Abstract
This paper examines the contemporary economic and political status of Mali within the West African region as of February 2026. Since the 2021 double military coup, Mali has undergone a fundamental restructuring of its domestic governance and international positioning. Politically, the junta led by Colonel Assimi Goïta has consolidated authoritarian control through the adoption of a presidentialist constitution, the systematic suspension of political parties and civil society organizations, and the judicial repression of opposition figures. Regionally, Mali has spearheaded the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and announced withdrawal from ECOWAS, precipitating the most significant fracture in West African regional integration since the organization’s founding. Economically, the country presents a paradoxical picture: macroeconomic aggregates show moderate growth driven by lithium production and post-conflict rebound, yet these figures mask deep structural fragilities including undiversified export dependence, energy crisis, fiscal constraints, and the economic costs of regional isolation. Drawing upon World Bank data, IMF projections, Africa Confidential reporting, human rights documentation, and analysis of regional geopolitical dynamics, this paper argues that Mali’s regional status is defined by its emergence as the vanguard of a sovereignty-focused, anti-France, pro-Russia counter-bloc. However, this political repositioning has come at substantial cost: the rupture with regional institutions, the erosion of democratic governance, and the tension between ambitious long-term development planning and deteriorating short-term economic security. The durability of Mali’s chosen trajectory remains contingent upon the junta’s capacity to reconcile sovereignty rhetoric with developmental delivery.

Introduction

Mali in February 2026 occupies a singular and deeply contested position in the West African regional order. Four and a half years after Colonel Assimi Goïta’s second coup consolidated military control, the country has transformed from a fragile democracy struggling against jihadist insurgency into the ideological and operational spearhead of a self-described sovereignty revolution. This transformation—encompassing constitutional revision, rupture with regional institutions, expulsion of former colonial powers, and strategic alignment with Russia—has fundamentally altered both Mali’s domestic governance architecture and its external relationships.

The significance of Mali’s trajectory extends beyond its national borders. As the most populous and geopolitically central member of the new Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Mali is shaping the strategic orientation of Burkina Faso and Niger while challenging the normative foundations of West African regionalism. Simultaneously, the country confronts acute internal contradictions: a government that projects long-term developmental ambition through its Vision 2063 framework while struggling to finance basic services, a regime that celebrates military sovereignty while failing to contain jihadist violence, and an economy that records positive growth rates while its population faces food insecurity and its businesses confront the costs of regional disintegration.

This paper addresses two principal questions: First, what are the defining characteristics of Mali’s political order as of early 2026, and how have domestic authoritarian consolidation and external strategic realignment reconfigured its regional position? Second, what is the substantive condition of Mali’s economy beneath the aggregate indicators, and how do structural vulnerabilities interact with geopolitical choices to shape developmental possibilities?

The analysis proceeds in five parts. Section one examines the institutional architecture of military rule, including the 2023 constitutional referendum, the February 2026 suspension of political parties, and the judicial suppression of opposition. Section two analyzes Mali’s rupture with ECOWAS and the formation of the AES as a rival regional pole, assessing motivations, mechanisms, and consequences. Section three evaluates the economic landscape: growth composition, fiscal constraints, energy crisis, and the structural challenge of diversification. Section four examines the geopolitical dimensions of Mali’s repositioning, particularly the deepening Russia relationship and the rupture with France. Section five synthesizes these dimensions to assess Mali’s overall regional status and the sustainability of its current trajectory.

1. The Architecture of Military Rule: Constitutionalization and Authoritarian Consolidation

1.1 The 2023 Constitution: Institutionalizing Military Prerogative

The foundational instrument of Mali’s contemporary political order is the constitution adopted by referendum in June 2023. This text, drafted under the exclusive direction of the transitional military authorities, represents a deliberate effort to constitutionalize the armed forces’ expanded political role while creating institutional mechanisms for prolonged military influence . The constitution establishes a hyper-presidential system that significantly concentrates power in the executive, eliminates the position of prime minister as an autonomous center of authority, and—most significantly—grants a “prominent place” to the armed forces in the republican institutions .

The constitutional text also creates a bicameral legislature through the establishment of a Senate alongside the existing National Assembly. While framed as institutional modernization, this expansion of parliamentary structures in a context where the legislature has functioned as a “rubber-stamp parliament of 120 placemen” suggests the creation of additional patronage vehicles rather than genuine deliberative enhancement . The constitution’s legitimation of “traditional authorities and languages” performs a dual function: it responds to nationalist critiques of postcolonial governance while potentially creating parallel hierarchies that circumvent democratic representation .

Crucially, the constitution contains a deliberate ambiguity regarding transitional President Goïta’s eligibility for future elections. While the text ostensibly prohibits the transitional president from contesting subsequent polls, widespread expectation in Bamako holds that Goïta will simply resign the transitional title ahead of any election in order to stand . This ambiguity—neither a clear disqualification nor an explicit authorization—preserves maximal strategic flexibility for the incumbent while maintaining the formal fiction of constitutional constraint.

1.2 The February 2026 Party Suspension: From Managed Transition to Open Authoritarianism

On February 3, 2026, Malian authorities announced the indefinite suspension of “all political parties and political organizations” . This decree, issued by transitional President Goïta under the justification of “preserving public order,” effectively liquidates the organizational infrastructure of democratic contestation. The suspension applies without distinction to opposition parties and those nominally supportive of the transition, indicating a comprehensive rejection of pluralist politics rather than targeted repression of specific adversaries.

The timing and context of this suspension are instructive. It follows the recommendations of a “national council of political actors” that proposed extending Goïta’s mandate for an additional five years and dissolving all political parties . This sequence—extra-constitutional deliberative body recommends indefinite incumbency; authorities adopt and expand the recommendation—exemplifies the pattern of managed political processes that simulate consultation while pre-determining outcomes favorable to the incumbent regime.

The suspension has elicited organized resistance. A broad coalition of parties scheduled protests in Bamako for February 6, 2026, which were prohibited by official decree . The coalition reported subsequent efforts to undermine mobilization, including “false information… shared online about the time and location of the march” and “threats… made on social media” . This combination of formal prohibition and informal disruption indicates systematic efforts to foreclose opposition space.

Amnesty International’s response frames the suspension as a fundamental violation of constitutional guarantees. Sahel researcher Ousmane Diallo emphasized that the junta’s decision “violates the principles of freedom of association, freedom of peaceful assembly and also freedom of expression, which are guaranteed by the Malian Constitution of 2023” . The invocation of the 2023 constitution by human rights organizations against the regime that promulgated it underscores the gap between constitutional text and authoritarian practice.

1.3 Judicial Repression and the Silencing of Dissent

The suspension of political parties forms part of a broader pattern of judicial and extra-judicial repression targeting opposition figures, journalists, and civil society actors. The February 9, 2026, decision by an appeals court in Bamako to uphold a two-year prison sentence against former Prime Minister Moussa Mara (2014-2015) exemplifies this pattern . Mara was arrested in August 2025 after expressing “solidarity with prisoners of conscience” on social media and visiting imprisoned junta critics. He was charged under the 2019 cybercrime law with “undermining state authority” and “inciting public disorder”—charges his legal team contends were supported by “no evidence of any criminal offense” .

The prosecution of prominent journalist Youssouf Sissoko, jailed for writing an article critical of Niger’s junta leader, demonstrates the transnational coordination of repression among AES states . That Malian authorities would prosecute a journalist for commentary on Niger’s political leadership—and invoke national security justifications in doing so—indicates the development of a regional ecosystem of authoritarian legalism, in which criticism of any AES regime is treated as a cognizable offense across all three jurisdictions.

Beyond formal judicial proceedings, the regime has moved to shutter opposition political formations entirely. Authorities have initiated proceedings to dissolve Solidarité africaine pour la démocratie et l’indépendance (SADI), the political party of exiled veteran radical Oumar Mariko, who in November 2025 accused the regime of “committing war crimes in the north” . Religious leaders who have spoken critically, including Chouala Bayaya Haidara and Bandiougou Traoré, have been arrested . The Tabital Pulaaku association, representing the Peulh (Fulani) community, has reported an “upsurge in the killing by ‘traditional hunters’ of Peulhs—often accused of sympathy for jihadism—in central Mali,” documenting ethnically-targeted violence occurring with apparent impunity .

This composite picture—cybercrime prosecutions of political opponents, dissolution proceedings against critical parties, arrest of religious critics, and documented communal violence—reveals a regime that has moved decisively from the transitional discourse of restoring civilian rule to the sustained practice of authoritarian governance.

2. Regional Rupture: From ECOWAS Membership to AES Vanguard

2.1 The Withdrawal Declaration and Its Implications

On January 28, 2026, Malian national television announced the country’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States “without delay,” simultaneously with identically-worded declarations by Burkina Faso and Niger . This coordinated announcement, following the September 2023 formation of the Alliance of Sahel States, represents the most serious institutional crisis in ECOWAS’s forty-seven-year history.

The legal status of this withdrawal remains ambiguous. ECOWAS treaty provisions require one year’s written notice of intent to withdraw, a formality the juntas have not observed. However, as Africa Confidential notes, since the AES regimes have already “dismissed as ‘illegitimate’ the sanctions Ecowas imposed on them for deposing civilian governments, these formalities will mean little” . The question is therefore political rather than juridical: can ECOWAS compel continued membership of states determined to exit, and what are the practical consequences of non-recognition of withdrawal?

The AES position was articulated definitively by Nigerien General Abdourahamane Tiani at the alliance’s inaugural summit in Niamey on February 6, 2026: “Our people have irrevocably turned their backs on ECOWAS” . The characterization of withdrawal as “irrevocable” forecloses compromise formulations such as associate membership or partial participation. Tiani further called for the AES to become a “community far removed from the stranglehold of foreign powers”—explicitly framing the new bloc as an anti-imperialist alternative to ECOWAS, which the juntas accuse of being “manipulated by former colonial ruler France” .

2.2 Economic Consequences of Regional Disintegration

The economic consequences of ECOWAS withdrawal for Mali are potentially catastrophic, though their full manifestation depends on the response of neighboring states and regional institutions. Africa Confidential enumerates several channels of impact: “the imposition of tariffs on Sahelian exports of livestock to coastal markets, disruption of the cross-border supply of power to Sahelian states, and bureaucratic headaches for the Hausa trading barons in northern Nigeria and southern Niger” .

Most consequentially, withdrawal jeopardizes the rights and economic security of the “millions of Sahelians who work in the more prosperous economies to the south, such as Ivorian cocoa and coffee plantations, or ports, markets and construction sites from Dakar to Lagos” . Malian labor migration to coastal states constitutes a structural feature of West African political economy, providing remittance income that sustains rural households and absorbing labor market pressure that domestic formal employment cannot accommodate. Disruption of these migration flows—whether through formal visa requirements, informal harassment, or retaliatory expulsions—would impose severe welfare costs on Malian households.

The WAEMU dimension adds further complexity. On February 11, 2026, the WAEMU Court delivered a ruling striking down the 2022 economic blockade imposed on Mali, a decision characterized as a “powerful legal warning” that “exposes the economic costs of politicising trade within a region that has long championed integration as a pathway to growth” . This ruling, while legally favorable to Mali, highlights the institutional incoherence between ECOWAS and WAEMU—the former pursuing political conditionality through economic sanctions, the latter adjudicating such sanctions as violations of economic treaty obligations. Economist Modibo Mao Makalou of Bamako identifies “the lack of policy coherence between regional institutions” as a “deeper structural issue” that the Mali sanctions controversy has exposed .

2.3 The Alliance of Sahel States: Counter-Bloc Formation

The AES represents an attempt to construct an alternative regional architecture that combines collective security guarantees, political solidarity, and economic coordination independent of ECOWAS frameworks. Formally established by the prime ministers of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in Niamey on September 16, 2023, the alliance has progressively articulated an institutional identity .

The security dimension is paramount. Tiani’s assertion at the February 2026 summit that “the AES is the only effective sub-regional grouping in the fight against terrorism” directly contests ECOWAS’s legitimacy claims while positioning the alliance as a operational necessity . This framing resonates with domestic audiences in all three countries, where ECOWAS sanctions were perceived as punishing populations for the actions of juntas while contributing nothing to the existential security threat posed by jihadist insurgencies.

However, the AES confronts substantial obstacles to becoming a functional economic community. The three member states share structural characteristics—landlocked or semi-landlocked geography, undiversified commodity exports, dependence on coastal neighbors for transit trade, and severe fiscal constraints—that limit their capacity for intra-regional economic complementarity. Unlike ECOWAS, which integrates coastal economies with Sahelian hinterlands in asymmetric but mutually beneficial exchange, AES members are competitors in similar export sectors and dependent on the same transit corridors. The alliance’s viability as an economic counter-pole therefore remains unproven.

3. The Political Economy of Transition: Growth, Fragility, and Structural Constraints

3.1 Macroeconomic Aggregates: The Lithium Dividend and Its Limits

The World Bank’s January 2026 country context memorandum presents a cautiously optimistic macroeconomic assessment. GDP growth is projected to reach 4.9 percent in 2025 (1.9 percent per capita), with acceleration to an average of 5 percent over 2026-2027. This growth is “supported by the start of lithium production, services, and agriculture,” with industrial recovery “primarily driven by mineral extraction and cotton ginning” offsetting a 4 percent decline in gold export volumes attributable to “temporary mine closures linked to tax disputes” .

The commencement of lithium production constitutes the most significant structural development in Mali’s mining sector since gold. As global energy transition accelerates demand for battery minerals, Mali is positioned to benefit from lithium price dynamics and investment flows. However, the World Bank’s formulation—“supported by the start of lithium production”—indicates that this remains an emergent rather than consolidated source of growth. The scale of lithium reserves, production timelines, and fiscal terms remain subjects of negotiation between government and investors.

The current account deficit is estimated to widen to 6.5 percent of GDP in 2025, reflecting both import requirements for mining investment and terms-of-trade pressures . Inflation is projected to rise beyond the WAEMU ceiling of 3 percent, driven by “conflict-related crop losses, disruptions in food distribution and climate shocks” . These inflationary pressures have direct welfare consequences in a country where food constitutes a substantial share of household consumption.

3.2 Fiscal Constraints and Public Debt

The fiscal deficit is expected to widen to 3.3 percent of GDP in 2025, reflecting “lower-than-anticipated mining revenues” . While tax and customs measures have supported revenue mobilization, spending pressures have risen from “public recruitment and flood-related spending” . The public wage bill presents a particular medium-term sustainability challenge: a youthful population demanding public sector employment, a regime that requires loyalist incorporation, and a constrained revenue base create structural tension between political stabilization and fiscal consolidation.

Public debt is estimated at 52.9 percent of GDP in 2025, with the World Bank assessing “the risk of debt distress remains moderate” . This WAEMU-level debt ratio, while not immediately alarming, requires contextualization. Mali’s borrowing capacity is constrained by its regional isolation and the deteriorating relationship with traditional bilateral and multilateral partners. The “moderate” risk assessment precedes the full manifestation of ECOWAS withdrawal consequences; debt dynamics could deteriorate rapidly if regional trade disruptions reduce fiscal revenues or if remittance flows contract.

3.3 The Energy Crisis as Developmental Bottleneck

The World Bank’s identification of “resolution of the energy crisis” as a short-term priority indicates the severity of electricity supply constraints . Mali’s energy deficit manifests in high costs, frequent outages, and dependence on imported fossil fuels—a particularly acute vulnerability for a landlocked state subject to regional supply disruptions.

The Sanankoroba solar power plant, under construction with a targeted capacity of 200 megawatts, represents the most significant infrastructure initiative addressing this constraint. Once completed, the facility is expected to provide “10% of the country’s electricity, reducing its reliance on imported fossil fuels” . This project, part of the broader Vision 2063 framework, illustrates both the potential and limitations of current energy strategy: significant relative contribution (10 percent of national supply) but still insufficient to close the gap between demand and reliable supply.

3.4 Vision 2063: Ambitious Planning in Constrained Circumstances

In September 2025, the Malian government presented its long-term development framework, “Vision Mali 2063,” to technical and financial partners. The plan is supported by a ten-year operational phase, the National Strategy for Emergence and Sustainable Development (SNEDD 2024-2033), with total estimated cost of 61,232.1 billion CFA francs and additional financing needs of 1,139 billion CFA .

The strategy’s 11 key projects focus on infrastructure, energy, and agriculture, with primary goals including poverty reduction and improved access to basic services including education, health, and clean water. Economic diversification beyond mining—through promotion of agriculture, renewable energy, and local industrialization—constitutes the core structural transformation objective .

The reception by technical and financial partners was characterized by “praise for the initiative” coupled with insistence on “rigorous monitoring, transparent management, and a focus on mobilizing internal resources” . This calibrated response—acknowledging planning effort while emphasizing implementation risks—reflects donor skepticism regarding the junta’s governance record. The financing gap remains substantial, and the deterioration in relations with traditional partners following ECOWAS withdrawal will further complicate resource mobilization.

4. Geopolitical Repositioning: The Russia Pivot and the Rupture with France

4.1 The Wagner Succession and Deepening Russia Alignment

Mali’s geopolitical repositioning since 2021 has been characterized by progressive rupture with France and corresponding alignment with the Russian Federation. The operational dimension of this alignment has centered on the Wagner Group, which has maintained approximately 1,000 mercenaries in Mali since 2021 . Following the August 2023 death of Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Kremlin has moved to integrate Wagner’s African operations into state structures through the formation of “Africa Corps,” a “new military/commercial formation designed to seamlessly merge all the functions of the Wagner Group with the Russian state” .

The Russia-Mali relationship extends beyond security contracting to high-level political coordination. The June 14, 2023, telephone call between Goïta and President Vladimir Putin—after which Goïta pronounced himself “very satisfied”—preceded Mali’s demand for the departure of the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA, a position Russia supported through its UN Security Council veto power . This sequence illustrates the operationalization of Russia-Mali coordination: Bamako identifies objectives, Moscow provides diplomatic cover, Wagner/Africa Corps provides ground-force supplementation.

4.2 The Rupture with France: From Troop Withdrawal to Comprehensive Antagonism

The France-Mali relationship has deteriorated from the 2022 withdrawal of French Operation Barkhane forces to comprehensive political antagonism. The expulsion of the French ambassador in January 2022, following perceived derogatory comments about transitional authorities, exemplified this deterioration . Malian authorities and demonstrators alike articulate suspicion that “France is behind the sanctions and accuse the French government of hiding behind ECOWAS to settle its accounts with the Malian authorities” .

This suspicion is grounded in historical experience. Malian analysts note that French forces, despite a decade-long presence, “have not actually improved security. On the contrary, violence against civilians is increasing” . More pointedly, Malian authorities and publics perceive French military strategy as having actively undermined Malian state sovereignty, particularly through the 2013 decision to permit separatist armed groups to control the northern town of Kidal “while prohibiting the Malian army and the Malian state from regaining control of it for several years, without explanation” .

The January 14, 2022, demonstrations in Bamako—in which tens of thousands of Malians chanted slogans including “We don’t want France, nor ECOWAS”—signaled the consolidation of a popular nationalism that rejects both former colonial power and regional institutions perceived as French instruments . This popular sentiment provides the junta with domestic legitimacy that partially compensates for its international isolation and governance deficits.

4.3 The CFA Franc Controversy and Monetary Sovereignty

The Mali-France-ECOWAS dispute has revived critical analysis of the CFA franc monetary system. As documented by the Centre Tricontinental, the 2022 sanctions regime—including the freezing of Mali’s assets at the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO)—exemplified the structural vulnerability inherent in CFA membership . The BCEAO, while nominally a regional institution, remains subject to French treasury oversight under cooperation agreements dating to the 1960s.

Critics argue that the “CFA system is a repressive tool used by France to direct the political trajectory of the CFA countries according to its interests” . The precedent of 2010-2011 Côte d’Ivoire, when France and the BCEAO “blocked the Ivorian government’s access to its BCEAO accounts” to force Laurent Gbagbo from power, substantiates claims that monetary instruments can be weaponized for political objectives . For Mali’s junta and its supporters, the sanctions experience confirms that CFA membership is incompatible with full sovereignty.

This critique, while originating with radical analysts, has entered mainstream political discourse in Mali and the broader Sahel. The demand for “withdrawal of France from the management of the CFA franc and the abolition of its legal and administrative control over the currency” has moved from activist circles into the program of the AES states . Whether this oppositional stance translates into concrete movement toward monetary sovereignty—including the long-discussed creation of an ECOWAS single currency or more radical exit from the CFA zone—remains uncertain, but the political demand is now firmly established.

4.4 Competing External Influences: Morocco, Algeria, and the United States

The Sahel geopolitical space is increasingly contested among multiple external actors beyond France and Russia. Morocco has moved strategically to position itself as an alternative partner for the AES states. The December 2025 talks in Marrakech, which included Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad, focused on “deepening trade ties and exploring their use of its Atlantic ports, which would circumvent Ecowas sanctions” . This initiative offers AES states an alternative transit corridor to the southward routes dependent on ECOWAS cooperation.

Algeria, Morocco’s regional rival, has historically positioned itself as a key Sahel mediator. However, relations with Mali have deteriorated sharply following Algiers’ reception of Tuareg armed group leaders expelled from Kidal and President Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s audience with Imam Mahmoud Dicko, a prominent junta critic . The Goïta regime’s “furious” declaration that Mali is “not Algeria’s back yard” and its unilateral abrogation of the 2015 Algiers peace accord signal a decisive rupture in this bilateral relationship .

The United States confronts a strategic dilemma in the Sahel. Washington has “stepped up its diplomacy, with Secretary of State Antony Blinken visiting Abidjan and Abuja to provide reassurance of Washington’s continuing strong support of Ecowas” . Simultaneously, the US seeks to preserve its drone bases in Niger, requiring accommodation with the Tiani junta that complicates unequivocal endorsement of ECOWAS maximalism. The reported “internal debate in the US administration” over continuing non-lethal security support for Burkina Faso’s gendarmerie illustrates the tension between counter-terrorism objectives and democracy promotion .

5. Regional Status: Vanguard of Counter-Bloc Formation or Precipice of Collapse?

5.1 The Sovereignty Dividend and Its Limits

Mali’s regional status in February 2026 is defined by its leadership of an emergent counter-bloc that has successfully challenged ECOWAS hegemony and articulated an alternative vision of West African regionalism grounded in anti-imperialist nationalism, strategic diversification, and security prioritization. This positioning has generated a “sovereignty dividend”: domestic legitimacy derived from standing up to former colonial powers and regional institutions perceived as illegitimate; operational autonomy to pursue security partnerships with Russia unfettered by Western human rights conditionality; and regional influence as the senior partner in the AES trilateral.

However, this sovereignty dividend confronts inherent limits. Popular mobilization against France and ECOWAS, while genuine and sustained, is not infinitely elastic. The same populations that cheered the expulsion of French forces and celebrated the capture of Kidal also confront food insecurity, electricity shortages, and employment deficits. The regime’s legitimacy, initially derived from rupture with the old order, increasingly requires demonstration that sovereignty produces tangible improvements in lived experience.

5.2 The Governance Deficit and Developmental Credibility

The junta’s governance record presents a fundamental contradiction to its developmental ambitions. The Vision 2063 framework projects a trajectory toward an “emerging Mali” by 2063, with intermediate targets for poverty reduction, infrastructure development, and economic diversification . Yet the short-term governance agenda consists of party suspension, opposition prosecution, and civic space contraction—measures that undermine the institutional foundations of sustainable development.

This contradiction is not merely normative but operational. The technical and financial partners whose resources are essential to financing the 61,232.1 billion CFA franc SNEDD strategy have signaled that “rigorous monitoring, transparent management, and a focus on mobilizing internal resources” are prerequisites for continued engagement . The deterioration in relations with traditional donors, compounded by ECOWAS withdrawal, narrows the circle of potential development partners. Russia, while a significant security partner, has not demonstrated capacity or willingness to finance transformational infrastructure investment at scale.

5.3 The Security Paradox: Tactical Gains, Strategic Vulnerability

The junta’s most demonstrable achievement has been the recapture of Kidal from Tuareg separatist forces in November 2025, a military operation conducted jointly by the Malian armed forces and Wagner Group personnel . This victory, reversing a decade of de facto separatist control, generated substantial domestic popularity and validated the regime’s assertion that sovereignty requires forceful territorial reclamation.

Yet this tactical victory coexists with persistent strategic vulnerability. The World Bank’s identification of “conflict-related crop losses” as an inflation driver indicates that jihadist violence continues to disrupt rural economies . The Tabital Pulaaku association’s documentation of ethnically-targeted killings in central Mali suggests that counter-insurgency operations may be exacerbating communal tensions rather than resolving them . The regime’s declaration that it has defeated terrorism is premature; the more accurate characterization is that territorial control has been reconfigured, with some areas reclaimed from separatists while other areas remain contested with jihadist groups.

5.4 The Economic Horizon: Lithium Promise and Structural Constraints

The commencement of lithium production provides a genuine basis for medium-term growth optimism. As global electric vehicle adoption accelerates and battery supply chains diversify, lithium-producing countries are positioned for sustained demand growth. Mali’s lithium reserves, while not yet fully delineated, appear substantial enough to support multi-decade extraction.

However, lithium does not resolve Mali’s structural economic constraints. Mining is capital-intensive, not labor-intensive; employment generation will be limited. Fiscal revenues from lithium depend on negotiated tax terms, which in turn depend on government bargaining capacity relative to international investors. The “tax disputes” that temporarily closed gold mines in 2025 indicate that relations between the state and extractive sector investors are not frictionless . Moreover, the energy crisis that constrains broader industrialization also affects mining sector competitiveness; the Sanankoroba solar plant, while significant, will not fully resolve this constraint.

Conclusion

Mali in February 2026 occupies a position of singular contradiction in the West African regional order. Politically, it has achieved a degree of sovereign autonomy unimaginable a decade ago: French forces are expelled, Russian partners provide security supplementation, regional institutions are defied with apparent impunity, and the national territory—with the notable exception of jihadist-contested zones—is under nominal state control. The regime has consolidated authoritarian control through constitutional revision, party suspension, and judicial repression, establishing institutional mechanisms for prolonged military stewardship.

Economically, the picture is more ambiguous. Macroeconomic aggregates show positive momentum, driven by lithium production and post-conflict rebound. The Vision 2063 framework articulates a coherent long-term development strategy. Yet these positive indicators coexist with severe structural constraints: energy crisis, undiversified export base, fiscal pressures from public wage bills, and the incipient costs of regional isolation. The financing gap for the SNEDD ten-year strategy remains substantial, and the rupture with traditional development partners has not been offset by alternative resource mobilization.

Regionally, Mali has transformed from a recipient of ECOWAS mediation and sanction into the vanguard of counter-bloc formation. The Alliance of Sahel States, while not yet a functional economic community, has successfully asserted an alternative political pole and forced ECOWAS into reactive posture. This repositioning carries genuine appeal for populations across the Sahel who perceive regional institutions as unresponsive to their security concerns and captured by French interests.

The durability of this regional status depends on three variables. First, the security trajectory: whether the regime can consolidate its territorial gains and demonstrate progress toward the elimination of jihadist threat, or whether violence re-intensifies. Second, the economic delivery: whether lithium revenues and infrastructure investments translate into tangible improvements in electricity access, food security, and employment—or whether the gap between sovereignty rhetoric and developmental reality widens. Third, the succession question: how the regime manages the transition from Goïta’s personalized leadership to whatever institutional arrangement follows, and whether the suspension of political parties proves temporary or permanent.

Mali has successfully disrupted the West African status quo and asserted an alternative model of regional engagement grounded in sovereignty assertion and strategic diversification. Whether this model can evolve from successful negation to positive construction—from rupture to development—remains the central unanswered question of Mali’s contemporary trajectory.

References

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