Corporate Governance and Development

Corporate Governance and Development

Corporate Governance and Development

Corporate Governance and Development

Definitions of corporate governance vary widely. They tend to fall into two categories. The first set of definitions concerns itself with a set of behavioral patterns: that is, the actual behavior of corporations, in terms of such measures as performance, efficiency, growth, financial structure, and treatment of shareholders and other stakeholders. The second set concerns itself with the normative framework: that is, the rules under which firms are operating—with the rules coming from such sources as the legal system, the judicial system, financial markets, and factor (labor) markets.

For studies of single countries or firms within a country, the first type of definition is the most logical choice. It considers such matters as how boards of directors operate, the role of executive compensation in determining firm performance, the relationship between labor policies and firm performance, and the role of multiple shareholders. For comparative studies, the second type of definition is the more logical one. It investigates how differences in the normative framework affect the behavioral patterns of firms, investors, and others.

In a comparative review, the question arises how broadly to define the framework for corporate governance. Under a narrow definition, the focus would be only on the rules in capital markets governing equity investments in publicly listed firms. This would include listing requirements, insider dealing arrangements, disclosure and accounting rules, and protections of minority shareholder rights. Under a definition more specific to the provision of finance, the focus would be on how outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders. This would include minority right protections and the strength of creditor rights, as reflected in collateral and bankruptcy laws. It could also include such issues as the composition and the rights of the executive directors and the ability to pursue class-action suits. This definition is close to the one advanced by economists Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny in their seminal 1997 review: “Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (1997, p. 737). This definition can be expanded to define corporate governance as being concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders.

A somewhat broader definition would be to define corporate governance as a set of mechanisms through which firms operate when ownership is separated from management. This is close to the definition used by Sir Adrian Cadbury, head of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom: “Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury Committee, 1992, introduction). An even broader definition is to define a governance system as “the complex set of constraints that shape the ex post bargaining over the quasi rents generated by the firm” (Zingales, 1998, p. 499). This definition focuses on the division of claims and can be somewhat expanded to define corporate governance as the complex set of constraints that determine the quasi-rents (profits) generated by the firm in the course of relationships and shape the ex post bargaining over them. This definition refers to both the determination of value-added by firms and the allocation of it among stakeholders that have relationships with the firm. It can be read to refer to a set of rules, as well as to institutions. Corresponding to this broad definition, the objective of a good corporate governance framework would be to maximize the contribution of firms to the overall economy—that is, including all stakeholders. Under this definition, corporate governance would include the relationship between shareholders, creditors, and corporations; between financial markets, institutions, and corporations; and between employees and corporations. Corporate governance would also encompass the issue of corporate social responsibility, including such aspects as the dealings of the firm with respect to culture and the environment.

When analyzing corporate governance in a cross-country perspective, the question arises whether the framework extends to rules or institutions. Here, two views have been advanced. One is the view that the framework is determined by rules, and related to that, to markets and outsiders. This has been considered a view prevailing in or applying to Anglo-Saxon countries. In much of the rest of the world, institutions—specifically banks and insiders—are thought to determine the actual corporate governance framework. In reality, both institutions and rules matter, and the distinction, while often used, can be misleading. Moreover, both institutions and rules evolve over time.

Institutions do not arise in a vacuum and are affected by the rules in the country or the world. Similarly, laws and rules are affected by the country’s institutional setup. In the end, both institutions and rules are endogenous to other factors and conditions in the country. Among these, ownership structures and the role of the state matter for the evolution of institutions and rules through the political economy process. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 738) take a dynamic perspective by stating: “Corporate governance mechanisms are economic and legal institutions that can be altered through political process.”  This dynamic aspect is very relevant in a cross-country review, but has received much less attention from researchers to date. When considering both institutions and rules, it is easy to become bewildered by the scope of institutions and rules that can be thought to matter. An easier way to ask the question of what corporate governance means is to take the functional approach. This approach recognizes that financial services come in many forms, but that if the services are unbundled, most, if not all, key elements are similar (Bodie and Merton 1995). This line of analysis of the functions—rather than the specific products provided by financial institutions, and markets—has distinguished six types of functions: pooling resources and subdividing shares; transferring resources across time and space; managing risk; generating and providing information; dealing with incentive problems; and resolving competing claims on the wealth generated by the corporation. One can define corporate governance as the range of institutions and policies that are involved in these functions as they relate to corporations. Both markets and institutions will, for example, affect the way the corporate governance function of generating and providing high-quality and transparent information is performed.

From “Corporate Governance and Development by Stijn Claessens /World Bank”

 

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