Abstract

This paper examines South Sudan’s contemporary economic and political status within the East African Community, revealing a nation defined by profound contradictions between immense resource wealth and chronic institutional fragility. Economically, South Sudan presents the most dramatic statistical paradox in Africa: the world’s fastest-growing economy in 2026 at 48.8 percent GDP expansion, following one of the deepest contractions of 23.8 percent in 2025. This volatility reflects near-total dependence on oil, which constitutes over 90 percent of government revenue, while non-oil sectors remain nascent. Current production of approximately 95,000 barrels per day—down from a pre-conflict capacity of 300,000—highlights the sector’s vulnerability to regional instability and infrastructure disruption. Politically, South Sudan navigates multiple existential challenges simultaneously: an escalating security crisis with over 400 ceasefire violations recorded in six months, a fragile 2018 peace agreement facing implementation paralysis, and a looming December 2026 election that regional guarantors insist must proceed despite inadequate preparation. As the country positions itself for the EAC Secretary-General rotational slot, its $15.5 million in unpaid community dues exposes tensions between diplomatic ambition and financial commitment. This paper argues that South Sudan’s status embodies the fundamental tension between extractive wealth and state-building failure: oil revenues sustain a war economy while institutional collapse prevents resource wealth from translating into development, raising profound questions about whether regional integration can anchor stabilization or merely accommodate fragility.

1. Introduction

South Sudan occupies an anomalous position in East Africa. As the continent’s youngest nation, born through a 2011 independence referendum that culminated decades of struggle, it entered statehood with immense promise—vast oil reserves, fertile agricultural land, and the solidarity of a liberation movement. Fifteen years later, that promise remains largely unrealized. The country that could produce 300,000 barrels of oil per day now manages barely one-third of that capacity . The nation that celebrated self-determination has endured two civil wars, persistent political violence, and what analysts describe as a “dangerous cycle of fragility, conflict, displacement, and deepening poverty” .

Yet in early 2026, South Sudan simultaneously commands attention as the world’s fastest-growing economy—projected by the World Bank to expand by 48.8 percent . This striking statistic captures the essence of the South Sudanese paradox: extreme volatility driven by oil production swings, not structural transformation. The projected rebound follows a catastrophic 23.8 percent contraction in 2025, when damage to the export pipeline through Sudan brought oil revenues to a standstill .

This paper investigates the contradictions that define South Sudan’s status in East Africa. Drawing on economic data, political analysis, diplomatic records, and security assessments, it examines a nation navigating simultaneous pressures: an escalating security crisis with over 400 ceasefire violations between August 2025 and January 2026 , a constitutional timeline demanding December elections , and deepening regional integration including the prospective assumption of the EAC Secretary-General role . The analysis proceeds in three parts. Section two examines South Sudan’s economic structure, the oil-dependent growth model, fiscal crisis, and climate vulnerabilities. Section three analyzes the multi-dimensional political crisis—security deterioration, peace agreement implementation paralysis, electoral timeline pressures, and the humanitarian catastrophe. Section four considers South Sudan’s regional integration trajectory, including the EAC Secretary-General succession debate, infrastructure corridor development, and the geopolitical dimensions of its relationship with Sudan and the broader region.

2. The Economic Dimension: Oil Volatility and Structural Fragility

2.1 The Growth Paradox: World’s Fastest Economy from Africa’s Deepest Contraction

South Sudan’s economic performance in 2026 presents the most dramatic statistical reversal in contemporary African economics. According to World Bank analysis, the country is projected to record GDP growth of 48.8 percent in 2026, following a catastrophic contraction of 23.8 percent in 2025 . This projected growth would be the highest in sub-Saharan Africa, outpacing even Rwanda’s robust 7.2 percent expansion.

The International Monetary Fund offers a slightly more conservative estimate, projecting growth of approximately 27.2 percent in 2025, driven largely by the restoration of oil exports . Both projections, however, tell the same essential story: South Sudan’s economic trajectory is determined almost entirely by fluctuations in petroleum production, not by fundamental improvements in productive capacity or institutional development.

The World Bank’s explanation captures this dynamic precisely: “In South Sudan, a substantial recovery in 2026 following five years of contraction is expected to be supported by a normalisation of activity and the resumption of oil exports” . The phrasing—”normalisation of activity”—is telling. The projected growth represents a return toward previous production levels, not the creation of new economic value through investment, innovation, or productivity gains.

2.2 Oil Dependence and Production Realities

South Sudan’s economy is defined by extreme oil dependence. Crude oil typically accounts for more than 90 percent of government revenue and a large share of GDP . This concentration creates existential vulnerability: when oil flows, the state functions; when oil stops, the state collapses.

Current production stands at approximately 95,000 barrels per day, according to Finance Minister Barnaba Bak Chol’s February 2026 budget presentation . This represents a significant recovery from the disruptions of 2024-2025, when damage to the export pipeline running through Sudan—compounded by regional conflict—triggered a sharp contraction . Repairs to the pipeline and renewed efforts to ramp up production are now underpinning the expected rebound.

However, current output remains dramatically below historical capacity. South Sudan could produce up to 300,000 barrels per day before the civil war erupted in 2013, and subsequent conflict in 2016 further damaged infrastructure and disrupted operations . Production had declined to approximately 149,000 barrels by 2023 before the outbreak of fighting between the Sudanese Army Forces and Rapid Support Forces forced additional cuts .

The 95,000 barrels per day figure thus represents just 31.7 percent of pre-conflict capacity, illustrating the cumulative impact of nearly a decade of production disruption, infrastructure deterioration, and investment starvation. Each conflict episode—whether domestic civil war or regional Sudanese conflict—further degrades production capacity, making full recovery increasingly difficult.

2.3 Fiscal Crisis and Public Financial Management Collapse

The World Bank’s February 2026 Public Finance Review documents in stark detail how volatility and eroded fiscal space have been driven by extreme oil dependence, combined with underinvestment, disruptions to Sudan’s export infrastructure, and governance gaps .

Key findings from the review reveal a fiscal system in profound distress:

Spending Composition Distortion: Public spending averages 35 percent of GDP but is skewed toward administration, security, and rule of law, while health, education, and social protection remain severely underfunded . This allocation reflects the priorities of a war economy rather than a development state, with security expenditures consuming resources that might otherwise support human capital development.

Public Wage Collapse: Salary arrears are widespread, and average public wages have collapsed in real terms . Civil servants and security personnel alike face extended periods without payment, undermining morale, encouraging corruption, and pushing households into poverty. The human consequences extend beyond state employees to the families and communities dependent on public sector incomes.

Transparency Deficit: The absence of transparent revenue management compounds these challenges. The Public Finance Review specifically recommends committing to transferring all oil revenues into the National Revenue Fund and publishing quarterly oil data to rebuild confidence in resource management . This recommendation implicitly acknowledges that current practices lack the transparency necessary for accountability or effective planning.

Debt Vulnerability: The review urges refraining from entering any new non-concessional or oil-backed borrowing agreements that jeopardize future revenues . This warning reflects concern that desperate fiscal circumstances may drive the government toward predatory lending arrangements that mortgage future production at punitive rates.

Honorable Benjamin Ayali Koyongwa, Undersecretary of Planning in the Ministry of Finance, acknowledged these challenges in response to the World Bank findings, stating: “As a government, we are committed to taking immediate steps by accelerating the implementation of Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms and strengthening budget discipline. These reforms are essential to rebuild trust, stabilize our economy, and deliver basic services to our people” .

2.4 Inflation and Exchange Rate Pressures

Despite the projected oil-driven rebound, macroeconomic stability remains elusive. Inflation is currently estimated at 15 percent, according to Minister Chol, largely due to persistent exchange rate pressures and supply-side constraints affecting the economy .

This elevated inflation rate—while dramatically lower than the hyperinflation experienced during peak conflict periods—nevertheless imposes significant hardship on households. For a population already facing extreme food insecurity, rising prices for basic commodities compound vulnerability.

The government’s fiscal policy for the 2026/2027 financial year is “deliberately designed to be anti-inflationary,” according to Minister Chol, “aimed at stabilizing prices and supporting macroeconomic recovery amid ongoing economic challenges” . This stated intention reflects recognition that inflation control must accompany production recovery if economic gains are to translate into improved living standards.

2.5 Non-Oil Sector Performance

Amid the overwhelming focus on petroleum, the non-oil sector continues to struggle. Minister Chol projects non-oil sector growth of 5.5 percent, reflecting “gradual improvements across other productive sectors of the economy” .

This modest growth projection, while positive in direction, underscores the limited diversification of South Sudan’s economy. Agriculture—which holds immense potential given the country’s fertile soils and water resources—remains largely subsistence-based, with minimal commercial development. Manufacturing is virtually non-existent. Services are concentrated in the informal sector and a small formal economy centered on government expenditure and humanitarian operations.

The 5.5 percent non-oil growth figure, if achieved, would represent genuine progress but from an extraordinarily low base. Translating this modest expansion into meaningful employment and income generation for South Sudan’s predominantly rural population requires investments in infrastructure, market access, and productive capacity that remain constrained by fiscal limitations and ongoing insecurity.

2.6 Climate Vulnerability and Adaptation Imperatives

The World Bank’s Country Climate and Development Report, released alongside the Public Finance Review, adds another dimension to South Sudan’s economic challenges. The report warns that “devastating floods, rising temperatures, and increasingly frequent climate shocks are already reshaping livelihoods, weakening the economy, and heightening social vulnerability—particularly for women, pastoralists, and resource-dependent communities” .

Extreme flooding, now considered the “new normal,” covers up to one-quarter of the country in severe years, cutting communities off from essential services, damaging livelihoods, and contributing to widespread food insecurity . These floods are not merely humanitarian emergencies but economic catastrophes that destroy crops, kill livestock, and disrupt trade routes.

The report projects that South Sudan will require over $13 billion in climate adaptation investments by 2050 . Climate change is also projected to cause substantial declines in labor productivity, livestock revenues, and crop yields, including an 8 percent reduction in sorghum yields by 2050 under hotter climate conditions .

These climate projections intersect with economic fragility in dangerous ways. A country already struggling to finance basic public services faces the prospect of massive additional adaptation costs. Communities already vulnerable to food insecurity face declining agricultural productivity. A pastoralist economy already disrupted by conflict faces further pressures on grazing lands and water sources.

The World Bank identifies five priorities for climate action:

1. Strengthen flood management, including early warning systems, community-led preparedness, and infrastructure rehabilitation

2. Invest in climate-resilient agriculture and livestock systems

3. Scale up off-grid renewable energy solutions

4. Accelerate governance and public financial management reforms

5. Enable responsible, sustainable use of natural capital including forests, fisheries, and wildlife

These priorities, while technically sound, require implementation capacity and financial resources that remain severely constrained.

3. The Political Dimension: Multi-Front Crisis

3.1 Security Deterioration and Ceasefire Violations

As South Sudan’s economy shows signs of oil-driven recovery, its security situation continues to deteriorate. The Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) reported on February 19, 2026, that insecurity has expanded across multiple states—Upper Nile, Unity, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Jonglei—with “serious implications for the implementation of Chapter II of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement” .

The statistics are alarming. Between August 2025 and January 2026 alone, CTSAMVM recorded 407 alleged violations of the permanent ceasefire . While direct hostilities between signatory parties had been relatively limited prior to clashes between the SSPDF and the White Army in Nasir, Upper Nile State, in March 2025, allegations of violations have since become “frequent and widespread” .

Particularly concerning are reported aerial bombardments of alleged civilian areas in parts of Jonglei and Upper Nile, which “may constitute serious violations of both the permanent ceasefire and international humanitarian law” . If confirmed, such actions would represent not merely ceasefire breaches but potential war crimes.

The human toll extends beyond direct violence. “Incidents affecting civilians and humanitarian actors have also been documented, including ambushes, abductions, looting, attacks on markets, and alleged extrajudicial killings” . These patterns of violence create an environment of pervasive insecurity that prevents communities from resuming normal life, accessing services, or engaging in productive economic activity.

CTSAMVM Chairperson Teshome Anagawe Ayana offered a sobering assessment: “The peace process is under significant strain. The R-ARCSS remains the only viable framework for sustainable peace in South Sudan. Agreements are upheld not by signatures, but through consistent compliance” .

3.2 Peace Agreement Implementation Paralysis

The 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) remains, as President Ramaphosa emphasized, “the paramount legal instrument which all parties must comply and by which progress in South Sudan will be measured” . Yet eight years after its signing, “implementation of the Revitalised Agreement remains slow” .

This implementation paralysis reflects multiple failures:

Security Arrangements Delay: The unification of forces—a core provision of the agreement—has proceeded at a glacial pace. The CTSAMVM chair specifically noted that “the durability of the agreement ultimately depends on accelerated implementation of the security arrangements, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, unified force deployment, strengthened accountability mechanisms, and sustained political will” .

Governance Provisions Unfulfilled: Key governance reforms envisioned in the agreement remain incomplete, including transitional justice mechanisms, constitutional review, and institutional restructuring.

Political Will Deficit: As President Ramaphosa noted, while regional leaders “will do our utmost best to assist South Sudan to transition to a peaceful and stable country, it is up to the leaders of South Sudan to act in good faith and demonstrate a willingness to undertake an inclusive process that fosters national cohesion, solidarity and reconciliation” .

3.3 The December 2026 Election Crucible

The political calendar now centers on December 2026, when South Sudan is expected to hold elections—the first since independence. The African Union’s Ad-hoc High Level Committee for South Sudan (C5) Plus Summit, convened in February 2026 on the sidelines of the AU Assembly, delivered a clear message: “Elections must go on and not be postponed. There should be no more postponements, and the elections must be held on a free and fair basis including all the people who are eligible to participate in those elections” .

Yet the summit simultaneously acknowledged the immense challenges facing this timeline. President Ramaphosa outlined essential preconditions: “a conducive political and security environment is vital. Violence and conflict at any stage will undermine confidence and derail the process.” He further emphasized that “political processes, such as the national dialogue and legal processes, must be genuinely inclusive” and “bring together all signatories and stakeholders to the Revitalisation Agreement so that decisions reflect broad ownership, credibility and legitimacy” .

These conditions are far from satisfied. The security environment, as documented by CTSAMVM, is deteriorating rather than improving. Political dialogue remains constrained by ongoing tensions between President Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar. The legal and institutional framework for elections—including voter registration, constituency delimitation, and electoral commission capacity—remains underdeveloped.

The summit recommended that “the Government of South Sudan needs to agree, identify and implement minimum standards, which should be put in place for people of South Sudan to exercise their democratic right to vote and choose their leaders” . The phrase “minimum standards” implicitly acknowledges that ideal conditions may be unattainable, but some baseline must be established.

Critically, the summit also called for “a release of political detainees, and this should also include people like the Vice President Riek Machar who is going through various processes of a legal nature” . This reference to Machar’s legal situation highlights the tensions within the transitional government and the risk that political maneuvering could further destabilize the pre-election period.

3.4 The Kiir-Machar Dynamic

At the heart of South Sudan’s political crisis remains the relationship between President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar—the two protagonists of the 2013-2018 civil war, now uneasy partners in a transitional government neither fully trusts.

The C5 summit’s call for Machar’s release from legal processes suggests that tensions between the two leaders continue to fester beneath the surface of formal power-sharing arrangements. The relationship, always fragile, faces intensifying pressure as elections approach and the zero-sum logic of electoral competition supplants the consensual framework of transitional governance.

President Kiir, for his part, expressed commitment to the roadmap “and that they would want us to assist them and support them without undue interference” . This qualification—”without undue interference”—reflects the sensitivity of sovereignty and the tension between external support and internal ownership that characterizes all international engagement with South Sudan.

3.5 Humanitarian Catastrophe

The cumulative impact of economic fragility, insecurity, and climate shocks manifests in what international agencies describe as a humanitarian catastrophe. Over 4.8 million Somalis will require humanitarian assistance, according to one analyst—a figure that, while specific to Somalia, reflects similar dynamics affecting South Sudan .

Disruptions along key river transport trade corridors have “intensified economic hardship and food insecurity” . Movement restrictions arising from insecurity and illegal checkpoints continue to impede humanitarian access and civilian livelihoods, “undermining the stabilization objectives of the peace agreement” .

The humanitarian situation is not merely a consequence of the political crisis but a driver of continued instability. Hungry populations are vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups. Displaced communities create new tensions in host areas. Desperation fuels illicit economies and criminal violence.

4. Regional Integration: Ambition, Arrears, and Infrastructure

4.1 EAC Membership and the Secretary-General Dilemma

South Sudan’s status within the East African Community reached a critical juncture in early 2026 as the bloc prepared to appoint its next Secretary-General. By tradition, the position rotates among member states, and following Kenya’s five-year tenure, the post should go to a South Sudanese national .

However, this diplomatic expectation confronts an uncomfortable financial reality: South Sudan is among the EAC’s worst defaulters on financial contributions. According to The EastAfrican, South Sudan’s arrears stand at approximately $15.5 million, although some officials suggest the figure could be as high as $26 million when accumulated over several years .

The context is a broader EAC financial crisis. Each partner state is required to contribute about $7 million annually to finance Community activities. By the end of the 2024/25 financial year, four countries—the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, South Sudan, and Somalia—were in arrears. DRC owed over $20 million, Burundi approximately $17 million . The approved budget was $109 million, with partner states expected to raise roughly half. Delayed remittances have left the bloc increasingly dependent on external donors, “undermining its vision of self-reliance” .

The financial crisis has tangible operational impacts. Institutions in Arusha are struggling, with many employees reportedly going four to five months without salaries . The East African Court of Justice has a backlog of approximately 350 cases due to funding shortfalls .

EALA members have voiced strong concerns. Paul Musamali, Uganda’s representative, warned: “The Community itself is facing a financial crisis, and one of the reasons is the failure by some partner states to remit their contributions, and South Sudan is one of them” . Veronica Babirye Kadogo, another Ugandan representative, posed pointed questions: “If we are to appoint a Secretary General from a partner state that is not contributing, it will be a dilemma. First of all, where will the funds to pay this Secretary General come from? Secondly, how will that SG mobilise funds from other partner states when his own country is not paying?” .

The diplomatic complexities extend beyond finances. Uganda, which some have suggested as an alternative candidate, maintains deep ties with South Sudan. As Musamali noted: “Uganda has a very good bilateral relationship with South Sudan. If we now take over the position, it could be interpreted as participating in a fight against them” . South Sudan remains one of Uganda’s largest export markets, and Ugandan troops have been deployed in South Sudan for over a decade at President Kiir’s invitation .

As East African leaders prepare to convene on March 7, 2026, they face a difficult choice: uphold the rotational principle and allow South Sudan to nominate the next Secretary-General, or prioritize financial compliance in a bid to rescue the bloc from deepening instability .

4.2 Infrastructure Corridor Development: The DESSU Agreement

Amid the EAC financial tensions, South Sudan has pursued alternative regional integration pathways. On February 15, 2026, the country signed a formal agreement establishing the Djibouti-Ethiopia-South Sudan-Uganda (DESSU) Corridor Authority .

The agreement, signed in Djibouti by Transport Minister Rizik Zakaria Hassan, establishes a strategic multi-modal transport initiative designed to streamline logistics, lower transit costs, and enhance connectivity among the four member states . For landlocked South Sudan, the corridor promises improved access to global trade routes through the Port of Djibouti.

The framework provides for:

• A unified regulatory framework to coordinate transport and trade policies

• Joint investment in road, rail, and digital infrastructure linking member states

• Measures to reduce trade barriers and facilitate seamless movement of goods and services

Notably, the Djibouti side pledged technical support to assist South Sudan in developing its river and inland water ports as part of broader cooperation in transport infrastructure and logistics management . This technical assistance component addresses South Sudan’s capacity constraints in infrastructure development and management.

The DESSU initiative represents a pragmatic approach to regional integration—focusing on tangible connectivity improvements rather than institutional processes. It also diversifies South Sudan’s regional relationships beyond the EAC framework, creating alternative pathways to markets and partnerships.

4.3 Sudan Relations: The Pipeline Vulnerability

Any discussion of South Sudan’s regional position must address the existential reality of its relationship with Sudan. As a landlocked country, South Sudan depends entirely on Sudanese infrastructure—the export pipeline running through Sudan to Port Sudan on the Red Sea—to monetize its oil wealth.

This dependence creates extreme vulnerability. Damage to the pipeline during the ongoing Sudanese civil war triggered the sharp 2024-2025 contraction that preceded the projected 2026 rebound . Each outbreak of conflict in Sudan directly threatens South Sudan’s economic lifeline.

The relationship is further complicated by outstanding issues from the 2011 separation, including final status of disputed border areas, debt allocation, and arrangements for oil transit fees. While these technical issues remain unresolved, they create ongoing friction and uncertainty.

The Sudanese conflict also generates spillover effects beyond the oil sector. Refugees cross borders, arms flows increase, and armed groups find sanctuary. The instability that has plagued Sudan since April 2023 thus represents a direct threat to South Sudan’s fragile stability.

4.4 Geopolitical Positioning

South Sudan’s geopolitical significance derives primarily from its oil resources and its location in a volatile region. External powers engage through multiple channels:

China remains the dominant actor in the oil sector, with Chinese national oil companies operating major fields and holding significant stakes in production. Beijing’s interest in stable oil flows gives it leverage and motivation for engagement.

Uganda maintains the most significant military presence, with troops deployed for over a decade at President Kiir’s invitation . This presence reflects Uganda’s security interests in preventing South Sudanese conflict from spilling across their border and its economic interests in maintaining a friendly government and export market.

The United States and European Union provide significant humanitarian and development assistance while pressing for political reform and accountability. However, competing global priorities have reduced the intensity of engagement compared to the independence period.

The African Union and IGAD remain the primary multilateral frameworks for peace process support, as evidenced by the February 2026 C5 summit. However, the proliferation of mediating bodies—the summit was a joint effort between the UN, IGAD, and EAC—risks coordination challenges .

5. Conclusion: The Extractive Trap

South Sudan’s economic and political status in East Africa embodies the fundamental contradictions of the extractive state. Economically, the country demonstrates how resource wealth, absent institutional development, produces volatility rather than prosperity. The projected 48.8 percent growth for 2026 is not a sign of successful development but a statistical artifact of recovery from catastrophe—a reminder that when your entire economy depends on a single commodity, production fluctuations translate directly into GDP swings.

The economic fundamentals remain deeply fragile. Oil dependence at over 90 percent of revenue leaves the state perpetually vulnerable to price shocks, pipeline disruptions, and reserve depletion. The non-oil sector, projected to grow at 5.5 percent, remains too small to absorb the population or generate alternative revenue. Inflation at 15 percent erodes purchasing power. Public financial management failures undermine service delivery and corrode trust.

Politically, South Sudan navigates multiple crises simultaneously. The security situation is deteriorating, with over 400 ceasefire violations in six months and violence spreading across multiple states. The 2018 peace agreement faces implementation paralysis eight years after signing. The December 2026 election timeline creates pressure that the fragile transitional arrangements may not withstand. The Kiir-Machar relationship, always tense, faces the ultimate test of competitive politics.

Regionally, South Sudan pursues integration while struggling to meet basic commitments. The EAC Secretary-General succession debate exposes tensions between diplomatic tradition and financial accountability. The DESSU corridor initiative offers a pragmatic alternative pathway to connectivity. But the fundamental vulnerability—dependence on Sudanese pipeline infrastructure—remains unresolved and largely unaddressed.

Several conclusions emerge for understanding South Sudan’s status:

First, the extractive economy cannot finance the developmental state. Oil revenues sufficient to sustain a war economy prove inadequate for building schools, clinics, and roads—the infrastructure of nationhood. The World Bank’s Public Finance Review documents how spending is skewed toward security while health and education remain starved .

Second, political settlements built on power-sharing without institutional transformation remain inherently unstable. The 2018 agreement brought Kiir and Machar into the same government but did not resolve the underlying competition for power and resources. As elections approach, the zero-sum logic reasserts itself.

Third, regional integration offers potential benefits but cannot substitute for domestic political consensus. EAC membership provides frameworks and peer pressure, but cannot compel the implementation of security arrangements or the conduct of inclusive dialogue.

Fourth, climate change is not a future threat but a present reality reshaping livelihoods and amplifying vulnerability. The floods that now cover one-quarter of the country in severe years are not anomalies but the “new normal” .

The path forward requires recognizing that South Sudan’s crises are interconnected. Security deterioration undermines economic recovery. Fiscal collapse prevents service delivery, fueling grievances. Political tensions block security sector reform. Climate shocks compound all other vulnerabilities.

President Ramaphosa’s words at the February 2026 summit capture both the urgency and the challenge: “The choices made in the coming months will determine whether South Sudan moves towards durable peace or back into cycles of instability” . Those choices—about elections, about security arrangements, about inclusive dialogue—rest ultimately with South Sudan’s leaders.

For East Africa, South Sudan represents both a member state and a warning. The EAC now includes the world’s fastest-growing economy and one of its most fragile states. The community’s ability to support South Sudan’s stabilization—through technical assistance, peer pressure, and collective security frameworks—will test whether regional integration can help resolve the deepest challenges of state fragility. The alternative—accommodating instability while maintaining the appearance of integration—would diminish the community’s relevance and leave South Sudan to navigate its crises alone.

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