Managing Global Managers

Organizations thrive to increase revenues and profits by expanding their businesses into the global markets and capitalizing on the opportunities that globalization offers. In this paper, the author aims to present an overview of global managers that are tasked to achieve organizations’ global business objectives face. The overview includes definition,challenges, management concepts, and skills development.

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Keywords: global managers, dimensions of national culture, management concepts, tasks, challenges, skills

Heterogeneous and Homogeneous Management Teams

This paper focuses on multicultural senior management teams and homogeneous team of senior executives selected locally. The author starts with brief descriptions of globalcompanies, responsibilities of senior managers, and global companies’ goals.Through literature review, the author identifies and employs the impacts of teams’ heterogeneity and homogeneity particularly in relation to the cultural backgrounds of teams’ members to appraise the advantages global companies could gain from multicultural senior management team as well as from homogeneous team of senior executives selected locally.

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Keywords: global companies, multicultural, heterogeneous, homogeneous, senior executives, advantages global companies gain

Impact of Culture on Motivation

People around the world have different perceptions of work and have different levels of motivation and commitment to perform work-related tasks. In order to achieveorganizations’ set goals, managers have the task of motivating employees to give their best performance. Motivation has been a topic of research for decades and several theories have been developed suggesting motivation factors and ways these factors could be implemented in employee motivation strategies. Download the e-book.


Keywords: motivation, motivation theories, motivating people, cultural dimensions, hierarchy of needs, Germany, China, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Nigeria

Executive Compensations to Address Agency Problems and the Income Strategy Impact

The general acceptance of the agency theory and the parallel research on executive compensation began in the early 1980s.



It was the evolution of the modern corporation with ownership separation and control that undermined the agency theory. Early studies in this area focused on documenting the relation between CEO pay and firm performance. The discussion of executive compensation must proceed with the fundamental agency problem afflicting management decision-making as background. According to Jensen and Murphy (1990), there is an optimal contracting approach, which is when boards use design compensation schemes to maximize shareholder value with efficient incentives (Jensen and Murphy 1990). Continue reading

Acquisition Values and Optimal Financial (In)Flexibility

According to conventional wisdom, the deep pockets of an incumbent serve to deter entry. In large part, the theoretical basis for this view rests upon the model of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), who show that an unconstrained cashrich incumbent can fund predation in order to increase the likelihood of venture capitalists terminating projects. Continue reading