Abstract

This paper examines Uganda’s contemporary economic and political status within the East African Community, revealing a nation at a strategic inflection point characterized by ambitious economic transformation targets alongside persistent governance tensions and deepening regional realignments. Economically, Uganda projects accelerating growth from 6.3 percent in FY2024/25 to a remarkable 10.4 percent in FY2026/27—a trajectory designed to achieve upper middle-income status through aggressive value addition, infrastructure investment, and private-sector-led development. The economy’s size is projected to reach Shs 290.2 trillion ($76.7 billion) by FY2026/27, supported by IMF recognition of sustained transformation and strategic partnerships including a $850 million Saudi-backed coffee industrialization initiative . Politically, Uganda presents a bifurcated landscape: institutional continuity and ruling party consolidation evident in opposition figures joining the National Resistance Movement, juxtaposed with opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi’s condemnation from exile of a “violent military dictatorship” and calls for international sanctions . Regionally, Uganda has executed a strategic pivot, deepening infrastructure-driven integration with Tanzania through the East African Crude Oil Pipeline and associated corridor development, while managing complex relations with Rwanda and asserting leadership in Great Lakes security through operations against the Allied Democratic Forces and peace efforts in Somalia and eastern Congo . This paper argues that Uganda’s status embodies the contradictions of a state pursuing simultaneous transformation, integration, and stabilization—ambitions that generate both opportunities and tensions as the country positions itself as an indispensable regional actor while navigating domestic political challenges and competing external expectations.

1. Introduction

Uganda occupies a distinctive and increasingly central position in East Africa. As one of the founding members of the East African Community’s revival in 2000, the country has long participated in regional institutions while maintaining independent foreign policy and security postures. With a population approaching 50 million and an economy projected to nearly double in size within five years, Uganda’s weight in regional affairs continues to grow . Yet this material expansion occurs alongside persistent questions about political openness, human rights, and the character of a governance system entering its fifth decade under the same leadership.

In early 2026, Uganda presents a study in strategic ambition and structural tension. Economically, the government projects transformative growth sufficient to lift the country to upper middle-income status, with the 2026/27 budget framework outlining a path to “double GDP every five years” through sustained investment in agriculture, tourism, minerals, oil and gas, and human capital development . International partners, including the International Monetary Fund, acknowledge consistent growth while urging continued reforms to widen the tax base and strengthen domestic revenue mobilization . A $850 million Saudi partnership to establish the Luwero Coffee Park exemplifies the value-addition strategy central to this vision .

Politically, the landscape is sharply contested. The ruling National Resistance Movement continues to consolidate its position, with opposition figures crossing the floor and joining the party . Yet opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi, addressing the Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy from hiding, describes a “violent military dictatorship” and reveals that his wife and children have fled the country . These competing narratives—of stable consolidation versus authoritarian repression—frame international perceptions of Uganda’s governance trajectory.

Regionally, Uganda has executed a strategic recalibration. Deepening integration with Tanzania through the East African Crude Oil Pipeline and associated infrastructure positions Tanzania as Uganda’s primary economic gateway, creating structural interdependence that analysts describe as “selective integration” . Simultaneously, Uganda asserts leadership in regional security, hosting peace processes for eastern Congo, contributing troops to Somalia, and warning against unilateral actions that could destabilize the Great Lakes region . Relations with Rwanda remain tense, with the border at Katuna closed and mutual accusations of supporting dissident groups .

This paper investigates Uganda’s multifaceted status through comprehensive analysis of its economic transformation agenda, political dynamics, and regional positioning. Section two examines macroeconomic performance, fiscal strategy, and the value-addition imperative. Section three analyzes the political landscape, including ruling party consolidation, opposition exile, and governance tensions. Section four considers Uganda’s regional strategy—the Tanzania partnership, relations with Rwanda and other neighbors, and security leadership. Section five addresses structural challenges and the path to sustained transformation.

2. The Economic Dimension: Accelerating Growth and Structural Transformation

2.1 Macroeconomic Performance and Growth Trajectory

Uganda’s economic performance in 2025-2026 reflects sustained expansion from a stable base, with ambitious targets for acceleration. According to the Ministry of Finance, the economy registered GDP growth of 6.3 percent in FY2024/25, with projected growth for FY2025/2026 estimated between 6.5 and 7.0 percent . These figures represent respectable expansion by regional standards, though below Rwanda’s projected 8.7 percent or South Sudan’s volatile rebound.

The transformative ambition becomes evident in projections for FY2026/27, when the economy is expected to grow by 10.4 percent, increasing the size of the economy to Shs 290.2 trillion (equivalent to $76.7 billion) . This acceleration would represent one of the highest growth rates in Africa and position Uganda to achieve its goal of reaching upper middle-income status within the planned timeframe.

Minister of State for General Duties Henry Musasizi captured this ambition in his January 2026 budget briefing, declaring that “Uganda stands at its most promising economic inflection point,” with FY2026/27 representing “Uganda’s opportunity to fast-track the qualitative leap to upper middle-income status” . The strategic framework, articulated through the National Development Plan IV, aims to “expand the size of the economy tenfold before 2040, starting by doubling GDP every five years” .

President Museveni, in February 2026 discussions with IMF African Department Director Abebe Aemro Selassie, expressed confidence in continued expansion: “The economy is doing well and will do even better,” noting that Uganda’s economy is “currently growing at approximately seven percent annually and is poised for further expansion, particularly through value addition” .

2.2 Fiscal Policy and Budget Strategy

The preliminary resource envelope for FY2026/27 amounts to Shs 69.399 trillion, representing a reduction from Shs 72.376 trillion in the current FY2025/26 . This contraction reflects overall resource constraints rather than diminished ambition, with the government emphasizing efficiency and expenditure rationalization as complementary strategies to revenue expansion.

Critical priorities identified for the coming fiscal year include:

• Stamping out budget games that breed corruption: Acknowledging that leakage undermines both fiscal sustainability and public trust

• Closing leakages in routine expenditures such as transfers to schools, health centres and the payroll: Recognizing that service delivery improvements require ensuring resources reach intended beneficiaries

• Improving liquidity (cash) management and sovereign credit ratings: Positioning Uganda for favorable access to international capital markets

• Diversifying sources of development finance including tapping into innovative financing: Reducing dependence on traditional development partners and concessional lending

The budget allocation to the Finance Ministry for FY2026/27 is estimated at Shs 2,693.40 billion, down from Shs 2,796.77 billion, primarily “on account of the overall reduction in the total resource envelope” . Treasury Operations receive Shs 28,264.652 billion, directed toward “ensuring timely processing of debt service payments, redemptions and other statutory obligations” —signaling commitment to maintaining creditworthiness despite fiscal pressures.

2.3 IMF Engagement and Tax Base Expansion

President Museveni’s February 2026 meeting with IMF African Department Director Abebe Aemro Selassie reaffirmed the continuing partnership between Uganda and the IMF in “advancing macroeconomic stability and sustainable development” . Selassie commended Uganda for “its sustained economic transformation, describing it as one of the few African countries that have maintained consistent growth over time” .

The discussions centered on strategies to “widen the country’s tax base” —a priority for sustaining growth while maintaining fiscal discipline. President Museveni emphasized that “wealth creation should be driven by the private sector rather than state-owned enterprises,” reiterating Uganda’s long-standing position that “the main economy should be in the hands of the private sector” .

Key elements of the private-sector enabling environment discussed included:

• Addressing production costs such as electricity, internet, and fuel (particularly jet fuel)

• Developing affordable railway transport and pipeline infrastructure

• Ensuring affordable financing through institutions like the Uganda Development Bank to support manufacturers and farmers

• Expanding market access, both internal and external

President Museveni called on the IMF to focus on “supporting measures that lower the cost of doing business and strengthen productive sectors, especially manufacturing and agriculture” .

2.4 The Value-Addition Imperative: Coffee Industrialization

The value-addition strategy central to Uganda’s transformation agenda finds concrete expression in the Luwero Coffee Park project, discussed during President Museveni’s February 2026 meeting with a Saudi investment delegation . The project, part of the Value at Source Coffee Project (VASP) spearheaded by Nonda Coffee, “seeks to transition Uganda from exporting raw coffee beans to exporting branded, high-value finished coffee products” .

The proposed Luwero Coffee Park represents an integrated industrial complex with substantial economic implications:

• Annual processing capacity: 42,000 metric tons of coffee

• Targeted annual revenue: $850 million

• Direct job creation: Approximately 1,500 positions

• Indirect employment: About 3,000 jobs in logistics, retail, and auxiliary services

• Farmer integration: Over 100,000 coffee farming households integrated into a structured supply chain

The facility will handle the full coffee value chain including “cleaning, grading, roasting, grinding, soluble and specialty coffee production, packaging, branding, and export of finished products” . This comprehensive approach aims to capture value currently lost to overseas processors and marketers.

The Saudi partnership positions Uganda to access Middle East markets, described as “one of the fastest-growing coffee consumption regions globally” . President Museveni noted that while Uganda and Saudi Arabia “have maintained cordial relations for many years, both countries had not fully maximised available economic opportunities” . The engagement “marked a significant step toward strengthening Uganda–Saudi Arabia economic relations and advancing mutually beneficial partnerships in strategic sectors” .

2.5 Strategic Minerals and Oil Sector Development

Beyond coffee, Uganda’s transformation strategy encompasses oil and gas development and strategic minerals. The East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP), scheduled to begin operations in July 2026, represents the centerpiece of hydrocarbon monetization . The 1,443-kilometer pipeline will transport Ugandan crude oil from Hoima to the Tanzanian port of Tanga, creating substantial revenue streams and catalyzing associated infrastructure development.

The pipeline has already generated momentum for broader energy cooperation, including discussions regarding natural gas pipelines to support Ugandan industrialization and refined petroleum product transport . This infrastructure web creates what analysts describe as “mutual dependence”—Uganda secures predictable access to global markets while Tanzania benefits from sustained port usage, logistics services, and fiscal revenues .

Strategic minerals, including those essential for the global energy transition, represent additional diversification opportunities. While specific project details remain under development, the government’s emphasis on value addition applies across extractive sectors.

3. The Political Dimension: Consolidation, Contestation, and Governance Tensions

3.1 Ruling Party Consolidation and Opposition Realignment

Uganda’s political landscape in early 2026 reflects continued consolidation of ruling party dominance alongside realignment within opposition ranks. The February 2026 decision by Mawokota South MP Yusuf Nsibambi, formerly of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), to join the National Resistance Movement (NRM) exemplifies this trend .

Nsibambi, who was defeated in the recent general elections, framed his decision in terms of political realism and constructive engagement: “I am joining NRM willingly, and I am ready to be given any task by the NRM party. I do accept the results from the general elections. I have joined the struggle for peace” . His arrival at NRM headquarters, “dressed in a yellow shirt (NRM party colour),” was received by Secretary General Richard Todwong and Speaker of Parliament Anita Among, who also serves as Second Vice Chairperson .

The move followed a February 6, 2026 meeting between Nsibambi and President Museveni at State House, Entebbe—the fourth such engagement within a year, with previous meetings on January 3 and February 5 . The delegation of 17 individuals “drawn from across the political spectrum” discussed issues including the release of political prisoners, with Nsibambi noting that over 1,000 people were arrested during the recently concluded elections .

According to Nsibambi, President Museveni “indicated he had no objection to the release of suspects who had not yet been charged,” while those facing court cases would need to await legal processes, after which “the President could invoke constitutional pardon or amnesty” . The condition attached—that detainees “would first have to seek forgiveness and promise not to engage in riotous acts” —reflects the government’s framing of political unrest as criminal behavior requiring repentance.

Nsibambi’s explanation for engagement acknowledged the asymmetry of political competition: “political reality shows that the opposition stands little chance of uprooting a regime that has, in his view, tightened its grip on dissenting voices” . This realism, rather than ideological alignment, appears to motivate cross-party movement.

3.2 Opposition in Exile: Kyagulanyi’s Geneva Address

In stark contrast to Nsibambi’s integration into ruling party structures, opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu addressed the Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy from hiding, delivering a searing indictment of Uganda’s political system .

Kyagulanyi, who has been “in hiding since January 16, 2026,” described Uganda as “a nation of 50 million people living under a violent military dictatorship for 40 years” . He alleged that “President Museveni and his son who serves as the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba, orchestrated widespread violence and election rigging” .

Specific allegations included:

• Arrests, abductions, and internet shutdowns during the presidential campaign

• Manipulation so extreme that “even at Museveni’s polling station, he got more votes than registered voters”

• A military raid on his home, torture of family members, and public humiliation of his wife

• His wife Barbie and their children forced to “flee the country for fear of their lives”

Kyagulanyi urged the international community to “impose sanctions and not recognize Museveni’s government,” while emphasizing that “Ugandans are not seeking pity” but rather international action against “Museveni, his son, and all human rights violators” .

The National Unity Platform (NUP) did not petition the courts to challenge the election outcome —a decision consistent with Kyagulanyi’s framing of the system as irredeemably compromised rather than amenable to legal remedy.

3.3 Competing Narratives and International Perception

The simultaneous presentation of Nsibambi’s voluntary alignment with the ruling party and Kyagulanyi’s condemnation from exile captures the polarized character of Uganda’s political discourse. For government supporters and external partners prioritizing stability, the Nsibambi narrative demonstrates that opposition figures can engage constructively, find accommodation within the system, and work toward incremental improvements. For human rights advocates and opposition supporters, Kyagulanyi’s testimony confirms that the system responds to dissent with repression rather than dialogue.

International perception navigates between these poles. The Geneva Summit, which “provides a platform for human rights activists and former political prisoners to testify about their personal struggles for democracy and freedom,” represents a constituency deeply skeptical of Uganda’s governance trajectory . Conversely, the IMF’s sustained engagement and commendation of Uganda’s economic transformation reflects continued confidence among financial institutions .

The diplomatic signals carry material consequences. As investment analysis increasingly recognizes, “diplomatic signals influence credit committees, insurance premiums and sovereign risk assessments” . How international actors weigh economic performance against governance concerns will influence Uganda’s access to capital and terms of engagement.

3.4 Security Sector and Civil-Military Relations

President Museveni’s meeting with the IMF director included explicit discussion of security’s role in development. He emphasized that “sustainable economic transformation must be anchored on strong defence and security structures,” adding: “Africa has been messed up by doing things which are not critical. If you are not dealing with defence and security and you have scout movements and you call them an army, what are you doing? Without a strong army, there is no development” .

This framing—security as prerequisite for development—has been consistent throughout Museveni’s tenure and reflects both genuine threats (the Lord’s Resistance Army historically, Allied Democratic Forces currently) and the political reality that military institutions exercise substantial influence in Uganda’s governance architecture.

The prominence of General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, mentioned in Kyagulanyi’s critique as co-orchestrator of election violence, reflects the institutionalization of the military’s political role . Succession questions, while not openly debated, inform both domestic political calculations and external engagement strategies.

4. Regional Positioning: Strategic Pivot and Security Leadership

4.1 The Tanzania Partnership: Selective Integration in Practice

Uganda’s deepening partnership with Tanzania represents the most significant development in its regional strategy, signaling what analysts describe as “a deliberate strategy to reposition Uganda as Tanzania’s closest and most strategically integrated partner within the East African Community” .

The February 2026 talks between Presidents Museveni and Samia Suluhu Hassan produced agreements spanning energy infrastructure, transport connectivity, trade facilitation, and security cooperation—”a comprehensive package” that moves beyond project-based collaboration to structural integration .

According to University of Iringa economist Samson Rutashobya, “When heads of state sit down to align oil pipelines, gas transport, ports and railways, they are not just discussing infrastructure. They are defining the future structure of their economies and who their most important partners will be” . Uganda’s growing reliance on Tanzanian infrastructure “is gradually embedding Tanzania into Uganda’s export and supply chains,” creating “mutual dependence” that benefits both economies .

Dr. Donald Mmari of research body Repoa observed that the talks reflect “the use of economic diplomacy to reshape regional partnerships,” with EACOP having “created a foundation of trust” now expanding “into other strategic sectors” including gas pipelines, refined petroleum transport, and rail connectivity .

Dr. Isack Safari of St Augustine University of Tanzania framed the partnership as exemplifying “selective, deeper integration within the EAC”—moving faster and deeper with willing partners while broader multilateral processes proceed at varying speeds. “Infrastructure creates permanence,” he noted: “Once ports, pipelines and railways are aligned, cooperation becomes structural rather than optional” .

Political scientist Dr. Paul Loisulie added that “when countries become economically intertwined, political coordination becomes necessary,” with security cooperation “naturally intensifying as economic ties deepen” .

4.2 Uganda-Rwanda Relations: Persistent Tensions

In contrast to the deepening partnership with Tanzania, Uganda’s relations with Rwanda remain strained. The border at Katuna remains closed, with both countries exchanging accusations that threaten regional stability and economic integration .

Leader of Opposition Betty Aol Ochan called on the East African Community to intervene, warning that “if conflicts are not resolved within EAC, there cannot be integration as envisaged by the East African Community States” . She identified core grievances: “The EAC does not allow a partner State to host one’s rebels and Rwanda is complaining that Uganda is hosting their rebels” .

Rwanda’s Foreign Minister Dr. Richard Sezibera has cautioned Rwandans against traveling to Uganda “because of safety concerns,” accusing Uganda of “illegally detaining Rwandan nationals” . President Kagame has accused Uganda of “failing to take action against dissidents in Uganda who are planning to destabilise Rwanda” . Uganda’s Foreign Affairs Minister Sam Kutesa, in turn, has accused Rwanda of “imposing non-tariff barriers to trade between the two countries” .

The economic impact extends beyond bilateral trade. “A number of businesses have been affected by the closure of the border,” Ochan noted . For a region committed to economic integration, such disruptions undermine the fundamental premise that closer ties benefit all parties.

Previous mediation efforts, including engagement by Kenya’s then-President Uhuru Kenyatta, have failed to produce lasting resolution . The underlying issues—rebel group presence, mutual suspicion, competing security doctrines—remain unresolved.

4.3 Great Lakes Security Leadership

Uganda asserts leadership in regional security through multiple channels. Minister of State for Regional Affairs John Mulimba, in February 2026 discussions with Sweden’s Ambassador Maria Hakansson (whose country assumed chairmanship of the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes in January 2026), “cautioned against unilateral actions by states in addressing conflicts in the Great Lakes region, saying peace and security can only be achieved through coordinated regional and international efforts” .

Mulimba’s warning that “what we are seeing today is a result of states taking unilateral decisions”  implicitly referenced actions by Rwanda in eastern Congo, though without naming specific actors. He “stressed the need to harmonise regional initiatives with international processes, citing the Doha and Washington frameworks as important platforms for strengthening peace and security efforts in the region” .

Uganda’s hosting of the 12th High-Level Regional Oversight Mechanism (ROM) Summit at State House Entebbe in December 2025 “reaffirmed Uganda’s commitment to peace, security and cooperation in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the wider Great Lakes region” . Uganda “continues to support efforts aimed at harmonising contentious issues among regional actors” .

On Somalia, Mulimba “called for a needs-based approach and what he described as ‘greater realism’ by the international community in assessing the causes of insecurity and instability in the region,” arguing that “security deployments should be informed by conditions on the ground rather than predetermined timelines” .

Operation Shujaa, the joint Uganda–DRC military operation against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, will similarly “be determined using a needs-based approach” . This positioning asserts Uganda’s prerogative to define security commitments based on operational requirements rather than external timelines.

4.4 Relations with Other Regional and Global Partners

Beyond the Tanzania partnership and Great Lakes security engagement, Uganda maintains active relationships with other regional and global actors. The Saudi investment cooperation described earlier reflects deepening engagement with Gulf states, positioning Uganda to access Middle Eastern markets and capital .

With the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda maintains both security cooperation (Operation Shujaa) and economic engagement, though tensions persist over eastern Congo’s instability and accusations of Ugandan support for various armed groups—accusations Uganda denies.

With Kenya, relations remain functional though competitive, as both countries vie for regional trade dominance and influence within EAC institutions.

With the African Union and United Nations, Uganda engages through peacekeeping contributions (troops in Somalia) and participation in continental governance mechanisms.

5. Strategic Implications and the Path Forward

5.1 Economic Transformation: Promise and Prerequisites

Uganda’s economic projections—10.4 percent growth in FY2026/27, doubling GDP every five years, reaching upper middle-income status—represent extraordinary ambition. Achieving these targets requires fulfillment of several prerequisites:

Value Addition at Scale: The Luwero Coffee Park model must be replicated across other sectors—minerals, agriculture, tourism—to capture value currently lost to overseas processors. This requires sustained investment, technical capacity, and market access .

Infrastructure Completion: EACOP and associated transport corridors must be completed and maintained, with railway connectivity extended to reduce transport costs and improve competitiveness .

Fiscal Sustainability: Expenditure rationalization and tax base expansion must continue, ensuring that growth translates into revenue sufficient to finance public services and debt obligations .

Investment Climate: Regulatory predictability, transparent tax administration, and credible dispute resolution mechanisms must be institutionalized to attract and retain long-term strategic investors .

5.2 Political Stability: Consolidation and Its Costs

The ruling party’s consolidation strategy has produced electoral dominance and institutional continuity but at apparent cost to political pluralism and international reputation. The contrast between Nsibambi’s accommodation and Kyagulanyi’s exile captures the trade-offs inherent in this approach .

The sustainability of managed dominance depends on:

• Economic performance sufficient to generate opportunities that legitimize the political order

• Security management that prevents unrest from escalating

• International tolerance of governance practices that fall short of democratic ideals

• Succession management that avoids disruptive power struggles

Each of these dependencies carries uncertainty. Economic shocks, security lapses, shifts in international engagement, or succession crises could destabilize the equilibrium.

5.3 Regional Integration: Selective Deepening and Its Implications

Uganda’s strategic pivot toward Tanzania represents a pragmatic response to the limitations of broad multilateral integration. By deepening ties with a trusted partner, Uganda secures predictable access to global markets while maintaining flexibility in other relationships .

This approach carries implications for:

• EAC Cohesion: Selective integration may accelerate cooperation among willing members but could also create tensions with those left behind or pursuing alternative partnerships

• Rwanda Relations: Deeper Tanzania ties may further isolate Rwanda, potentially exacerbating existing tensions

• Infrastructure Investment: Concentration on the Tanzania corridor may divert resources from alternative routes through Kenya or other neighbors

• Diplomatic Alignment: Economic interdependence with Tanzania creates incentives for political coordination, potentially shaping Uganda’s positions on regional issues

5.4 Security Leadership: Regional Public Goods and National Interests

Uganda’s security activism—in Somalia, eastern Congo, and regional peace processes—provides regional public goods while serving national interests. Operations against the ADF protect Ugandan territory from cross-border attacks. Engagement in Somalia builds international credibility. Leadership in Great Lakes diplomacy positions Uganda as an indispensable partner .

The challenge lies in balancing these roles with:

• Resource constraints that limit sustained military commitments

• Accusations of ulterior motives (resource extraction, political influence) that accompany military presence

• Tensions with neighbors who may perceive Ugandan activism as interference

• International expectations regarding human rights and civilian protection

6. Conclusion: The Indispensable Partner

Uganda’s economic and political status in East Africa reflects the strategic positioning of a state that has become indispensable to regional integration, security, and economic transformation while navigating profound domestic governance tensions. Economically, the country projects transformative growth sufficient to achieve upper middle-income status, anchored in value addition, infrastructure investment, and private-sector-led development. International partners, including the IMF, acknowledge consistent performance while urging continued reforms .

Politically, Uganda presents a bifurcated landscape. Ruling party consolidation continues, with opposition figures joining the NRM and engaging constructively within existing structures . Yet opposition leader Kyagulanyi’s condemnation from exile—describing a “violent military dictatorship” and calling for international sanctions—captures the depth of alienation among those who view the system as irredeemably compromised .

Regionally, Uganda has executed a strategic pivot, deepening infrastructure-driven integration with Tanzania through EACOP and associated corridor development, while managing complex relations with Rwanda and asserting leadership in Great Lakes security . This positioning reflects recognition that while broad multilateral integration proceeds slowly, willing partners can move faster and deeper together.

Several conclusions emerge for understanding Uganda’s status:

First, economic transformation provides the foundation for regional influence. Uganda’s projected growth, if realized, will increase its weight in regional institutions and its attractiveness as a partner for external actors.

Second, political governance remains contested. The coexistence of institutional continuity and opposition exile captures tensions that international partners must navigate in their engagement.

Third, selective integration with Tanzania represents a strategic choice with long-term implications. By embedding itself in Tanzanian infrastructure, Uganda creates structural interdependence that will shape its regional position for decades.

Fourth, security leadership entails both opportunities and burdens. Uganda’s activism in Somalia and eastern Congo builds credibility but requires sustained commitment and carries reputational risks.

For East Africa, Uganda represents an indispensable partner—too large to ignore, too strategically positioned to bypass, and too engaged in regional security to exclude. The country’s trajectory will influence not only its own development but the character of regional integration and the prospects for stability across the Great Lakes.

The path forward requires managing the tensions inherent in simultaneous transformation, consolidation, and integration. Economic growth must translate into inclusive development that legitimizes the political order. Regional partnerships must be managed to avoid alienating neighbors. Security commitments must be sustained without overstretching resources. And domestic political space must accommodate dissent sufficient to prevent alienation from hardening into insurgency.

Uganda has strategic ambition and material resources to pursue it. The test ahead lies in whether this ambition can be realized without generating contradictions that undermine the very stability on which transformation depends.

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