The Economic and Political Status of The Gambia in West Africa

11 February, 2026 lov 0 Comments 4 categories

Abstract

This paper provides a deeply researched analysis of The Gambia’s economic and political status as of early 2026. A decade removed from the 2016 electoral defeat of autocrat Yahya Jammeh, the nation stands at a critical juncture. Economically, The Gambia exhibits a compelling paradox: robust macroeconomic indicators—including above-average GDP growth (5.2-5.9%), a stabilizing currency, and a dramatic diversification of exports—coexist with deep structural fragility characterized by a consumption-driven, import-dependent growth model and pervasive popular dissatisfaction. Politically, the nation navigates a contested democratic transition. While significant gains in press freedom and anti-corruption perceptions have been achieved, the Barrow administration faces a crisis of public trust, with critics accusing it of perpetuating the autocratic “gravitational pull” it was elected to abolish. As the December 2026 presidential election approaches, the convergence of severe economic discontent and unresolved constitutional questions positions the poll as a potential referendum not merely on leadership, but on The Gambia’s competing governance models. This paper argues that The Gambia’s status in West Africa is defined by this tension: it serves as a rare democratic outlier in a region experiencing democratic backsliding, yet its internal contradictions threaten to undermine the very stability that distinguishes it.

Introduction

The Republic of The Gambia, Africa’s smallest mainland state, has historically occupied a unique position within West Africa. Geographically defined by the Gambia River and almost entirely surrounded by Senegal, the nation of 2.6 million people has long been characterized by its resilience and its vulnerabilities. Since gaining independence from Britain in 1965, The Gambia has oscillated between two distinct governance traditions: a 30-year democratic era under Dawda Jawara, and 22 years of iron-fisted, autocratic rule under Yahya Jammeh (1994-2016).

The 2016 “Year of Deliverance,” which saw current President Adama Barrow assume power backed by a coalition of opposition forces, was heralded as a historic democratic breakthrough. Nearly a decade later, this paper assesses the true nature of that transformation. Utilizing the most recent data available—including February 2026 trade policy statements, 2026 budget disclosures, and comprehensive public opinion polling conducted ahead of the December 2026 elections—this analysis examines the substantive status of The Gambia. It is structured into two primary sections: first, an examination of the structural economic reality beneath headline growth figures; and second, an analysis of the political dynamics, focusing on the crisis of democratic consolidation, the 2026 election landscape, and the legacy of the Jammeh era.

Part I: The Economic Status – Macroeconomic Success Versus Structural Fragility

1.1 Macroeconomic Performance and International Standing

At first glance, The Gambia’s recent economic performance presents a narrative of successful recovery and resilience. According to the European Union’s February 2026 Trade Policy Review statement, The Gambia’s real GDP growth has averaged 5.2% per year since 2021. The government’s 2026 budget, presented to the National Assembly in December 2025 by Finance Minister Seedy Keita, projects growth to accelerate further to 5.9% in 2025, significantly above the Sub-Saharan African average.

This growth has been accompanied by notable macroeconomic stabilization. Inflation has eased substantially, declining from a peak of 10% in September 2024 to 7% by October 2025. The Gambian dalasi has stabilized, supported by two of the country’s primary foreign exchange earners: remittances and tourism receipts. Furthermore, domestic revenue mobilization has improved; the tax-to-GDP ratio, while still low by international standards, is projected to increase from 12% in 2025 to 13.2% in 2026. The fiscal deficit is forecast to narrow to just 1% of GDP.

Perhaps the most striking economic achievement is The Gambia’s dramatic reduction in export concentration. According to UNCTAD’s merchandise concentration index, The Gambia’s export reliance narrowed from 0.520 in 2017 to 0.218 in 2024. This sharp decline suggests a successful diversification of exports away from total dependence on a few commodities, a rare accomplishment for a Least Developed Country (LDC). This performance has enhanced The Gambia’s international standing, with the nation currently serving as the coordinator of the Group of Least Developed Countries at the World Trade Organization (WTO).

1.2 The Consumption-Led Growth Trap

Despite these encouraging indicators, a profound disconnect exists between macroeconomic data and structural economic reality. As Dr. Abdoulie Bojang argues in a critical February 2026 analysis, “The Gambia stands today not at a lack-of-growth problem, but at a choice-of-growth problem”. The prevailing economic model is characterized not by productive transformation, but by consumption-led growth.

This model functions as follows: economic activity is driven primarily by the circulation of money derived from imports, remittances (diaspora funding), aid, and tourism. These inflows generate demand and sustain household livelihoods, but they fail to embed durable value within the domestic economy. The result is a structural imbalance. Consumption-led growth expands imports significantly faster than exports, placing persistent pressure on foreign exchange reserves. It creates an illusion of prosperity—visible activity in ports and markets—without building the industrial or agricultural productive capacity necessary for long-term resilience.

The agriculture sector exemplifies this failure. Despite employing a significant proportion of the population and benefiting from available arable land, the sector contributes modestly to national income. Food imports continue to rise, draining foreign exchange and exposing households to global price volatility. Policy-makers have historically treated agriculture “as a social safety net rather than a strategic economic sector”. Similarly, industrial development remains stunted. The Gambia’s small market size does not preclude light manufacturing, agro-processing, or construction materials production, but these sectors are discouraged by high energy costs, limited access to long-term finance, and regulatory unpredictability.

The 2026 budget, while ambitious, reflects the continuation of this model. While it allocates a historic D18.6 billion (over 35% of expenditure) to human capital sectors (Health, Education, Agriculture), it simultaneously reveals the model’s vulnerabilities. Public debt has climbed to a record D129.5 billion, driven by domestic borrowing and currency depreciation. Infrastructure spending, while necessary, primarily facilitates circulation rather than domestic production for export.

1.3 The Disconnect Between Data and Public Perception

The most politically significant aspect of The Gambia’s economic status is the chasm between the government’s narrative of success and the lived experience of its citizens. A national opinion poll conducted by the Centre for Research and Policy Studies (CEPRASS) in early 2026 revealed that 60% of Gambians believe the economy is “badly managed” . An overwhelming 66% rate the government’s performance in job creation as poor, and the cost of living remains the population’s primary concern.

This discontent is not merely a matter of communication failure; it is a structural reality. Despite rising per capita incomes (up 24% since 2016), annual incomes remain around $750, and an estimated 53% of Gambians live below the national poverty line. For a population where 60% is under the age of 25, the lack of formal employment opportunities is acute, driving an estimated 12,000 young Gambians to attempt migration to Europe annually.

The rights group Edward Francis Small Centre for Rights and Justice (EFSCRJ) has explicitly framed the 2026 election as a “referendum on economic justice” . This framing captures the erosion of the “democratic dividend”—the expectation that political freedom would translate into tangible economic improvement. The government’s positive macroeconomic outlook has been rendered “irrelevant” to voters who do not perceive improvements in their daily livelihoods.

Part II: The Political Status – Democratic Consolidation or Autocratic Reversion?

2.1 The Gravitational Pull of Autocracy

The central political question facing The Gambia in 2026 is whether it can definitively escape what the Africa Center for Strategic Studies terms the “gravitational pull of consolidated executive power” . President Adama Barrow came to power in 2016 on a platform of democratic restoration, explicitly promising to serve only a single term and to institute constitutional term limits as a corrective to Jammeh’s 22-year rule.

These promises remain unfulfilled. Barrow successfully sought a second term in 2021 and is now actively seeking a third term in the December 2026 election—a move that has generated “considerable turmoil” among the electorate. Proposed constitutional amendments to institutionalize two-term limits were defeated in both 2020 and 2025, failing to secure the requisite three-quarters majority in the National Assembly due to insufficient support from Barrow’s own party. This failure has created a scenario where, absent explicit legal prohibitions, the incumbent can theoretically extend his rule indefinitely.

Public opinion on this matter is unambiguous. According to the CEPRASS poll, 84% of Gambians support a two-term limit, and a majority view a president seeking a third term as fundamentally “undermining democracy”. This is not merely an abstract concern; it strikes at the core of The Gambia’s transition narrative. As noted in Africa Confidential, the threatened return of Yahya Jammeh from exile in Equatorial Guinea adds further volatility. President Barrow has been “unclear” about whether Jammeh would face immediate arrest on extant charges of corruption and murder, a stance interpreted by critics as an attempt to court Jammeh’s old political base.

2.2 Governance: Measurable Progress and Stalled Reforms

The record of the Barrow administration is one of stark contradictions. On one hand, there have been undeniable achievements. The Gambia’s ranking on the Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index has improved nearly 90 places, from 145th in 2016 to 58th out of 180 countries. The country’s score on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index has advanced from 145th to 96th globally. These metrics reflect the restoration of civic space, independent media, and civil society—spheres that were violently suppressed under Jammeh.

However, this progress is incomplete and, by some measures, backsliding. There have been multiple recent instances of journalists facing intimidation and detention on defamation charges. Civil society requests to protest government policies are “at times rejected by the Inspector General of Police”. In a particularly contentious act, the government removed Auditor General Modou Ceesay from his post in September 2025, only three years into his constitutionally protected nine-year term. This action sparked angry protests and arrests in Banjul and drew formal condemnation from UN human rights rapporteurs.

Allegations of preferential treatment for government insiders have further eroded trust. Critics accuse the administration of enabling crony access to foreign exchange and government-backed loans. The liquidation of state assets recovered from the Jammeh era—valued at an estimated $362 million—has been conducted with limited transparency, with allegations of assets being sold at below-market prices to government officials. This perceived normalization of impunity and opaque governance undermines the foundational promise of the 2016 movement.

2.3 The 2026 Electoral Landscape

The December 2026 presidential election is shaping up to be the most consequential since the 2016 transition. Unlike in 2016, however, President Barrow faces a fragmented but potentially potent opposition.

The political landscape is crowded, with 19 registered political parties . The most prominent opposition figure is Ousainou Darboe, the 77-year-old leader of Barrow’s former party, the United Democratic Party (UDP). Darboe, who finished second in the 2021 election with 28% of the vote, is positioning to lead a united opposition coalition. However, his leadership is contested from within. Younger members of the UDP, frustrated by slow change and the persistence of old-guard politics, have splintered to form the Unite Movement for Change, led by Talib Ahmed Bensouda, the 40-year-old Mayor of Kanifing. Bensouda represents a technocratic, service-delivery focused alternative, emphasizing tangible improvements in water, electricity, and healthcare.

Other declared candidates include Mama Kandeh (Gambia Democratic Congress) and Bakary Badjie (United Gambian Front). Most recently, Musa Batchilly was declared the presidential candidate for the Gambia Action Party (GAP), promising “truth, justice, accountability, and transformational leadership”. However, Batchilly’s candidacy is complicated by past allegations of fraud, highlighting a recurring challenge in Gambian politics: the credibility of challengers.

The opposition faces a strategic imperative: coalition-building. With a presidential system requiring a candidate to secure over 50% of the vote to avoid a run-off, a divided opposition significantly advantages the incumbent. As of February 2026, there is significant public pressure on Darboe and the UDP to “initiate and lead Coalition 2026”. However, internal rivalries and mistrust among opposition factions remain formidable obstacles.

2.4 The External Dimension: ECOWAS, ECOMIG, and Transitional Justice

The Gambia’s political status cannot be separated from its regional context. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has played a decisive role in The Gambia’s stability. The ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia (ECOMIG) , a 500-troop strong force, has remained in the country since 2017 with a mandate to support security sector reform and deter instability. This presence is a testament to both the region’s investment in Gambian democracy and the lingering fragility of domestic security institutions.

Frustrated by the Gambian government’s slow progress in prosecuting former officials linked to abuses under Jammeh, ECOWAS took the unprecedented step of establishing a special tribunal in December 2024 to try crimes committed during the 1994-2016 period. This externalization of transitional justice underscores the domestic political paralysis. While the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) documented extensive abuses, including the alleged deaths of 240 regime opponents, domestic prosecutions have stalled. The establishment of the ECOWAS tribunal represents both a rebuke to the Barrow administration and a regional commitment to ensuring that the Jammeh era is subject to legal accountability.

2.5 A Regional Anomaly?

The Gambia’s political trajectory holds significance beyond its borders. As of early 2026, West Africa is characterized by a wave of military coups and democratic backsliding. Regimes in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) have withdrawn from ECOWAS and entrenched military rule. Coastal states face varying degrees of political crisis. In this context, The Gambia’s maintenance of an electoral calendar and its (however imperfect) respect for civic space positions it as a democratic outlier.

Yet this status is precarious. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies notes that The Gambia enjoyed “a nearly 30-year era of democratic governance from 1965 until 1994.” The current tensions represent a struggle between this older tradition and the autocratic model imposed by Jammeh. “Given the tensions over these competing governance models within West Africa,” the Center concludes, “the path taken by The Gambia will likely have larger ripple effects”. A successful consolidation of democracy in Banjul would offer a powerful counter-narrative to the region’s authoritarian drift; a reversion toward personalized rule would reinforce it.

Conclusion: The Decision Before the Nation

The Gambia in 2026 is a nation suspended between promise and peril. Economically, it has achieved the difficult task of stabilizing its macroeconomy and diversifying its exports, earning commendation from international partners. Yet it has failed to translate these macro-level gains into the structural transformation required to employ its youth, reduce poverty, or build resilience. The choice, as articulated by Dr. Bojang, is stark: continue as a consumption-dependent economy or commit, with policy coherence and political will, to a production-led model .

Politically, The Gambia has restored fundamental freedoms and broken with the overt repression of the Jammeh years. However, it has not yet institutionalized the checks and balances necessary to prevent the gradual reconcentration of executive power. The failure to enact term limits, the removal of independent oversight officials, and the perception of cronyism suggest a transition that has stalled. The December 2026 election is therefore not merely a routine contest; it is a constitutional moment.

The CEPRASS poll delivers a decisive verdict: only 16% of Gambians report trusting the President, while a plurality (45% trust “somewhat”) and a significant bloc (37% “no trust”) express deep skepticism. Yet the same poll indicates that Gambians “are not disengaged; rather, they are demanding results”. The electorate remains committed to democracy but is “informed, demanding and no longer willing to accept symbolic reforms without tangible outcomes”.

The Gambia’s status in West Africa is thus defined by this tension. It is a beacon of regional hope precisely because its citizens hold their government to a higher standard than the autocratic baseline set by its neighbors. Whether the nation emerges from 2026 with its democratic promise renewed or diminished depends on three factors: the willingness of the opposition to forge a credible, unified alternative; the incumbent’s respect for the electoral outcome; and the collective decision to finally align economic policy with the productive potential of its people. The Gambia can grow, but first it must decide to build.

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