Abstract

Burkina Faso stands at a critical juncture in 2026, embodying the profound tensions reshaping the Sahel region. This paper examines the country’s dual transformation: economically, a ambitious fiscal consolidation and domestic resource mobilization strategy pursued under IMF guidance; politically, a radical break with multiparty democracy justified by existential security threats. The junta’s February 2026 dissolution of all political parties marks an unprecedented democratic reversal, while simultaneous investments in digital tax infrastructure and adherence to WAEMU fiscal norms reveal a complex governance model that defies simple categorization. Despite controlling less than 60 percent of national territory and facing entrenched jihadist insurgencies, Burkina Faso projects economic growth exceeding 6 percent while deepening its alliance within the Confederation of Sahel States. This paper argues that the Traoré regime’s strategy represents a calculated bet: that sovereignty and security, achieved through authoritarian consolidation and external reorientation toward Russia, can compensate for the erosion of democratic institutions and civic space. Whether this bet succeeds will determine not only Burkina Faso’s trajectory but potentially that of the broader West African region.

1. Introduction

Landlocked in the heart of West Africa, Burkina Faso has long occupied a distinctive position in regional affairs. Named the “land of upright people” by its revolutionary leader Thomas Sankara, the country maintained a tradition of relatively stable, if imperfect, civilian governance following its democratic transition in 1991. That era has decisively ended.

Since January 2022, Burkina Faso has experienced two military coups, a escalating jihadist insurgency that has claimed thousands of lives and displaced over two million people, and a fundamental reorientation of its international partnerships . The military government led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who seized power in September 2022, has consolidated authority through measures that include the February 2026 dissolution of all political parties, the suspension of elections until at least 2029, and the severing of security ties with former colonial power France in favor of Russian military cooperation .

Yet paradoxically, this same government pursues fiscal discipline that meets West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) standards, implements sophisticated digital tax collection systems, and projects economic growth exceeding 6 percent . The 2026 budget allocates over 24 percent of expenditures to defense and security while simultaneously investing more than 20 percent in education—a balancing act that reflects the regime’s strategy of funding both “the gun and the ploughshare” .

This paper examines Burkina Faso’s contemporary political economy through three analytical lenses: the fiscal transformation embodied in the 2026 budget and domestic resource mobilization initiatives; the political consolidation represented by the dissolution of parties and the construction of an authoritarian governance model; and the regional realignment expressed through the Confederation of Sahel States (AES) and the rupture with ECOWAS and Western partners. The central argument is that Burkina Faso’s trajectory reveals an emerging governance paradigm in the Sahel: one that trades democratic participation for security and sovereignty, pursues economic nationalism through digital modernization, and seeks new international partners while breaking with established regional frameworks.

2. The Economic Landscape: Fiscal Consolidation Amid Crisis

2.1 Macroeconomic Trajectory and the 2026 Budget

Burkina Faso’s economic performance in 2025-2026 presents a striking paradox: a country confronting an existential security crisis, with over one-third of its territory outside state control, nonetheless projects robust growth and adheres to regional fiscal norms . The 2026 finance law, adopted by the Transitional Legislative Assembly on December 27, 2025, embodies this contradiction.

The budget totals 3,431 billion CFA francs in revenues against 3,918 billion in expenditures, yielding a deficit of 486 billion CFA francs . Critically, Finance Minister Aboubakar Nacanabo emphasized that this deficit, at approximately 3 percent of GDP, meets the WAEMU convergence criterion—”lower than the 3% rate set as the reference standard within WAEMU” . This adherence to regional norms signals a commitment to macroeconomic stability that international financial institutions have acknowledged.

Coface projections indicate GDP growth of 4.4 percent in 2025 accelerating to 4.8 percent in 2026, while the government’s own targets are more ambitious at 6.3 percent and 6.6 percent respectively . This growth is driven by three primary sectors: gold mining, which accounts for approximately 80 percent of exports; agriculture, employing nearly one-third of the workforce; and services, contributing about 22 percent of GDP .

Inflation has moderated significantly, from 4.2 percent in 2024 to a projected 2.5 percent in 2026, reflecting both global commodity price trends and domestic agricultural recovery . The 2025 experience of 0.5 percent deflation, while beneficial for consumers, also signaled weak domestic demand—a challenge the government’s expansionary budget aims to address .

2.2 Budgetary Priorities: Security and Human Capital

The 2026 budget allocations reveal the regime’s strategic calculus. Defense and security receive over 24 percent of expenditures, reflecting what Minister Nacanabo termed the imperative of “continuing the military and security reconquest of national territory” . This funding supports not only conventional military operations but also the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), a civilian militia force that has been implicated in human rights abuses .

Yet security spending, while paramount, does not crowd out human capital investment. Education receives over 20 percent of the budget, health over 12 percent, and agriculture approximately 6 percent . This allocation reflects what the government frames as a dual mobilization: funding both immediate security needs and the long-term development prerequisites of food self-sufficiency and human capital formation.

The agricultural allocation supports the “agro-pastoral and fisheries offensive,” a program providing inputs and equipment to boost domestic food production. With over 104 billion CFA francs mobilized for the 2025-2026 campaign, this initiative addresses both food sovereignty and the livelihood needs of a predominantly rural population . In a country where 2.7 million people face food insecurity, these investments carry urgent humanitarian significance .

2.3 Domestic Resource Mobilization: The Digital Sovereignty Initiative

Perhaps the most innovative dimension of Burkina Faso’s economic strategy is the domestic resource mobilization effort centered on digital tax administration. In January 2026, the government launched a “Certified E-Invoicing System” requiring real-time digital recording of commercial transactions . This system, implemented by the Burkina Faso Tax Administration (DGI), processes transactions instantly in a central database while minimizing physical contact between taxpayers and officials—addressing both corruption risks and the logistical challenges of operating in a conflict environment.

The strategic significance extends beyond fiscal efficiency. As Ankara-based analysts note, “In a neocolonial order where foreign aid is tied to political conditions, resources obtained through taxation of national income are the only assurance of full independence” . The digital invoicing system enables the state to monitor economic activity in real time, combat the informal economy that dominates many African countries, and reduce dependence on conditional external financing.

Preliminary results suggest this strategy is yielding dividends. By the third quarter of 2025, Burkina Faso had mobilized 2,500 billion CFA francs in domestic resources, achieving 105 percent of its targets . This performance, achieved despite increased security spending, demonstrates the potential of administrative modernization to expand fiscal space even under crisis conditions.

2.4 Fiscal Consolidation Under IMF Guidance

Paradoxically, Burkina Faso’s pursuit of fiscal discipline occurs within a framework supported by the International Monetary Fund—an institution the regime’s nationalist rhetoric might be expected to reject. In September 2023, Burkina Faso signed a four-year Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement providing approximately $302 million, with $131 million disbursed by June 2025 .

This program aims to strengthen public finance discipline through tax base broadening, elimination of certain exemptions, and gradual reduction of fuel subsidies . The government’s commitment to these reforms, despite the security crisis, reflects both the practical necessity of IMF support and the regime’s genuine interest in fiscal sustainability.

The results are measurable. Public debt, which stood at approximately 56 percent of GDP in 2024, is projected to decline to 55 percent by 2026—well below the WAEMU convergence threshold of 70 percent . The budget deficit, while still above the 3 percent WAEMU standard, narrowed from 6.7 percent of GDP in 2023 to a projected 3.5 percent in 2026 . Minister Nacanabo highlighted that “budgetary savings have improved by over 600 billion CFA francs,” reflecting aggressive rationalization of non-essential operating expenses .

2.5 Structural Vulnerabilities and External Constraints

Despite these achievements, Burkina Faso’s economy remains highly vulnerable. Gold accounts for approximately 82 percent of exports, creating dependence on global commodity prices and the investment decisions of foreign mining companies . The mining sector’s revival in 2025-2026 relies on reopening sites closed for security reasons, formalizing artisanal mining, and commissioning new operations like the Kiaka mine . Each of these depends on security conditions that remain precarious.

Agriculture, employing 31 percent of the workforce and contributing 18.6 percent of GDP, faces chronic vulnerability to weather shocks and climate change . The sector’s performance directly affects food security for millions, with 2.1 million internally displaced persons and 37.5 percent of the population living in extreme poverty .

The humanitarian situation compounds these economic challenges. With 2.7 million people facing food insecurity and over two million displaced, the social fabric is stretched to breaking point . Low human development indicators—Burkina Faso ranks 186th out of 193 countries—reflect deep structural deficits in education, health, and infrastructure that no budget allocation can quickly remedy .

External financing has also contracted. International support, almost exclusively from multilateral lenders, declined from 2.5 percent of GDP in 2021 to 1.6 percent in 2023 following the September 2022 coup . Bilateral development aid from Western partners has been suspended or reduced, though remittances from the diaspora continue to provide some cushion .

3. The Political Transformation: From Democracy to Military Rule

3.1 The Dissolution of Political Parties

On February 10, 2026, Burkina Faso’s transitional Parliament adopted a bill repealing the laws governing political parties and groups, effectively dissolving all political organizations and transferring their assets to the state . This action, approved by the Council of Ministers on January 29, represents the culmination of a three-year process of democratic retrenchment .

The government’s justification frames the dissolution as necessary for “national unity” and “rebuilding the state.” Interior Minister Emile Zerbo argued that “the proliferation of political parties has led to abuses, fuelled divisions among citizens and weakened the social fabric” . A government review purportedly found that the multiparty system had fostered excesses and undermined social cohesion, though specific evidence was not provided .

This rationale must be understood within the context of Burkina Faso’s pre-coup political landscape. Prior to 2022, the country had over 100 registered political parties, with 15 represented in parliament following the 2020 elections . The ruling People’s Movement for Progress (MPP) held 56 of 127 seats, followed by the Congress for Democracy and Progress with 20 seats . While this proliferation arguably diffused accountability and encouraged clientelism, the regime’s response—wholesale elimination rather than reform—represents an unprecedented step even in a region accustomed to military takeovers.

3.2 The Trajectory of Democratic Reversal

The February 2026 dissolution did not occur in isolation but as the latest in a series of measures consolidating authoritarian control. Following the September 2022 coup, Captain Traoré immediately suspended political activities and consolidated authority . In May 2024, after nationwide consultations boycotted by opposition parties and civil society, the junta announced a five-year extension of the transition period, effectively postponing elections until at least 2029 .

April 2025 brought an even more explicit rejection of democratic norms, with Traoré declaring that Burkina Faso was “no longer in a democracy” but rather in a “progressive people’s revolution” . This framing echoes revolutionary rhetoric while providing ideological cover for authoritarian consolidation.

The judiciary has not escaped this process. A December 2023 constitutional change placed courts directly under government control, with Traoré appointed in a supervisory capacity . In July 2025, the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) was dissolved, the government citing excessive costs .

3.3 The Shrinking of Civic Space

Beyond institutional restructuring, the junta has systematically repressed dissent through extra-legal means. Human Rights Watch documents the use of sweeping emergency laws to arbitrarily arrest, forcibly disappear, and unlawfully conscript critics, dissidents, judges, and journalists .

Forced conscription has emerged as a distinctive tool of repression. In August 2024, at least five senior members of the judiciary, including deputy prosecutor Abdoul Gafarou Nacro, were forcibly conscripted and sent to fight armed groups after speaking out against the government . Their whereabouts remain unknown. In April 2025, three abducted journalists—Guezouma Sanogo, Boukari Ouoba, and Luc Pagbelguem—resurfaced in military fatigues ten days after their disappearance, apparently victims of forced conscription .

Media freedom has similarly contracted. In April 2024, authorities ordered internet service providers to suspend access to websites and digital platforms of the BBC, Voice of America, and Human Rights Watch . While some outlets continue operating, self-censorship has become widespread, and the state’s dominance of the media landscape has intensified.

3.4 The Security Rationale and Its Limitations

The junta’s consolidation of power rests fundamentally on the security rationale: the argument that democratic institutions and civil liberties impede effective counterterrorism. As analyst Beverly Ochieng notes, “The military government will remain highly influential, especially after a recent decree appointing Traore in a supervisory capacity in the judiciary” . The regime presents itself as the only force capable of confronting jihadist groups that control vast swaths of territory.

Yet security outcomes under Traoré’s leadership challenge this justification. Fatalities have tripled since he took power, reaching 17,775 by May 2025—mostly civilians—compared with 6,630 in the three years prior . The Africa Center for Strategic Studies estimates that armed groups now control approximately 60 percent of national territory .

The most active groups—Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)—have shifted tactics toward economic warfare, targeting supply chains and infrastructure rather than seeking direct control of cities . The International Crisis Group’s 2026 “Ten Conflicts to Watch” report warns that these groups are now “strangling the roads and infrastructure that connect urban centers to neighboring countries,” effectively creating economic blockades that raise the cost of governance .

Human rights organizations have documented atrocities by both sides. Human Rights Watch has accused JNIM and ISSP of massacring civilians in northern towns, while also documenting military and VDP attacks on civilians suspected of collaborating with armed groups. In early 2024, military forces killed 223 civilians, including 56 children, in attacks on Nondin and Soro villages .

3.5 Popular Support and Its Contradictions

Despite this grim security record, Captain Traoré maintains significant popular support, particularly among urban youth and pan-Africanist constituencies. At 37, Traoré projects an image of youthful vigor and anti-imperial conviction that resonates in a country where frustration with Western influence runs deep . His rhetoric evokes Thomas Sankara, Burkina Faso’s revolutionary leader assassinated in 1987, and his image circulates widely in AI-generated videos celebrating his defiance of former colonial powers .

This support, however, may prove brittle. Coface notes that “support from the population is gradually drying up” as the humanitarian crisis worsens and security fails to improve . The regime’s authoritarian consolidation leaves limited avenues for expressing discontent, but the absence of organized opposition does not guarantee durable legitimacy.

4. Regional Realignment: The Confederation of Sahel States

4.1 Rupture with ECOWAS

Burkina Faso’s political transformation has unfolded alongside a fundamental reorientation of its regional relationships. In January 2025, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formally withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the region’s preeminent political and economic bloc . This withdrawal followed months of deteriorating relations triggered by ECOWAS’s imposition of heavy sanctions on Niger following the July 2023 coup and threatened military intervention to restore deposed president Mohamed Bazoum .

The rupture reflects deep grievances. The three Sahelian states accuse ECOWAS of being manipulated by former colonial power France and of insufficient commitment to combating jihadist violence. At the first AES summit in February 2026, Nigerien General Abdourahamane Tiani declared that “our people have irrevocably turned their backs on ECOWAS,” calling for the new bloc to become “a community far removed from the stranglehold of foreign powers” .

4.2 The Confederation of Sahel States (AES)

The Alliance of Sahel States, established in September 2023 and transformed into a confederation in July 2024, represents the institutional embodiment of this regional realignment . The AES brings together Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger in a coordinated framework for security cooperation, economic integration, and diplomatic coordination.

Security cooperation forms the alliance’s core. The three countries have coordinated their expulsion of French forces—more than 5,000 soldiers previously deployed for counterterrorism—and turned instead to Russian military partners . Approximately 2,000 Russian security personnel from Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) are now stationed across the three countries, conducting protection, training, and logistics missions .

Economic integration proceeds more slowly but with ambition. The AES is considering creation of a common currency, a customs union, and joint institutions including an investment bank funded by 5 percent of each member state’s tax revenues . Burkina Faso’s digital tax modernization initiative is explicitly designed with future interoperability in mind, potentially enabling data sharing and coordinated economic governance .

4.3 The Russian Turn and Western Rupture

Burkina Faso’s reorientation toward Russia represents one of the most consequential shifts in its foreign policy. Following the expulsion of French, American, and UN forces, Russia has become the country’s main diplomatic and military partner . This relationship provides not only security assistance but also political cover at the United Nations and rhetorical reinforcement of the regime’s anti-imperialist narrative.

The rupture with France has been particularly dramatic. Paris suspended development aid and budgetary support following the withdrawal of French forces in February 2023 . French cultural and economic influence, built over decades, has been systematically dismantled as the regime seeks to “decolonize” national institutions.

Yet this reorientation carries risks. Russian support, while valuable, has not translated into improved security outcomes. The Africa Corps contingent remains relatively small, focused primarily on force protection and regime security rather than大规模 counterinsurgency operations. The Wagner Group’s record in other African theaters suggests limited effectiveness against entrenched insurgent movements.

4.4 Continued WAEMU Membership: The Monetary Paradox

Despite withdrawing from ECOWAS, Burkina Faso remains a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which maintains the CFA franc currency peg to the euro and coordinates monetary policy through the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) . This continued membership creates a paradox: the regime rejects the political authority of ECOWAS while maintaining participation in its monetary institution.

WAEMU membership provides crucial stability. The currency peg anchors inflation expectations, facilitates trade with other West African countries, and enables access to the regional bond market for deficit financing . Breaking with WAEMU would require creating a new currency—a prospect the AES discusses but has not yet pursued seriously. The technical and economic challenges of monetary sovereignty, combined with the lack of external financing alternatives, make continued WAEMU membership a pragmatic necessity.

Trade with ECOWAS countries has continued despite the political rupture, facilitated by negotiations for new bilateral arrangements . Coface data shows that Côte d’Ivoire remains a major trading partner, accounting for 13 percent of imports, while ECOWAS members collectively represent significant shares of both imports and exports .

5. The Development Paradox: Authoritarian Modernization?

5.1 The Model of “Progressive People’s Revolution”

Captain Traoré’s characterization of Burkina Faso as engaged in a “progressive people’s revolution” offers ideological framing for what might be termed authoritarian modernization . This model combines political closure with administrative reform, nationalist rhetoric with pragmatic engagement with international financial institutions, and security prioritization with continued investment in human capital.

The model draws on distinctive ideological resources. Sankarist nostalgia provides revolutionary legitimacy, while pan-Africanist sentiment animates the rupture with Western partners. Anti-corruption messaging resonates with populations frustrated by elite impunity. Digital modernization projects like the e-invoicing system project an image of competent, forward-looking governance.

Yet the model’s internal contradictions are evident. Administrative reform cannot substitute for political participation. Digital tax collection, however efficient, does not address the underlying grievances that fuel insurgency. Russian military cooperation has not delivered security. The regime’s legitimacy rests ultimately on performance, and performance metrics in security, humanitarian conditions, and economic opportunity remain deeply troubling.

5.2 Economic Governance: Reform Without Representation

The 2026 budget and associated reforms demonstrate that authoritarian rule does not necessarily mean economic mismanagement. Burkina Faso’s fiscal consolidation, digital modernization, and adherence to WAEMU norms would be creditable in any context. The government’s ability to mobilize domestic resources while increasing security spending suggests genuine administrative capacity.

This capacity, however, operates without democratic accountability. The budget was adopted by a transitional legislature whose composition reflects regime preferences rather than popular choice. The dissolution of political parties eliminates organized channels for fiscal oversight. Journalists who might scrutinize procurement decisions face arrest or forced conscription.

The long-term sustainability of this model remains uncertain. Effective public financial management requires not only technical capacity but also political mechanisms for reconciling competing claims and building consensus. Authoritarian regimes can achieve short-term fiscal discipline but often struggle to maintain it as legitimacy erodes and elite factions compete for resources.

5.3 Human Development Under Authoritarianism

The budget’s substantial allocations to education and health reflect recognition that human capital development cannot be deferred until security is achieved. With a young population (median age approximately 17 years) and extremely low baseline indicators, investment in education and health is essential for any development trajectory.

Yet these investments occur in a context where academic freedom has been curtailed, independent civil society organizations face harassment, and the space for policy debate has narrowed. The quality of education and health services depends not only on funding but also on professional autonomy, community participation, and accountability mechanisms—all eroded under authoritarian rule.

The humanitarian crisis adds further complications. With over two million internally displaced persons, many children are displaced from their communities of origin, separated from families, or traumatized by violence. The education system must serve not only its traditional functions but also emergency response and psychosocial support roles for which it is poorly equipped.

6. Future Trajectories: Scenarios for 2026 and Beyond

6.1 Security Scenarios

The trajectory of the jihadist insurgency will fundamentally determine Burkina Faso’s future. Three scenarios are plausible:

The first scenario involves continued stalemate. JNIM and ISSP maintain control over extensive rural areas, disrupting supply chains and isolating population centers, while the military holds urban centers and key infrastructure. This outcome perpetuates the current humanitarian crisis, constrains economic activity, and gradually erodes regime legitimacy as the promised security improvements fail to materialize.

The second scenario envisions regime collapse. Military defeat, internal coup, or popular uprising could remove Traoré, potentially opening space for negotiated settlement or renewed international engagement. This scenario carries high uncertainty, as any successor regime would inherit the same structural challenges.

The third scenario—regime consolidation through military success—appears least likely given current trajectories. The ICG’s assessment that armed groups are shifting toward economic warfare rather than territorial expansion suggests they are adapting to state capabilities rather than being defeated by them .

6.2 Political Scenarios

The February 2026 dissolution of political parties forecloses near-term prospects for democratic transition. With elections postponed until at least 2029 and no organized political opposition permitted, the regime has eliminated institutional pathways for power transfer.

Two political scenarios merit consideration. The first involves extended authoritarian rule, with Traoré consolidating personal power through successive extensions of the transition, controlled “elections” without genuine competition, or constitutional revision establishing a new political order. This scenario draws on regional precedents in Mali, Chad, and other Sahelian states.

The second scenario involves managed transition, potentially through a national conference or dialogue process that produces a new constitutional framework and eventual elections. This outcome would require regime willingness to share power—unlikely given current trajectories—or sufficient internal or external pressure to force concessions.

6.3 Regional Scenarios

The AES’s evolution will significantly shape Burkina Faso’s options. Three regional scenarios are plausible:

Deepened integration within AES could create an alternative regional framework for security cooperation, economic coordination, and diplomatic solidarity. This scenario requires overcoming significant institutional, financial, and technical hurdles, including the challenge of creating a common currency without external backing.

Reconciliation with ECOWAS remains possible despite the “irrevocable” rhetoric. Practical economic interdependence, continued WAEMU membership, and eventual leadership changes in member states could create conditions for renewed engagement. ECOWAS’s February 2026 summit, addressing relations with AES, indicates continuing dialogue .

Parallel structures might emerge, with AES and ECOWAS coexisting through bilateral arrangements and pragmatic accommodations. This scenario maintains economic linkages while accommodating political differences—essentially extending the current situation of WAEMU membership alongside AES membership.

7. Conclusion

Burkina Faso in 2026 presents a study in contradictions. A military regime that has dissolved all political parties and eliminated democratic institutions simultaneously pursues fiscal discipline that meets regional standards, invests heavily in education and health, and implements sophisticated digital tax administration. A country confronting an existential security threat, with over half its territory outside state control and millions displaced, projects economic growth exceeding 6 percent. A government that has broken with ECOWAS and expelled French forces maintains membership in WAEMU and continues trading with its neighbors.

These contradictions reflect a deeper tension between sovereignty and survival. The Traoré regime’s bet is that authoritarian consolidation, nationalist mobilization, and reorientation toward Russian partners can achieve what democratic governance and Western partnership could not: security, stability, and development. This bet is not irrational given the failures of the pre-coup order and the genuine grievances that fuel popular support for the junta.

Yet the evidence for this bet’s success remains elusive. Security has deteriorated under military rule. The humanitarian crisis has deepened. International isolation, while embraced rhetorically, carries real costs in reduced development assistance and investment. Russian partnership has not translated into improved counterterrorism outcomes. The dissolution of political parties eliminates mechanisms for managing conflict and building consensus that even flawed democracies provide.

The coming years will test whether authoritarian modernization can deliver what democracy has not. Burkina Faso’s trajectory matters not only for its 23 million citizens but for the broader Sahel, where similar dynamics of insecurity, state fragility, and democratic reversal are playing out across multiple countries. If the Traoré regime succeeds in restoring security while maintaining fiscal discipline and investing in human capital, it will offer a model that other Sahelian states may follow. If it fails, the consequences—for Burkina Faso, for the AES, and for West Africa—will be severe.

What is already clear is that the era of assumptions about democratic progress in the Sahel has ended. Burkina Faso’s experiment in authoritarian governance, born of crisis and justified by necessity, will be judged by its results. The people of the “land of upright people” deserve nothing less.

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