rebadged from the Janjaweed militias that operated in Darfur, developed their own economic empire. Lieutenant-General Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo, second-in-command of the RSF and brother of Hemedti, along with Hemedti himself, incorporated “several private companies in Sudan and the United Arab Emirates” that carried out contracts for the RSF under opaque arrangements . These economic interests provide the material basis for the RSF’s military capabilities and create powerful incentives for continued conflict.

The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy’s 2026 outlook emphasizes that the war “is sustained not only by national actors but also by external entities that provide arms, financing, and political cover to warring parties” . The military-economic complexes of both SAF and RSF are embedded in transnational networks that profit from continued conflict and resist peace efforts that would threaten their revenue streams.

2.4 Destruction of Productive Capacity and Livelihoods

The war has systematically destroyed Sudan’s productive base across multiple sectors. The Tahrir Institute notes that “agricultural, trade, and informal economies have been severely disrupted, fueling inflation, unemployment, and food insecurity” . This destruction is not collateral damage but, in many cases, a deliberate strategy of war: controlling agricultural areas denies food to opponents, looting livestock and equipment funds military operations, and destroying market infrastructure weakens communities associated with the other side.

The humanitarian consequences are catastrophic. UN-backed food security analysis indicates that famine conditions “may be prevalent” in Kadugli and Dilling in South Kordofan, while acute malnutrition rates in Um Baru and Kernoi localities in North Darfur exceeded famine thresholds in December 2025 . A 26-truck humanitarian convoy reaching these besieged cities in February 2026—the first in more than three months—carried life-saving supplies for more than 130,000 people, a fraction of those in need .

Edem Wosornu, Director of the Crisis Response Division at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, told the Security Council that the toll on relief workers is mounting: since the conflict began, some 130 humanitarian workers—”nearly all Sudanese”—have been killed . In one week in February 2026, four incidents left humanitarian personnel killed or injured while delivering food. The World Health Organization reported that three health facilities were attacked in South Kordofan in a single week, killing 31 people including children and health workers .

2.5 The Humanitarian Funding Gap

Against this backdrop of escalating need, international funding falls desperately short. The 2026 humanitarian response plan calls for $2.9 billion to reach more than 20 million people—”two out of every five people—across the country” . The gap between pledged and delivered funding has been a persistent feature of the international response, leaving humanitarian agencies to make impossible triage decisions about who receives assistance and who is left to fend for themselves.

The Tahrir Institute’s policy priorities for 2026 include “providing sustained humanitarian aid” alongside enforcing sanctions and arms embargoes, strengthening accountability mechanisms, and supporting a genuinely civilian-led political process . Without a dramatic increase in humanitarian funding and sustained access negotiated with warring parties, the death toll from hunger and disease may ultimately exceed that from direct violence.

3. Political Status: War, Atrocity, and State Fragmentation

3.1 The Thousand-Day War: Combatants and Front Lines

The conflict that erupted on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” has become one of the most destructive wars of the twenty-first century. As the conflict approaches its third anniversary in April 2026, UN Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo reports that “front lines have fluctuated in North Darfur, North Kordofan, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states” .

In North Kordofan, the state capital El Obeid is “besieged from three sides by the RSF,” while the SAF have sought to reassert their presence in and around the city—”a key logistical hub for ongoing operations in the Kordofan region” . DiCarlo warned that “ground fighting inside El Obeid would have catastrophic consequences and deal a significant blow to the prospects for a ceasefire” .

South Kordofan has seen intensified fighting around Kadugli and Dilling. Although recent announcements suggested sieges there had been broken, humanitarian access remains uncertain . The RSF have also opened a new front in Blue Nile state, launching attacks on southern localities in January 2026 .

In Darfur, the RSF appear to be “in control of most of Darfur,” though fighting has recently erupted in North and West Darfur between the RSF and the SAF and their Joint Forces allies, including clashes along the Sudan-Chad border .

A defining feature of the conflict has been the escalating use of drone warfare. DiCarlo notes that “drone attacks and aerial strikes by both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have become a defining feature of this conflict” . UN spokesperson Stephane Dujarric expressed alarm at reports that “more than 50 civilians were killed in drone strikes carried out by parties to the conflict in Sudan over two days this week” in mid-February 2026, calling the attacks “yet another reminder of the devastating toll on civilians from the escalating use of drone warfare in Sudan” .

3.2 Atrocities and International Criminal Accountability

The human rights catastrophe unfolding in Sudan has drawn comparisons to the worst atrocities of the early twenty-first century. The United States, in a February 19, 2026, announcement, sanctioned three RSF commanders—Elfateh Abdullah Idris Adam, Gedo Hamdan Ahmed Mohamed, and Tijani Ibrahim Moussa Mohamed—for their role in atrocities . The State Department stated that “the RSF and allied militias engaged in a campaign of widespread killings, torture, and sexual violence in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, during the months-long siege and subsequent capture of the city in October 2025, targeting civilians based on their ethnicity and tribal identity” . The RSF also “prevented food and other humanitarian assistance from entering the city, leading to famine and disease” .

The designation of Elfateh Abdullah Idris Adam under Section 7031(c) for gross violations of human rights noted that he “brazenly filmed his atrocities, including executing unarmed civilians in El Fasher” . The Trump administration’s statement emphasized that it “seeks a lasting peace in Sudan and an end to the world’s worst humanitarian crisis” .

UN officials have framed these atrocities in the starkest terms. The February 2026 Security Council briefing came hours after a UN human rights fact-finding mechanism warned that atrocities committed by the RSF in El Fasher were “indicators of a genocidal path,” raising fears of similar patterns elsewhere . DiCarlo stated that the events in El Fasher “were preventable,” noting that while the city was under siege for more than a year, UN officials “repeatedly sounded the alarm about the risk of mass atrocities. But the warnings were not heeded” .

High Commissioner Volker Türk has now warned of the possibility of similar crimes in Kordofan, where civilians face risks of “summary executions, sexual violence, arbitrary detention and family separation” . Violence against women and girls has reached “catastrophic levels,” with demand for prevention and response services surging by 350 per cent since the war began and documented cases of sexual violence nearly tripling .

3.3 The RSF Capture of the Strategic Triangle

A significant military development in January 2026 was the RSF’s announcement that it had “successfully taken control of the strategic Almuthallath ‘Triangle’ area, which constitutes a pivotal junction between Sudan, Libya and Egypt” . According to the RSF’s official statement, this control represents “a significant step that will impact multiple combat front lines, particularly in the northern desert” .

The RSF described the victory as strengthening “efforts to combat illegal immigration and human trafficking along Sudan’s borders,” a framing that positions the paramilitary force as a state actor concerned with border security . The area’s strategic importance derives from its function as “a crucial economic and border crossing point between the three countries,” serving as “a vital hub for trade and transportation between North and East Africa” and containing natural resources including “oil, gas, and minerals” .

The RSF’s control of this tri-border area has profound implications for regional dynamics. It provides the RSF with access to supply routes, potential revenue sources, and strategic depth. It raises concerns in Egypt and Libya about cross-border spillovers and the expansion of RSF influence beyond Sudan’s borders. And it demonstrates the paramilitary force’s capacity to project power and control territory far from its Darfur origins.

3.4 The Fragmentation of State Authority

The war has fundamentally transformed—and in many respects eliminated—the Sudanese state as a coherent entity. The Tahrir Institute’s 2026 outlook notes that “seven years since the December Revolution and three years into a devastating war, the aspirations of the Sudanese people for freedom, peace, and justice remain unfulfilled. The fundamental right to life continues to be systematically threatened” .

The formal state structures that survived the 2019 revolution have been captured by the warring parties. The SAF controls the rump state apparatus in areas it holds, including Port Sudan, which has become the de facto capital. The RSF has established parallel governance structures in areas under its control, including the tri-border region and much of Darfur. Neither entity commands legitimacy beyond its military reach, and both are implicated in the atrocities documented by international bodies.

The international community’s engagement is complicated by this fragmentation. The “Quad countries—Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States” have pursued initiatives to secure a humanitarian truce . The “Quintet” mechanism brings together the African Union, European Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, League of Arab States, and United Nations . But these diplomatic structures struggle to engage with parties that have shown no willingness to compromise and that derive material benefits from continued conflict.

3.5 The Failure of Mediation and the Prospect of Continued War

Despite intensified international engagement, mediation efforts have consistently failed to achieve even a humanitarian ceasefire, let alone a political settlement. DiCarlo acknowledged that “efforts to find a path toward peace are intensifying” and welcomed progress in the Quad initiative, but the fundamental obstacles remain unchanged: both parties believe they can achieve military victory, both have access to external support that sustains their campaigns, and neither faces sufficient pressure to compromise .

The Tahrir Institute’s analysis emphasizes that “no sustainable peace is possible while foreign support continues to fuel violence” and calls on the international community to play a critical role by “enforcing sanctions and arms embargoes, cutting off the war’s financial lifeline, strengthening mechanisms to hold perpetrators accountable, providing sustained humanitarian aid, and supporting a genuinely civilian-led political process” .

The human rights mechanism’s warning of “indicators of a genocidal path” in El Fasher and the possibility of similar crimes in Kordofan underscores the stakes of continued international inaction . DiCarlo’s plea to the Security Council was unequivocal: “Unified messaging and strong action by the Security Council is more important than ever. Pressure must be brought on the parties and those who back them to end the war now” .

Yet the record of Security Council action on Sudan offers little ground for optimism. The Council has been divided, with competing interests among permanent members limiting its ability to impose meaningful consequences on the warring parties or their external backers. The arms embargo, where it exists, is poorly enforced. Sanctions, when imposed, target mid-level commanders rather than the leadership or the external actors providing material support.

3.6 Civil Society and Grassroots Resistance

Amid the catastrophe of war, Sudanese civil society has demonstrated remarkable resilience and organizing capacity. The Tahrir Institute’s policy priorities emphasize that “grassroot actors, including emergency response rooms and women’s groups, are central to civilian survival, resistance, and humanitarian coordination” . These networks have filled voids left by the collapsed state, organizing mutual aid, documenting atrocities, and maintaining spaces for civilian coordination even in areas controlled by armed groups.

The Tahrir Institute calls for mandating “their meaningful inclusion in peace negotiations, alongside sustained pressure to end the conflict and establish humanitarian corridors” . Women’s groups are particularly critical: they have been at the forefront of humanitarian response, and they have insisted that any peace process must address the specific harms inflicted on women and girls, including the systematic use of sexual violence as a weapon of war.

The exclusion of these grassroots actors from international mediation efforts “limits both legitimacy and effectiveness” . Any peace agreement negotiated exclusively among armed actors will lack the popular buy-in necessary for implementation and will fail to address the underlying grievances that fuel conflict.

4. Regional Position: Destabilization and Proxy Dynamics

4.1 Relations with North African Neighbours

Sudan’s relations with its North African neighbours have been profoundly reshaped by the war, with each country navigating the competing demands of security, diplomacy, and the protection of national interests.

Egypt shares an extensive border with Sudan and has historically maintained complex relations with Khartoum, shaped by Nile water politics, historical ties, and security cooperation. The RSF’s capture of the tri-border area with Egypt and Libya in January 2026 represents a significant development for Egyptian security planners . Egypt has historically supported the SAF, viewing a unified Sudanese state under military control as preferable to fragmentation and the emergence of an RSF-controlled entity with ties to regional actors that Egypt views with suspicion. Egypt is also a member of the Quad initiative seeking to broker a humanitarian truce, reflecting its interest in stabilizing its southern neighbour .

Libya’s fragmentation has intersected with Sudan’s conflict in multiple ways. The RSF’s control of the tri-border area creates potential linkages between Sudan’s paramilitary forces and the myriad armed groups operating in eastern Libya. Cross-border movements of fighters, weapons, and goods have been reported, and the absence of effective state authority on either side of the border creates a sanctuary for actors seeking to evade detection. DiCarlo noted that “reports indicate that weapons also continue to transit through Sudan’s neighbors” .

Chad has been directly affected by the conflict, with fighting erupting along the Sudan-Chad border in early 2026. On January 16, the Government of Chad announced that seven Chadian soldiers had been killed during a confrontation with RSF elements in the border area. The RSF later acknowledged the clash, characterizing the incident as an “unintentional mistake” . This incident underscores the risk of the conflict’s regionalization and the potential for escalation between Sudan’s warring parties and neighbouring states.

South Sudan, which separated from Sudan in 2011, remains deeply entangled in its northern neighbour’s conflicts. DiCarlo noted that “movements of armed groups across Sudan and South Sudan’s border in both directions continue to be reported” . South Sudan’s own fragility makes it vulnerable to spillovers, and the presence of Sudanese armed groups on its territory creates dilemmas for Juba’s leadership.

Ethiopia, while not a North African country, is a critical regional actor with interests in Sudan’s stability. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute with Egypt has historically drawn Sudan into complex trilateral negotiations, but the current conflict has rendered Khartoum incapable of coherent diplomacy on this or any other file.

4.2 External Support and Proxy Dynamics

The war in Sudan has drawn in external actors whose support sustains the conflict and complicates peace efforts. The Tahrir Institute’s analysis emphasizes that the war “is sustained not only by national actors but also by external entities that provide arms, financing, and political cover to warring parties” .

The United Arab Emirates has been accused of providing support to the RSF, though Abu Dhabi denies these allegations. The RSF’s economic interests in gold mining and other sectors intersect with Emirati commercial networks, and the UAE has historically maintained ties with Hemedti and his forces. The Quad mechanism, which includes the UAE alongside Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, reflects an effort to align external actors behind diplomatic efforts, but suspicions about continued support undermine confidence in the process.

Russia’s Wagner Group (subsequently reorganized) has been reported to have provided support to the RSF, including through gold mining operations that generate revenue for the paramilitary force. Russia’s broader engagement in Africa, including through the Africa Corps and other entities, creates interests in maintaining influence rather than promoting genuine peace.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have both engaged diplomatically while maintaining relationships with Sudanese actors. Saudi Arabia’s interests focus on Red Sea security and the stability of a neighbouring state, while the UAE’s interests appear more complex and contested.

The United States has intensified its engagement, with the Trump administration’s February 2026 sanctions targeting RSF commanders and its call for “the belligerents to accept the U.S.-brokered humanitarian truce without preconditions” . The US has also worked through the Quad mechanism to coordinate international pressure. However, the effectiveness of US engagement is limited by the administration’s broader foreign policy priorities and the difficulty of imposing costs on actors who have already demonstrated willingness to incur enormous human and material losses.

4.3 The Regionalization of the Conflict

UN officials have expressed urgent concern about “the risk of regionalization of the conflict” . The Chad border clash demonstrates how easily the war can draw in neighbouring states. The RSF’s control of the tri-border area with Libya and Egypt creates new vectors for spillover. The movements of armed groups across the South Sudan border add another layer of complexity.

DiCarlo warned that “escalating tensions and rhetoric among neighboring states over the situation in Sudan underscore the impact of the conflict on regional stability” . The potential for the war to become a proxy conflict among regional powers—with Egypt and the UAE on opposing sides, or with Gulf states pursuing competing agendas—represents a nightmare scenario that would further complicate peace efforts and deepen human suffering.

The Tahrir Institute’s call for “coordinated international engagement that promotes stability, reconciliation, and the protection of human rights, while centering the needs and aspirations of the Sudanese people” reflects the recognition that only unified external pressure can create conditions for peace . Yet such coordination remains elusive, with external actors pursuing competing agendas and providing material support that perpetuates conflict.

4.4 The Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis

The war has generated one of the world’s largest displacement crises, with millions of Sudanese fleeing their homes. Many have crossed into neighbouring countries—Chad, Egypt, South Sudan, Ethiopia—creating humanitarian challenges for hosts already facing their own difficulties. The refugee flows add another dimension to regional instability, straining resources, complicating border security, and creating potential recruitment pools for armed groups.

Egypt, already hosting large numbers of Sudanese refugees from previous conflicts, has seen continued arrivals. The RSF’s control of the tri-border area may affect migration routes and border management. Chad, one of the world’s poorest countries, has absorbed hundreds of thousands of Darfuri refugees, with the recent border clashes raising concerns about the militarization of refugee-hosting areas.

The humanitarian catastrophe inside Sudan also generates regional implications. Famine conditions, disease outbreaks, and the collapse of basic services do not respect borders. The potential for cross-border movements of armed groups, weapons, and illicit goods interacts with humanitarian flows in ways that complicate response efforts.

5. Conclusion: Sudan’s Trajectory and the Prospects for Reconstruction

Sudan in early 2026 presents a portrait of comprehensive national catastrophe. More than 1,000 days into a brutal war, the country has experienced “staggering violence and unimaginable suffering” across its entire territory . The economy, which had been poised for a historic breakthrough with international debt relief and reform programmes, has been destroyed, with hyperinflation, unemployment at 58 per cent, and productive capacity systematically dismantled . The political order has fragmented beyond recognition, with two warring military factions—both implicated in atrocities, both sustained by external support—controlling different parts of the country while the civilian population suffers the consequences.

The human toll defies comprehension. Famine conditions prevail in multiple locations. Sexual violence has reached catastrophic levels. More than 130 humanitarian workers have been killed. Genocide indicators have been documented in Darfur and warned for Kordofan . The international community, despite repeated warnings and the activation of multiple diplomatic mechanisms, has proven unable or unwilling to take the kind of decisive action that might force an end to the fighting.

Yet even in this darkness, there are flickers of possibility. The Quad initiative has made some progress toward a humanitarian truce . A humanitarian convoy reached besieged cities in South Kordofan in February 2026, the first in more than three months . Sudanese civil society continues to organize, to document, to demand accountability, and to provide mutual aid in the absence of state support . These grassroots actors represent the most credible foundation for any future recovery—if and when the guns fall silent.

The path to that silence runs through unified international pressure on the warring parties and their external backers. As DiCarlo told the Security Council, “pressure must be brought on the parties and those who back them to end the war now” . As the Tahrir Institute emphasizes, “no sustainable peace is possible while foreign support continues to fuel violence” . As the United States declared in imposing sanctions, the world’s worst humanitarian crisis demands resolution .

The tragedy of Sudan is that its people had already endured decades of authoritarian rule, international isolation, and conflict before the 2019 revolution raised hopes of a different future. Those hopes have been brutally dashed by the current war. But the Sudanese people have demonstrated remarkable resilience throughout their history, and the grassroots networks that have sustained communities through 1,000 days of war will be essential to any eventual reconstruction.

The questions that remain unanswered are whether the international community can find the will to act, whether the warring parties can be compelled to cease their violence, and whether the foundations for a just and inclusive peace can be laid before Sudan descends further into fragmentation and conflict. The answers to these questions will determine not only Sudan’s trajectory but also the stability of a region that can ill afford another failed state at its heart.

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