Abstract

This paper examines the economic and political status of Chad in Central Africa as of early 2026, arguing that the country represents a distinctive case of authoritarian consolidation amid profound structural vulnerabilities. Drawing on 2026 budget documents, CEMAC regional projections, diplomatic reporting, and security analysis, the analysis demonstrates that Chad under President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno is navigating a triple transition: consolidating power following the 2021 military transition, resetting strategic partnerships after the November 2024 rupture with France, and pursuing economic diversification while managing deep structural fragilities. Economically, Chad projects 2.1% growth for 2026—the weakest in the CEMAC region—with diversification efforts centered on the CotonTchad revitalization plan and nascent special economic zones, alongside ambitious fiscal modernization targeting 10% revenue growth through digitalization. Politically, the regime faces domestic opposition through the newly formed “Save Democracy in Chad” coalition while managing external pressures including over 900,000 Sudanese refugees and volatile relations with Libya. The France-Chad relationship has been reconfigured from security dependence toward economic partnership, reflecting both N’Djamena’s assertion of sovereignty and Paris’s broader strategic recalibration in Africa. The paper concludes that Chad’s status embodies the predicament of the Central African “gatekeeper state”: political survival achieved through control of resource rents and strategic external positioning, but structural transformation impeded by institutional weakness, regional instability, and the legacy of personalized governance.

1. Introduction: The Déby Era’s Second Generation

When Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno assumed power in April 2021 following his father’s death on the battlefield, Chad entered a new political era—one that combined continuity of the Déby dynasty with uncertainty about the transition’s trajectory. Nearly five years later, as of February 2026, the contours of the younger Déby’s rule have crystallized: a 2024 electoral process that conferred formal presidential authority, the dramatic November 2024 termination of France’s military presence, and a concerted push for economic modernization that seeks to reduce dependence on volatile oil revenues.

Chad occupies a distinctive position in the Central African landscape. Geographically, it is the region’s largest country, a Sahelian state bridging Arab Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, with borders touching Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger. This geographic positioning has historically rendered Chad a strategic actor—a “desert citadel” whose stability or instability ripples across multiple regional security complexes. Politically, it represents one of Central Africa’s most durable authoritarian systems, with the Déby family having ruled since 1990 through a combination of military effectiveness, strategic patronage, and external backing. Economically, it embodies the resource curse: oil wealth that has financed state survival but failed to generate broad-based development, leaving Chad ranked among the world’s least developed countries despite its hydrocarbon endowment.

This paper assesses Chad’s contemporary status through integrated political and economic analysis. The political section examines the regime’s consolidation trajectory, opposition dynamics, security challenges including the Sudanese refugee crisis, and the dramatic recalibration of the France-Chad relationship. The economic section analyzes the 2026 budget’s ambitious fiscal reforms, Chad’s underperformance in regional digital finance, diversification initiatives, and the structural constraints that limit transformation. Together, these dimensions reveal a state managing political survival through adroit external positioning and internal control, yet facing profound structural barriers to the development its population desperately needs.

2. The Political Landscape: Consolidation, Contestation, and Strategic Reorientation

2.1 From Transition to Presidency: Mahamat Déby’s Consolidation

Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno’s path from interim military ruler to elected president reflects a carefully managed transition designed to maintain continuity while adapting to post-coup normative pressures. Following his father’s death fighting rebels in April 2021, the young general assumed leadership of the Transitional Military Council, initially promising an 18-month transition. This timeline was subsequently extended, and presidential elections were eventually held in 2024, with Déby securing victory in a process opposition critics characterized as deeply flawed.

By early 2026, Déby has consolidated his position through familiar mechanisms: control over security forces, strategic distribution of patronage, and external partnerships that provide both legitimacy and resources. The regime maintains the Déby family’s characteristic fusion of military command and political authority, with key security positions held by trusted allies and relatives. This consolidation, however, operates against a backdrop of persistent opposition and significant governance challenges.

2.2 Opposition Formation: “Save Democracy in Chad”

On January 10, 2026, a significant political development occurred with the formation of a new opposition coalition in N’Djamena. Seven political parties united under the banner “Save Democracy in Chad” to challenge what they characterize as authoritarian consolidation . The coalition’s founding statement condemns “a democratic deficit marked by rigged elections” and a country where “human rights are violated” .

Izadine Ahmat Tidjani, the coalition’s coordinator, articulated a dual mission: to “denounce irregularities and abuses of power” and to “inform citizens about their rights and political issues” . This framing reflects opposition recognition that electoral processes alone cannot dislodge entrenched power, necessitating longer-term civic mobilization.

The coalition’s formation occurs against the backdrop of the August 2025 sentencing of prominent opposition figure and former Prime Minister Succès Masra to 20 years imprisonment for “spreading hateful and xenophobic messages and complicity in murder” . Masra, leader of Les Transformateurs, had emerged as a significant challenger to Déby’s transition. His imprisonment has become a focal point for opposition mobilization, with Les Transformateurs’ secretary-general, Tog-Yeum Nagorngar, explicitly calling for Masra’s “amnesty” as part of the new coalition’s demands .

The regime’s response to opposition formation will test its consolidation strategy. Historically, Chadian authorities have alternated between co-optation and repression, depending on perceived threat levels. The new coalition’s capacity to mobilize sustained pressure—particularly given Masra’s imprisonment and the broader climate of constrained civic space—remains uncertain.

2.3 The Strategic Rupture: Ending France’s Military Presence

The most consequential political development of 2025 was Chad’s November 2024 decision to terminate military cooperation with France, followed by the complete withdrawal of French forces by January 31, 2025 . This decision fundamentally altered Chad’s external security architecture and signaled a dramatic assertion of sovereignty by the Déby regime.

The termination ended a relationship of extraordinary duration and intensity. French soldiers and fighter aircraft had been stationed in Chad almost continuously since the country’s 1960 independence, with France viewing Chad as its last reliable military foothold in the Sahel following forced withdrawals from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in the wake of coups . The relationship had been mutually beneficial: France maintained strategic positioning and influence; Chad received essential security backing, including air support that had repeatedly proven decisive against rebel advances.

Déby’s November 2024 announcement, while abrupt, carefully calibrated the rupture’s scope. While welcoming “the complete departure of the French army,” he simultaneously stressed that Chad was “not breaking off its relationship with France altogether” . This distinction—ending military cooperation while preserving diplomatic and economic ties—reflects strategic calculation rather than ideological rupture. Chad sought to demonstrate sovereignty and respond to domestic anti-French sentiment while avoiding complete isolation from its historically most important partner.

2.4 The Paris Reset: Economic Partnership as New Foundation

The rupture’s aftermath has been characterized by deliberate efforts to reconstruct bilateral relations on new foundations. On January 29, 2026—nearly one year after the last French troops departed—President Déby met with French President Emmanuel Macron at the Élysée Palace for talks explicitly framed as resetting the relationship .

The meeting’s outcomes reflect both sides’ adaptation to new realities. The Chadian presidency emphasized that “revitalising economic cooperation is a priority,” highlighting “energy, digital technology and agriculture” as fields for enhanced engagement . The French presidency concurred, stating that “the focus is no longer on security but on the dynamics of investment and cultural exchanges” .

A joint statement issued after the talks pledged a “revitalised partnership, based on mutual respect and shared interests” . While no specific financial commitments were announced, the meeting established a framework for continued engagement that acknowledges Chad’s assertion of sovereignty while preserving French access and influence through non-military channels.

The reset reflects pragmatic calculation on both sides. For Chad, diversification of security partnerships “has not produced the expected results,” making continued relationship with a reliable partner strategically valuable . For France, maintaining economic and cultural ties preserves influence in a strategically located country and region, even without a military footprint. The approach aligns with Paris’s broader strategy of adopting “an economic and cultural prism” in its Africa policy following military setbacks across the Sahel .

2.5 The Sudanese Refugee Crisis: Humanitarian Pressure and Regional Diplomacy

Chad’s political stability is significantly strained by the ongoing conflict in neighboring Sudan. Since war erupted between Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces in April 2023, more than 900,000 refugees have fled to Chad—a figure representing “one in three refugees in the eastern part of the country” as of January 2026 .

The humanitarian scale is staggering. Eastern Chad, already among the country’s poorest and most infrastructure-deficient regions, now hosts a population equivalent to a significant percentage of local inhabitants. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has issued urgent appeals: “Chad cannot cope alone. The world cannot afford to look away” .

This refugee influx generates multiple pressures. Humanitarian: basic services—health, education, water—are overwhelmed. Security: refugee camps can become sites of armed group recruitment or cross-border raids. Political: host communities may resent perceived resource diversion to refugees, creating intercommunal tensions. Economic: food prices and local competition increase.

The crisis also engages Chadian diplomacy. Déby discussed the Sudan situation with Macron during their January 2026 meeting, with both leaders urging “the warring parties to implement the humanitarian truce proposed by the so-called Quad group” (United States, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia) . The joint statement called for “an international environment conducive to a resolution of the conflict, preserving the unity and territorial integrity of the country” .

2.6 Volatile Relations with Libya

Chad’s northern border with Libya represents another zone of persistent tension. In late December 2025, nine Libyan truck drivers were kidnapped in northern Chad in apparent retaliation for the arrest of approximately 60 Chadians in the Libyan city of al-Kufra following “a fight caused by an identity check that went wrong” .

Chadian Foreign Minister Abdallaye Fadoul characterized the incident as “unfortunate” but part of a series of recent incidents that “do not, however, reflect the nature of relations between the two brotherly peoples” . This diplomatic framing seeks to contain bilateral fallout while addressing underlying tensions.

The Libya relationship is complicated by multiple factors: cross-border ethnic ties, arms trafficking, mercenary recruitment, and competition over influence in the post-Qaddafi vacuum. Chadian armed groups have historically operated from Libyan territory, while Libyan factions have recruited from Chadian communities. Managing this relationship requires constant diplomatic attention and occasionally produces the kind of incidents witnessed in December.

2.7 Domestic Security Environment

The Austrian Foreign Ministry’s travel advisory, updated January 2026, provides sobering assessment of Chad’s security environment. A “regional travel warning (security level 4 of 4)” applies to “border regions with Libya, the Central African Republic and Cameroon,” while “high security risk (security level 3 of 4)” applies to the capital N’Djamena itself .

The advisory warns that “the situation is tense and insecure and can deteriorate rapidly. Generally, there is a high risk nationwide of becoming a victim of violent crime on overland journeys. In all former combat zones, there is also a risk of unexploded ordnance and minefields” . “A particularly high security risk exists in the areas around Lake Chad and in the border areas with Libya, Cameroon and the Central African Republic” .

This security environment imposes significant constraints on economic activity and development. Agricultural production in border areas is disrupted. Trade routes are insecure. Investment—both domestic and foreign—is deterred by risks that raise costs and threaten personnel. The state’s capacity to project authority beyond major population centers remains limited, creating space for armed groups and criminal networks.

3. The Economic Status: Fiscal Modernization Amid Structural Fragility

3.1 Growth Trajectory: The Region’s Weakest Performer

Chad’s economic growth projections for 2026 position it as Central Africa’s weakest performer. According to CEMAC Commission forecasts, Chad’s GDP is expected to grow by only 2.1% in 2026, trailing Cameroon (3.6%), Central African Republic (4.1%), Congo (4.2%), and Gabon (6.3%), and only marginally ahead of Equatorial Guinea’s projected 0.7% .

This growth, modest as it is, depends on specific diversification initiatives. The Commission attributes the projected expansion primarily to the “CotonTchad SN revitalization plan” and “the gradual development of special economic zones” . CotonTchad, the country’s historically significant cotton parastatal, has been targeted for revival as part of agricultural sector development. Special economic zones represent an attempt to create enclaves of investment-attracting infrastructure and regulation, learning from models employed elsewhere on the continent.

The broader regional context provides limited tailwinds. The BEAC (Bank of Central African States) projects CEMAC growth of 3.8% for 2026-2027, driven by “various structural transformation initiatives underway, notably the sub-regional import-substitution strategy for local products (beef, fish, cassava, rice)” . Chad’s ability to benefit from these regional initiatives depends on its own productive capacity and infrastructure connectivity—both severely constrained.

3.2 The 2026 Budget: Ambitious Fiscal Reform

The 2026 budget proposal, presented in December 2025, reveals government strategy for managing fiscal constraints while pursuing modernization. Central to the budget is an ambitious tax reform agenda targeting revenue mobilization through digitalization and tax base expansion .

Tax revenues are projected to reach 1,446.058 billion FCFA in 2026, a 10% increase from 1,310.94 billion FCFA in 2025 . The government attributes this projected growth to “economic prospects, but also to the rise of digital tools: e-Tax, interconnection of regulatory authorities and especially the Standardized Electronic Invoice (FEN), presented as a lever for traceability and the fight against fraud” .

The 79-article finance law introduces several innovations :

1. Income tax by category (IRPP), rationalizing personal income taxation

2. Reduced withholding tax rates on investment income

3. Integration of measures related to special economic zones

4. Extension of VAT to activities including e-commerce

5. New data interconnection obligations for certain institutions

The stated objective is to “tax better,” improve taxpayer relations, and enhance the business environment while “securing non-oil revenues, deemed crucial in a context of volatile commodity prices” .

This fiscal modernization agenda reflects recognition that hydrocarbon revenues cannot be relied upon indefinitely. Oil price volatility, production challenges, and global energy transition pressures all counsel diversification of revenue sources. The digitalization push, if effectively implemented, could gradually formalize economic activity and expand the tax base—a long-term transformation requiring sustained institutional capacity building.

3.3 The Mobile Money Paradox: Regional Laggard

Chad’s digital finance landscape reveals starkly the country’s economic modernization challenges. Despite the CEMAC region’s “real explosion of mobile money, which has become one of the main levers of financial transformation in Central Africa,” Chad “remains behind” .

BEAC data illustrates the scale of underperformance. Between 2019 and 2023, the number of electronic money transactions in the region grew from 794 billion FCFA to 3,517 billion FCFA—a “spectacular progression of 341.3%” . Cumulative transaction value reached 28,911 billion FCFA in 2023, up from 11,335 billion FCFA five years earlier, representing a 155% increase .

Chad’s position, however, is marginal. While instant transfers via electronic money represent 94.8% of all CEMAC transactions, Chad captures only 0.73%, ranking just above Equatorial Guinea (0.11%) . Of the 40 million mobile money accounts in the sub-region, Chadians hold only 2.1 million, corresponding to a “financial penetration rate of 19.78%, one of the lowest in the region” .

This “structural delay” reduces Chad’s participation in the regional digital market and constrains financial inclusion . It reflects multiple factors: limited telecommunications infrastructure, low smartphone penetration, regulatory barriers, and population dispersion in a vast, sparsely populated country.

3.4 Removing the Mobile Money Tax: A Strategic Signal

The 2026 budget addresses mobile money underperformance through a significant policy reversal: “total abolition of the tax on money transfer operations, introduced in 2022 at 0.2% then reduced in 2024 to 0.1%” . Starting in 2026, this levy “must disappear to remove a major obstacle to mobile money adoption” .

Government rationale encompasses multiple objectives: encouraging digital service usage, facilitating payment traceability, and shifting transactions “from cash to more modern and secure channels” . The measure sends “a strong signal to operators, often reluctant in the face of levies perceived as penalizing for consumers” .

The policy shift acknowledges that taxing an emerging sector still building scale is counterproductive—that revenue maximization requires first expanding the base. However, analysts note that “the country will also have to meet other structural challenges” . Infrastructure deficits, literacy barriers, and trust issues cannot be resolved by tax policy alone. In a context where “mobile money has become an essential tool for economic development and financial inclusion in Central Africa, Chad is playing something of its economic future” .

3.5 Diversification Initiatives: CotonTchad and Special Economic Zones

Beyond fiscal reform, Chad’s economic strategy centers on two diversification pillars identified in CEMAC growth projections.

CotonTchad Revitalization: The cotton sector has historically been one of Chad’s few non-oil industries, providing livelihoods for hundreds of thousands of rural households. The CotonTchad parastatal, despite decades of mismanagement and financial difficulties, remains potentially viable given Chad’s comparative advantage in cotton production. The “revitalization plan” referenced in CEMAC projections suggests government commitment to sector rehabilitation, though details on investment, governance reform, and market access remain unspecified .

Special Economic Zones (SEZs): The “gradual development” of SEZs represents Chad’s attempt to replicate a model employed across Africa and Asia: creating geographically delimited areas with superior infrastructure, streamlined regulation, and tax incentives to attract investment . Successful SEZs can generate employment, exports, and technology transfer. However, they require significant upfront investment, effective governance, and strategic positioning—conditions Chad struggles to meet. The risk is creating enclaves with limited linkage to the broader economy.

3.6 Oil Sector Realities

Any assessment of Chad’s economy must acknowledge the persistent centrality of hydrocarbons, even as diversification efforts proceed. Oil accounts for the vast majority of export earnings and a significant share of government revenue. The Doba basin production, transported via pipeline to Cameroon’s Atlantic coast, remains the economy’s lifeblood.

However, the oil sector faces multiple challenges. Production has faced technical difficulties and maturity-related declines. Price volatility introduces fiscal unpredictability, as the 2026 budget’s emphasis on securing non-oil revenues acknowledges. Global energy transition pressures raise questions about long-term demand for Chad’s crude. And the sector’s enclave nature means limited employment and linkage effects—oil wealth finances the state but does not transform productive structures.

3.7 Structural Constraints: Infrastructure, Human Capital, and Institutions

Chad’s economic transformation confronts profound structural barriers that fiscal reform and diversification initiatives can only partially address.

Infrastructure deficit: As one of Africa’s largest but least densely populated countries, Chad faces extraordinary infrastructure challenges. Road networks are minimal, particularly outside the southern belt. Electricity access is among the continent’s lowest. Telecommunications infrastructure, while improving, remains concentrated. These deficits raise production and transaction costs, limiting competitiveness.

Human capital crisis: Chad ranks near the bottom of global human development indices. Education indicators are dismal, with low enrollment rates and poor learning outcomes. Health metrics reflect high maternal and child mortality, limited access to services, and disease burden. Without investments in human capabilities, economic diversification lacks necessary foundation.

Institutional weakness: State capacity beyond N’Djamena is minimal. Regulatory enforcement is arbitrary. Property rights are insecure. Corruption pervades economic life. These institutional deficits deter investment—both domestic and foreign—and undermine the predictability essential for private sector development.

Climate vulnerability: As a Sahelian country, Chad is highly exposed to climate variability. Drought threatens pastoral and agricultural livelihoods. Desertification reduces productive land. Lake Chad’s shrinkage—a slow-moving ecological catastrophe—undermines the livelihoods of millions dependent on its waters. Climate shocks compound economic fragility.

4. Regional Positioning: Chad Within Central African Dynamics

4.1 CEMAC Membership: Constraints and Benefits

Chad’s CEMAC membership, like other member states, provides monetary stability through the CFA franc’s fixed exchange rate and French Treasury guarantee, but at the cost of monetary policy autonomy. The BEAC sets interest rates for the entire region, which may not align with Chad’s cyclical position. Reserve pooling provides stability but exposes Chad to region-wide shocks.

The January 2026 CEMAC extraordinary summit highlighted regional vulnerabilities that affect Chad. Leaders ordered “urgent fiscal and monetary measures” including repatriation of export revenues to BEAC-managed accounts . Foreign reserve declines—approximately 1,335.7 billion FCFA ($2.4 billion) between March and November 2025—raised “concerns about the sustainability of the exchange system” . These regional pressures constrain fiscal space and reinforce the importance of the non-oil revenue mobilization emphasized in Chad’s 2026 budget.

4.2 Security Regionalism and Multilateral Engagement

Beyond monetary union, Chad participates in multiple regional security frameworks. The Lake Chad Basin Commission coordinates response to Boko Haram and other extremist groups operating in the Lake Chad region. The G5 Sahel, though weakened by Mali and Burkina Faso’s withdrawals, provided a framework for counterterrorism cooperation. The African Union and ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States) provide additional security architecture.

However, Chad’s security posture has historically prioritized bilateral partnerships—first with France, now being reconfigured—over multilateral frameworks. The November 2024 rupture with France and subsequent reset reflects this bilateral focus. Regional partners must adapt to Chad’s assertion of sovereignty while managing shared security challenges including the Sudanese refugee crisis and instability along multiple borders.

4.3 The Geopolitics of the Sudanese Crisis

The Sudan conflict positions Chad at the center of regional diplomatic efforts. As a neighbor hosting over 900,000 refugees, Chad has direct interests in conflict resolution. Its historical relationships with Sudanese armed actors—including both government forces and Darfurian groups—provide potential leverage. President Déby’s meeting with Macron included discussions of the Sudan crisis, with both leaders urging international action .

However, Chad’s Sudan policy must navigate complex dynamics. Ethnic ties across the border create both opportunities and risks. Accusations of support for particular factions could complicate relations with Sudan’s eventual government. The humanitarian imperative—managing massive refugee flows—creates immediate pressures that transcend geopolitical calculation.

5. Challenges and Prospects: The Second Déby Era

5.1 Political Consolidation vs. Legitimacy Deficit

President Déby’s consolidation of power through the 2024 electoral process has not resolved underlying legitimacy questions. Opposition formations like “Save Democracy in Chad” will continue to challenge the regime’s democratic credentials . Imprisoned opposition leader Succès Masra remains a rallying figure. International partners, even as they engage pragmatically, maintain concerns about governance and human rights.

The regime’s political challenge is to manage opposition without destabilizing repression, maintain elite cohesion through patronage distribution, and secure sufficient international legitimacy to access development finance and diplomatic support. This balancing act becomes more difficult as fiscal constraints limit patronage resources.

5.2 Economic Transformation Under Severe Constraints

The economic modernization agenda articulated in the 2026 budget—fiscal digitalization, mobile money promotion, cotton revitalization, special economic zones—represents genuine reform intent. However, implementation capacity is severely constrained by institutional weakness, infrastructure deficits, and human capital limitations. Success requires sustained commitment, technical assistance, and investment that current revenue mobilization cannot finance.

The fundamental economic challenge remains structural transformation: moving beyond oil dependence toward diversified productive capacity. This requires private investment, which requires predictable governance and infrastructure. Breaking this circle—attracting investment to build infrastructure that attracts investment—demands catalytic public investment and credible reform signaling.

5.3 External Partnership Reconfiguration

The France-Chad relationship reset will define Chad’s external positioning for years. Economic partnership must replace military cooperation as the bilateral foundation. Diversification of partnerships—with Turkey, Russia, Gulf states, and others—will continue as Chad seeks to maximize strategic options. Regional partners including Cameroon, Nigeria, and Libya require continuous diplomatic management.

The challenge is maintaining sufficient external support to sustain the regime while avoiding over-dependence that constrains sovereignty. The France rupture demonstrated Chad’s capacity for dramatic assertion of independence, but also revealed the limits of partnership diversification—hence the subsequent reset.

5.4 The Humanitarian-Security Nexus

The Sudanese refugee crisis, cross-border tensions with Libya, and persistent insecurity in multiple border zones create a humanitarian-security nexus that strains state capacity and international partnerships. Managing over 900,000 refugees requires resources Chad cannot provide alone, necessitating sustained humanitarian engagement . Border security requires military deployments that divert resources from development. Regional instability limits economic activity and investment.

Addressing these interconnected challenges requires coordinated international support, regional cooperation, and domestic capacity building—none of which can be achieved quickly or easily.

6. Conclusion: The Predicament of the Gatekeeper State

Chad in February 2026 presents the classic predicament of the African “gatekeeper state”: a regime whose power derives from control over access to external resources—oil revenues, strategic rents, diplomatic recognition—rather than from domestic productive transformation. President Mahamat Déby has consolidated power through mechanisms inherited from his father: security force control, strategic patronage, and adroit external positioning. The dramatic rupture with France and subsequent reset demonstrate this external positioning capacity—the ability to assert sovereignty while preserving essential partnerships.

Economically, the regime pursues genuine reform through fiscal digitalization and diversification initiatives. The 2026 budget’s tax modernization agenda, the mobile money tax removal, and the focus on CotonTchad and special economic zones all reflect recognition that oil dependence is unsustainable. Yet these reforms operate against profound structural constraints: infrastructure deficit, human capital crisis, institutional weakness, and climate vulnerability that no single budget can address.

The Sudanese refugee crisis—over 900,000 people—adds humanitarian pressure to existing challenges . Border tensions with Libya require constant diplomatic management. Domestic opposition, newly coalesced under the “Save Democracy in Chad” coalition, challenges regime legitimacy . Security conditions remain precarious, with travel warnings affecting most of the country .

For Central Africa, Chad’s trajectory carries region-wide implications. A stable Chad provides a buffer against spillover from Libya and Sudan, contributes to Lake Chad Basin security cooperation, and maintains regional economic connectivity. A destabilized Chad would export refugees, armed groups, and insecurity across multiple borders, with effects reaching Cameroon, Nigeria, and beyond.

The question for Déby’s second era is whether political consolidation can be translated into developmental transformation—whether the gatekeeper state can evolve beyond resource rent management toward productive diversification. The 2026 budget suggests awareness of this imperative. Whether implementation matches intent, and whether structural constraints permit success, will determine not only Chad’s future but also, to a significant degree, Central Africa’s stability.

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